In this paper technology adoption behaviour under (regulatory) no-anticipation of new technology, and imperfect competition in a tradable permits scheme (rents market) is investigated. The inter-dependence between the incentive to adopt a new technology and the allowance price is explicitly modelled. A firm's longterm incentives to adopt a new technology depend on the future value of tradable permits (scarcity rents) and, ultimately, on the level of uncovered pollution emissions (permits demand) and the level of offered emission permits (permits supply)-both affected by the current technological status. In an imperfectly competitive permit market, the aggregate supply is the solution of a non-cooperative game that possesses a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. It is shown that this condition is also satisfied when a price-support instrument, which is contingent on the adoption of the new technology, is introduced. This is done to foster the firms' long-term incentives to adopt new technologies. The impact of the price-support contract on the scarcity rent value and on the technology adoption behaviour is both theoretically and numerically examined: (i) it creates a floating price floor that can be interpreted as a minimum price guarantee; (ii) the higher the minimum price guarantee, the higher the aggregate level of adoption and the earlier the adoption of new technologies.
A large number of empirical studies find evidence for systematic deviations from the CAPM. The CAPM tends to understate the returns on low-beta stocks and overstate the returns on high-beta stocks, which means that the security market line is too steep. Other well-documented anomalies are the size premium and the value premium. The CAPM is a special case of the consumption-based CAPM. This study addresses the question whether the consumption-based CAPM with constant relative risk aversion preferences can explain CAPM-anomalies. An example of an economy with power utility and lognormal returns is examined that can be solved in closed form. The model leads to a security market line that is flatter than in the CAPM and generates a size and a value premium. The comparative statics suggest that cross-sectional anomalies and the equity premium puzzle are of a very similar nature.
The majority of academic economists share the view that a corporation should serve the exclusive interests of its shareholders (shareholder value maximization). This view is fi rmly grounded on the extension, by Arrow (1953) and Debreu (1959) of the two welfare theorems to production economies with uncertainty and complete markets. This paper considers a variant of the Arrow-Debreu model where uncertainty is endogenous: probabilities of productive outcomes depend on decisions made by fi rms. In that case, a competitive equilibrium with shareholder value maximizing fi rms (capitalist equilibrium) is never Pareto optimal. This is because endogenous uncertainty implies that firms exert externalities on their consumers and their employees. When rms are stakeholder oriented, in that their managers are instructed to maximize a weighted sum of their shareholder value and of their contributions to consumer and employee welfares, the new competitive equilibrium (stakeholder equilibrium) improves upon the capitalist equilibrium.
Das Earnings Management der Unternehmen ist seit vielen Jahren ein beliebter Untersuchungsgegenstand. Seine Aktualität lässt sich an zahllosen Bilanzskandalen der letzten Jahre ablesen. Um (strategische) Rechnungslegungspolitik und -delikte zu verhindern, wurden Methoden zur Aufdeckung ausgearbeitet. Jede Methode hat ihre Stärken; der sichere Nachweis ist in der Regel aber unmöglich. Dazu stellt die Rechnungslegung ein zu komplexes Konstrukt dar.
