Das Gesundheitssystem der Schweiz bietet der Bevölkerung sehr hohe Qualität, aber auch zu sehr hohen Kosten. Ein Vergleich mit anderen Ländern soll dazu dienen, Stärken und Schwächen dieses Systems zu erkennen und Möglichkeiten zur Steigerung seiner Effizienz herauszufinden. Für diesen Vergleich bieten sich insbesondere die westeuropäischen OECD-Staaten an, aber auch Australien und Kanada, die eine ähnliche Struktur in der Krankenversicherung aufweisen. Das Hauptproblem der hohen Kosten liegt im stationären Bereich: Nicht weil dessen Leistungen besonders stark nachgefragt werden, sondern weil ihre Kosten besonders hoch sind.
In this paper the approach of Constitutional Economics is presented and some of its applications are shown. First, the concept of the original position (constitutional convention) with its informational restrictions and the unanimity rule are discussed. Next, the exchange paradigm which lies behind the whole approach and the role of the self-interest assumption are discussed. Then it is asked for the value judgments which have to be accepted whenever this approach is to be applied to problems of real constitutions. Finally, we show applications of this approach to problems of public debt, taxation, fiscal federalism as well as the tension between liberalism and democracy as organising principles of a modern society.
In this paper, the introduction of direct-democratic decision-making in all EU decisions is considered when it is feasible without prohibitively increasing decision-making costs. We start with the contractarian argument that each constitution is a contract joining the citizens of a state and requires as such the explicit agreement of (a majority of) citizens. Thus, the future European Constitution as well as future changes of it should be decided by the European citizens. After a discussion of the pros and cons of direct democracy, the ability of direct democracy to help creating a European demos is discussed. Consequently, we propose a mandatory (required and binding) referendum on total and partial revisions of the European Constitution. In addition, we propose a constitutional initiative, a statutory and a general initiative as well as a fiscal referendum for financially important projects.
We take up the recent discussion about institutions, governance and geography. The main result of this debate is that institutions matter, be they the fundamental cause of growth or not. We first discuss economic institutions safeguarding economic freedom, including the role of
the judiciary, then political institutions, especially democracy. While there is a large consensus that economic institutions matter for economic growth, the opinions with respect to political
institutions as well as the empirical results differ quite a lot. Then we turn to institutions especially relevant for Switzerland: direct democracy and (fiscal) federalism. There is no indication
that these institutions hamper economic growth. We conclude by asking for possible consequences of the empirical results presented.
