Stock vs. Mutual Insurers: Who Should and Who Does Charge More?
Auteur(s)
Accéder
Description
We contribute to the literature by developing a normative theory of the relationship between stock and mutual insurers based on a contingent claims framework. To consistently price policies provided by firms in these two legal forms of organization, we extend the work of Doherty and Garven (1986) to the mutual case, thus ensuring that the formulae for the stock insurer are nested in our more general model. This set-up allows us to separately consider the ownership and policyholder stakes included in the mutual insurance premium and explicitly takes into account the right to charge additional premiums in times of financial distress, restrictions on the ability of members to realize the value of their equity stake, as well as relevant market frictions. Based on a numerical implementation of our model, we are able to show that, for the premiums of stock and mutuals insurers to be equal, the latter would need to hold comparatively less equity capital. We then evaluate panel data for the German motor liability insurance sector and demonstrate that observed premiums are not consistent with our normative findings. The combination of theory and empirical evidence is not compatible with full competition in insurance markets and suggests that policies offered by stock insurers are overpriced relative to policies of mutuals. Consequently, we suspect considerable wealth transfers between the stakeholder groups.
Institution partenaire
Langue
Date
Le portail de l'information économique suisse
© 2016 Infonet Economy