L'accréditation est un système que l'on retrouve dans le monde entier et dont le but est d'établir et de maintenir une infrastructure compétente d'organismes d'évaluation de la conformité, reconnue internationalement. Ce qui sonne d'abord comme une affaire d'experts techniques se révèle en fait une infrastructure fondamentale pour l'économie moderne. L'article ci-contre étudie le rôle économique de l'accréditation et son fonctionnement. Il montre l'importance que peut avoir un réseau compact d'organismes accrédités et son intégration internationale pour l'accès des entreprises suisses aux marchés étrangers
Die Akkreditierung ist ein weltweit etabliertes System zur Schaffung und Aufrechterhaltung einer kompetenten und international anerkannten Infrastruktur an Konformitätsbewertungsstellen. Was zunächst nach einer technischen Expertenangelegenheit klingt, entpuppt sich auf den zweiten Blick als Basisinfrastruktur für moderne Volkswirtschaften. Der vorliegende Beitrag beleuchtet die volkswirtschaftliche Rolle der Akkreditierung und ihre Funktionsweise. Er zeigt auf, welche Bedeutung das dichte Netz an akkreditierten Stellen und dessen internationale Einbindung für den Zugang schweizerischer Unternehmen auf ausländische Märkte hat
Working Paper, BETA, Strasbourg#### not available in German This empirical study investigates the ratification behaviour of ILO member states. We use a multivariate hazard model for the analysis of data on the timing of ratifications of different conventions. The model accounts for two random effects, one at the country level and the other at the convention level. We use a semi-parametric Bayesian approach, based on the partial likelihood. Our findings confirm the results of preceding studies that ratification behaviour varies substantially across members states and conventions. Furthermore, the results yield insights on the impact of unobserved heterogeneity on the ratification process. Download Discussion Paper: (pdf, 271kb)
We study the effects of economic shocks on civil conflict at the subnational level using a panel dataset of 5689 administrative regions from 53 African countries with yearly observations from 1992 to 2010. We find that economic shocks, measured by nighttime light intensity and instrumented by lagged rainfall levels and droughts, increase the probability of civil conflict.
We present a model of (re)elections in which an incumbency advantage arises because the incumbent can manipulate issue salience by choosing inefficient policies in the policy dimension in which he is the stronger candidate. The voters are uncertain about the state of the world and the incumbent's choice of policy. Under complete information they would reelect the incumbent if and only if the state is sufficiently high. Undesirable policy outcomes may be due to either a bad state or the incumbent's choice of inefficient policies. The incumbent uses inefficient policies in intermediate states, whereby he creates uncertainty about the true state in such a way that voters are better off in expectation reelecting him. Hence the equilibrium exhibits an incumbency advantage that stems from asymmetric information and the use of inefficient policies.
