After discussing various approaches about heroic behaviour in the literature, we first define and classify moral behaviour, in distinction to intrinsically motivated and "prudent" behaviour. Then, we present some arguments on the function of heroic behaviour in a modern democratic society, before we turn to the analysis of heroic behaviour. We conclude with some remarks on methodological as well as social problems which arise or may arise if behaviour can not be influenced by extrinsic incentives.
Using Allensbach survey data about how people look forward to the coming year, we construct true ex-post forecasts and compare them with the forecasts produced by the German Council of Economic Experts and by the Economic Research Institutes. Then we perform rationality tests for these forecast series. The Allensbach forecasts outperform the professional forecasts in many respects. Finally we ask whether information included in short-term interest rates is reflected in the different forecasts. We show that the Allensbach forecasts seem to fully take into account this information, while the professional forecasts do not. Thus when making expectations, the German general public seems to consider more information than the professional forecasters.
It is a hardly disputable fact that one can get scientific reports in favour of (and against) nearly every policy a government wants to perform. One of the reasons for this is that economic theory is in many relevant cases so weak that it is possible for different economists to defend pretty contrary positions with the claim of scientific truth. This makes empirical research necessary. However, using the ecological tax reform as an example, it is shown that researchers can often easily obtain their ‘esired’ empirical results without (obvious) violations of the rules of scientific work. To detect such manipulations, a critical discussion of theoretical approaches and empirical results is necessary. Finally, we discuss how it is possible that despite all these problems the process of policy advice may lead to something like ‘objectivity’, why even economists who are not corrupt in most cases promote the objectives of their clients, and why economic policy advice is demanded at all.
Economists often claim that they have no or at best a minor impact on economic policy: other disciplines like law or political science are assumed to have much more impact.129 This is insofar true as academic economics is often of little help to solve real economic policy problems, while other disciplines provide answers to the politicians’ questions which seem to be much straightforward in this respect. On the other hand, in recent decades, economic ideas have changed the world in a dramatic way. Since the Second World War, we see a continuous increase in international trade and a tremendous reduction of trade barriers, in Europe especially within the ever increasing European Union, but also on a world wide scale first through the GATT and since 1995 through the WTO. Moreover, since the eighties, a wave of deregulation and privatisation of former public enterprises gushed over the Western industrialised countries. Its aim was and is the reduction of the political sphere and the strengthening of the private sphere. In the ‘Washington Consensus’, this strategy was also recommended to the developing world.
I define and classify moral (or altruistic) behaviour and discuss the necessity of moral behaviour for the functioning of a market economic and a democratic political order. I also evaluate claims that moral behaviour is unnecessary. Moral behaviour can only be stable if certain conditions hold, including most importantly that moral requirements for citizens not be too high; only a minimum standard of morality can be demanded if many citizens are expected to comply. Finally, I point to some problems of relying on moral behaviour.
After discussing various approaches about heroic behaviour in the literature, we first give a definition and classification of moral behaviour, in distinction to intrinsically motivated and ‘prudent' behaviour. Then, we present some arguments on the function of moral behaviour according to ‘minimal' standards of the average individual in a modern democratic society, before we turn to heroic behaviour. We conclude with some remarks on methodological as well as social problems which arise or may arise if behaviour can not be influenced by extrinsic incentives.
