Zunächst wird die erwartete demographische Entwicklung bis zur Mitte dieses Jahrhunderts dargestellt, wie sie sich aus den Szenarien des Bundesamts für Statistik ergibt. Danach befassen wir uns mit grundlegenden Problemen der Finanzierung der Altersvorsorge, wobei zunächst die Frage des Finanzierungssystems behandelt wird, bevor auf die Entwicklung und einzelne Probleme der AHV sowie der zweiten Säule eingegangen wird. Im weiteren wird die Arbeit im Alter betrachtet, die zusammen mit einer besseren Vereinbarkeit von Familie und Berufsleben für Frauen eine Minderung der gesellschaftlichen Lasten, die mit dem Alterungsprozess verbunden sind, bewirken könnte. Schliesslich wird auf die Entwicklung der Gesundheitskosten im Alter (einschliesslich der Pflegekosten) eingegangen, da sich die finanziellen Lasten der demographischen Entwicklung nicht nur bei der Altersvorsorge, sondern auch in diesem Bereich niederschlagen. Die Arbeit schliesst mit einigen politisch-ökonomischen Überlegungen.
Abschnitte 1, 3 und 5 des Jahresberichtes 2005 der Kommission für Konjunkturfragen
Beilage zur Volkswirtschaft, dem Magazin für Wirtschaftspolitik, 1-2005
First the transmission of information in direct and representative democracies is investigated. Because there is more supply and demand of information, citizens are better informed in direct democracies than in purely representative systems. Then, a survey is given about empirical studies of the economic consequences of direct democracy which show that these consequences are mostly positive. Finally we discuss some of the arguments which are often raised in Germany against the introduction of direct democratic rights on the federal level, especially the reference to ‘bad experiences' in the Weimar republic. It is shown that these arguments are not valid.
After presenting casual evidence of the difference between economists and the rest of the population, I review the survey and experimental evidence on this topic during the last 20 years. I then ask whether these results are applicable to real world situations. To consider this, examples of referenda results in Switzerland are presented where the citizens decided against recommendations of most economists. What is particular in economic theory that causes these differences in convictions? Explanations can point to aspects of positive economic theory and to normative convictions of economists. I conclude with consequences that economists might draw.
In the philosophical literature, there exist rather positive but also rather negative evaluations of competition. It has, of course, positive and negative effects, for single individuals, for their moral behaviour, but also for the whole society. At least for the latter, the dynamic aspects are more relevant than the static ones. In connection with its negative effects it is frequently demanded that competition should be eliminated or at least restricted. This does often, however, not take into account its evolutionary nature; competition cannot just be switched on and off. Thus, the government has only limited options to make competition possible, to enhance or to suppress it. Because the suppression of competition always implies a restriction of individual liberty rights, it is not a trivial matter under which conditions and how such restrictions can be justified.
