This paper reports evidence from Switzerland which indicates that a democracy with direct popular rights is at least not less efficient than a democracy without such rights: The citizens are better informed and the (economic) policy decisions are taken in a way that economic welfare is higher and the political outcome corresponds closer to the demands of the citizens than in a purely representative system. Correspondingly, reported subjective personal well being is positively related to the existence of direct popular rights. This holds despite the fact that the Swiss democracy is largely unlimited and, correspondingly, even less consistent with the views of F.A. v. Hayek about a reasonable design of a democracy than nearly all purely representative systems. Finally, the different philosophical ideas which lie behind F.A. v. Hayek's conception of a democracy and the Swiss constitutional reality are shortly discussed.
Die in dieser Arbeit zusammengefasste empirische Evidenz aus der Schweiz spricht dafür, dass eine Demokratie mit direkten Volksrechten zumindest nicht ineffizienter ist als eine Demokratie ohne solche Rechte: In der direkten Demokratie sind die Bürgerinnen und Bürger besser informiert, und die (wirtschafts-)politischen Entscheidungen werden so getroffen, dass die wirtschaftliche Wohlfahrt höher ist und die politischen Ergebnisse eher den Bedürfnissen der Bürgerinnen und Bürger entsprechen als in einem rein repräsentativen System. Dies gilt, obwohl die direkte Demokratie der Schweiz weitgehend unbegrenzt ist und daher mit den Vorstellungen von F.A. v. Hayek über eine sinnvolle Ausgestaltung der Demokratie noch weniger vereinbar ist als praktisch alle rein repräsentativen Systeme. Zum Schluss wird kurz auf die hinter seinen Vorstellungen sowie hinter der Verfassungswirklichkeit der Schweiz liegenden philosophisch-theoretischen Konzeptionen eingegangen.
Nach einer kurzen Darstellung der Institutionen der direkten Demokratie in der Schweiz wird zunächst die Informationsvermittlung in der direkten wie der repräsentativen Demokratie näher untersucht. Dabei zeigt sich, dass die Bürgerinnen und Bürger in der direkten Demokratie im Allgemeinen besser informiert sind als im rein repräsentativen System, weil sowohl die Nachfrage als auch das Angebot an Information grösser sind. Danach wird ein kurzer Überblick über empirische Studien gegeben, die wirtschaftliche Auswirkungen der direkten Demokratie in der Schweiz untersuchen. Diese Arbeiten zeigen, dass die wirtschaftlichen Auswirkungen eher positiv sind. Die Arbeit schliesst mit einigen Ausführungen zum Spannungsverhältnis zwischen Rechtsstaats- und demokratischem Prinzip. After a short description of the Swiss direct democratic institutions we first discuss the transmission of political information in direct and representative democracies. It is shown that, because demand as well as supply of information is higher, citizens are generally better informed in direct democratic compared to purely representative systems. Then we give a short survey of empirical research about the economic consequences of Swiss direct democracy. This research indicates that its impact is positive. We close with some remarks about the tension between the principles of demoeraey and the rule of the law.
First it is clarified what"trust"and"tax morale"actually mean and how they are measured. Especially in German-speaking countries, tax morale is often mixed with tax compliance. But the first is a moral conviction while the second denotes actual behaviour, and both do not necessarily need to be congruent. Then it is shown how direct popular rights empower Swiss citizens to influence their tax burden. Finally, we discuss the impact of direct popular rights on tax morale and on tax compliance as well as the impact of the trust between citizens and tax authorities on the latter. It is shown that direct democracy leads to higher tax morale and compliance, even if tax morale is today rather low in Switzerland compared to other countries.
There is a basic tension between the principle of democracy and the rule of law. This becomes obvious whenever the Swiss citizens accept an initiative that is incompatible with the European Convention on Human Rights. First, we discuss the traditions behind these two principles before we survey the empirical papers about the relation between direct democracy and minority rights in the US as well as in Switzerland. Then we discuss the literature on the relation between direct democracy and death penalty. There, the conflict becomes rather obvious. Solutions, which will always involve compromises between these two principles, necessitate some role of the Supreme Court, at the cost of some, but only minor limitations of direct popular rights.
Swiss direct democracy is often accused of being an obstacle to reforms, with the strong influence of interest groups being the reason. Actually, the referendum has a retarding effect: it implies a status quo bias. On the other hand, the initiative has an accelerating effect. The influence of interest groups is hardly larger in direct compared to representative democratic systems. Thus, it is highly questionable whether the abolition of Switzerland's direct democracy (at the federal level) would-in the long-run-really lead to political decisions which are more open to reforms.
This paper discusses several problems of direct popular decisions. In the first part, we consider problems related to the functioning of direct democracy. As a political system it only makes sense if there exists a continuous process and not if only occasional single questions are brought to a referendum. Then, the relation between direct democracy and the rule of unanimity is discussed, a subject of special relevance to the European Union, before we consider the role of quorums. In the second part, some areas are considered in which conflicts might arise. Re¬sults of initiatives might be incompatible with individual human rights or might endan¬ger fis¬cal sustainability, and referenda might impede economic reforms. All these problems, however, do not justify a general rejection of direct popular rights. Thus, we conclude by listing several points that should be observed to safeguard the well-functioning of di¬rect de¬mocracy.
