The basic distinction made in this volume compares “economic value”, expressed in monetary terms, to “cultural value”, reflecting cultural, aesthetic and artistic significance.nThis paper makes a different distinction which is rarely made explicit but which is ofncentral importance to the decision process in cultural policy. On the one hand, “value” is attached to the economic effects of cultural activities: When cultural values are created, economic activity is bolstered. The increase of commercial actitivities induced is measured by the so-called “impact effect”. On the other hand, the value of culture isnreflected in the increased utility going to consumers and non-consumers of a particularncultural activity. This type of value is measured by “willingness to pay studies”. I argue that these two values dominate cultural policy but they capture totally different aspects and are proferred by different kinds of communities.
We report on several experiments on the optimal allocation of ownership rights. The experiments confirm the property rights approach by showing that the ownership structure affects relationship-specific investments and that subjects attain the most efficient ownership allocation despite starting from different initial conditions. However, in contrast to the property rights approach, the most efficient ownership structure is joint ownership. These results are neither consistent with the self-interest model nor with models that assume that all people behave fairly, but they can be explained by the theory of inequity aversion that focuses on the interaction between selfish and fair players.
Die ZfKE ist die führende wissenschaftliche Zeitschrift zu den Themen KMU und Entrepreneurship in deutscher Sprache. Seit dem erstmaligen Erscheinen im Jahr 1952, damals noch unter dem Titel "Internationales Gewerbearchiv", hat sich die ZfKE konsequent weiterentwickelt: Die Zeitschrift arbeitet heute mit einem doppelblind-Gutachtersystem und einem international renommierten Gutachtergremium. Alle Beiträge sind auch online verfügbar.
Seit mehr als zehn Jahren - seit die Nachfrage nach Ausbildungsplätzen das Ausbildungsplatzangebot kontinuierlich übersteigt - ist ein wachsendes Interesse an der Ökonomie der Berufsausbildung zu verzeichnen, und es sind zahlreiche theoretische und empirische Arbeiten zu diesem Thema erschienen. Da Deutschland und die Schweiz über ein hoch entwickeltes System der Berufsausbildung verfügen, stellen sie ein ideales Feld für empirische Forschung mit einer Vielzahl von Forschungsthemen und -ansätzen dar. Dem wachsenden Interesse an Berufsbildungsökonomie trägt die Sonderausgabe der 'Zeitschrift für ArbeitsmarktForschung' Rechnung. Sie enthält ein breites Spektrum von Beiträgen zur Ökonomie der Berufsausbildung und repräsentiert damit die Forschungs-Community in beiden Ländern. Beiträge über empirische Erkenntnisse über Berufsausbildung und langfriste Wirkungen beruflicher Erstausbildung werden ergänzt durch drei Beträge zur Weiterbildung, welche das Thema abrunden.
When information is costly, a seller may wish to prevent prospective buyers from acquiring information, for the cost of information acquisition ultimately is borne by the seller. A seller can achieve the desired prevention through posted-priceselling, by offering prospective buyers a discount. No such prevention is possible in the case of an auction. We establish the result that the seller prefers posted-priceselling when the cost of information acquisition is high andauctions when it is low. We view corporatebonds as an instance of the former case, andgovernmentbonds as an instance of the latter.
We analyze the role of knowhow acquisition in the formation and duration of joint ventures. Two parties become partners in a joint venture to benefit from each other’s knowhow. Joint operations provide each party with the opportunity to acquire part of its partner’s knowhow. A party’s increased knowhow provides the impetus for the dissolution of the joint venture. We characterize the conditions under which dissolution takes place, identify the party that buys out its partner, determine the time to dissolution, establish its comparative statics, and examine the implications of knowledge acquisition for the desirability of joint venture formation.
Shareholder agreements govern the relations among shareholders in privately held firms, such as joint ventures and venture capital-backed companies. We provide an economic explanation for key clauses in such agreements 14namely, put and call options, tag-along and drag-along rights, demand and piggy-back rights, and catch-up clauses. In a dynamic moral hazard setting, we show that these clauses can ensure that the contract parties make efficient ex ante investments in the firm. They do so by constraining renegotiation. In the absence of the clauses, ex ante investment would be distorted by unconstrained renegotiation aimed at (i) precluding value-destroying ex post transfers, (ii) inducing value-increasing ex post investments, or (iii) precluding hold-out on value-increasing sales to a trade buyer or the IPO market.
We propose a new modeling framework to study the asset pricing implications of learning under ambiguity aversion. In a continuous time partial information Lucas economy, we characterize analytically equilibrium equity returns and make the following observations. First, learning under ambiguity aversion implies an equilibrium discount for ambiguity, if and only if relative risk aversion is below one or, equivalently, the elasticity of intertemporal substitution (EIS) is above one. In this case, ambiguity aversion increases conditional equity premia and volatilities. Second, equilibrium interest rates are lower, irrespective of risk aversion. Third, no time-invariant relation between excess returns and conditional variances exists. Therefore, estimated relations between excess returns and equity conditional variances are highly time varying and have an indeterminate sign. Fourth, estimates of the EIS based on standard Euler equations for equity returns are strongly downward biased in a setting of learning and ambiguity aversion. Therefore, an EIS well above one can be consistent with estimates of EIS well below one. Fifth, ambiguity does not resolve asymptotically. Finally, using realistic model parameters, we show that a low risk aversion and a moderate amount of ambiguity are consistent with the equity premium, the low interest rate, and the excess volatility puzzles.
Mit Ruedi Volkart – er damals ausserordentlicher Professor und ich Oberassistent am Institut für schweizerisches Bankwesen – habe ich in den achtziger Jahren sehr eng zusammengearbeitet. Wir haben zusammen sehr viele Seminare an der Universität und in der Wirtschaftspraxis erteilt. Mein damaliger persönlicher Forschungsfokus galt dem Rechnungswesen der Banken. Heute, mehr als zwanzig Jahre später, interessieren mich nach wie vor Themen des Rechnungswesens. Eines davon ist die Frage der „Umsatzerfassung als Teil des Earnings Management“. Dabei hat die sog. Revenue Recognition eine erwiesenermassen
schlechte Reputation erlangt. Die SEC hat nachgewiesen, dass 50% der Betrugsdelikte in US-Konzernen dieser Praxis zuzuschreiben sind. Was sind die Treiber für solche Eskapaden und wie können sie vermieden werden?
