This paper formulates an empirical model to estimate the impact of endogenous new regional trade agreement (RTA) membership on trade structure. The likelihood of new RTA membership is influenced by economic fundamentals such as country size, factor endowments, and trade and investment costs. In a sample of country-pairs covering mainly the OECD economies we find a particularly strong effect of endogenous RTAs on intra-industry trade in a difference-in-difference analysis based on matching techniques. The associated trade volume effects are similar to the ones found in previous research on the effects of endogenous RTAs. Overall, this indicates that RTA membership might reduce inter-industry trade not only in relative but also in absolute terms and that the trade volume effect is due to the associated growth in trade within industries.
In the television show Deal or No Deal a contestant is endowed with a sealed box, which potentially contains a large monetary prize. In the course of the show the contestant learns more information about the distribution of possible monetary prizes inside her box. Consider two groups of contestants, who learned that the chances of their boxes containing a large prize are 20% and 80% correspondingly. Contestants in both groups receive qualitatively similar price offers for selling the content of their boxes. If contestants are less risk averse when facing unlikely gains, the price offer is likely to be more frequently rejected in the first group than in the second group. However, the fraction of rejections is virtually identical across two groups. Thus, contestants appear to have identical risk attitudes over (large) gains of low and high probability.
This paper studies the effects of introducing competition for local passenger railway markets in the German state of Baden-Württemberg. We compare the evolution of the frequency of service on lines that were exposed to competition for the market with lines procured by direct negotiations with the incumbent. Our results suggest that the competitively procured lines enjoyed a stronger growth of the frequency of service than those that were not procured competitively, even after controlling for various line characteristics that might have had an independent influence on the frequency of service. Our results further suggest that the effects of competition may depend strongly on the operator.
It has been shown in past research that unemployment has a large negative impact on subjective well-being of individuals. In this paper, I explore whether and to what extent people with more social capital are sheltered from the harmful effects of unemployment. Using data from the German Socio-Economic Panel 1984–2004, I find that social capital is an important predictor of well-being levels, but there is no evidence that it moderates the effect of unemployment on well-being. Possible reasons for these findings are discussed, and suggestions for future research given.
The most influential approach of corporate governance, the view of shareholders’ supremacy does not take into consideration that the key task of modern corporations is to generate and transfer firm-specific knowledge. It proposes that, in order to overcome the widespread corporate scandals, the interests of top management and directors should be increasingly aligned to shareholder’ interests by making the board more responsible to shareholders, and monitoring of top management by independent outside directors should be strengthened. Corporate governance reform needs to go in another direction altogether. Firm-specific knowledge investments are, like financial investments, not ex ante contractible, leaving investors open to exploitation by shareholders. Employees therefore refuse to make firm-specific investments. To gain a sustainable competitive advantage, there must be an incentive to undertake such firm-specific investments. Three proposals are advanced to deal with this dilemma: (1) The board should rely more on insiders. (2) The insiders should be elected by those employees of the firm who are making firm-specific knowledge investments. (3) The board should be chaired by a neutral person. These proposals have major advantages: they provide incentives for knowledge investors; they countervail the dominance of executives; they encourage intrinsic work motivation and loyalty to the firm by strengthening distributive and procedural justice, and they ensure diversity on the board while lowering transaction costs. These proposals for reforming the board may help to overcome the crisis corporate governance is in. At the same time, they provide a step in the direction of a more adequate theory of the firm as a basis for corporate governance.
We propose a dynamic model of neighbourhood watch schemes. While the state chooses punishment levels, apprehension of criminals depends on the watchfulness of citizens. We show that, contrary to standard intuition, crime levels can increase in punishments. This is because neighbourhood watch schemes can fall victim to their own success if recruitment of new members is driven by fear of crime - a finding that is in line with the empirical literature. We discuss the policy implications of this result and show how it extends to the more general problem of norm enforcement among interacting citizens.
In this paper, we analyze the completed highest education degree of two birth cohorts (1934-1943 and 1964-1973) in Switzerland, using data from the 1999 wave of the Swiss Household Panel. As expected, the fraction of tertiary graduates has increased over time, for women more so than for men. Also, the educational attainment depends strongly on the educational attainment of parents. We then decompose the overall trend into a parental background effect, a general expansion effect and a distribution effect. For women in particular, we find that a substantial fraction of the overall increase in participation in tertiary education can be explained by the fact that the gap in participation rates between women with lowly educated parents and women with highly educated parents has narrowed. We then investigate the role of financial constraints in explaining these trends. Although the number of individuals suffering financial hardship during youth has declined over time, logit models show that financial problems have become more important as an impediment for higher education.
A central aspect of historical research is to provide explanations for the causes and effects of events that occurred in the past, in particular the Second World War. History can be analyzed and explained from different perspectives. Two such perspectives are considered, the first being the traditional historiographic approach, in which the main emphasis is on the qualitative analysis of various kinds of historical sources and documents, and the second being what we call the financial market approach, a recent methodology for linking significant changes in historical market prices to simultaneously occurring geopolitical events. The fundamental characteristics of the two approaches are identified and compared in answering some important historical questions concerning the Second World War. The financial market approach, as reflected in the secondary market for government bonds, isnstudied for various countries. Both approaches rely heavily on interpretation – but inndifferent ways. They complement each other in a useful way.
Das vorliegende Papier schlägt eine neue Sicht auf Probleme der Corporate Governance vor. Es wird analysiert, wie der Unternehmenssektor bezüglich Governance vom politischen Bereich lernen kann. Demokratien haben einzigartige Institutionen der Führung und Kontrolle von Akteuren im öffentlichen Bereich geschaffen, welche neue Einsichten für die Governance von Unternehmen geben können. Drei Bereiche werden diskutiert und konkret auf den Kontext der Schweizer Corporate Governance angewendet: Gewaltenteilungnim Unternehmen, kompetitive Wahlen für Kernfunktionen in der Firma, und direktdemokratischenBeteiligungsrechte für Aktionäre.
In this paper, we develop the concept of a psychological tax contract that goes beyond thentraditional deterrence model and explains tax morale as a complicated interaction betweenntaxpayers and the government. Based on crowding theory, the impact of deterrence and rewardsnon tax morale is discussed. As a contractual relationship implies duties and rights for each contract partner, sticking to the fiscal exchange paradigm between citizens and the statenincreases tax compliance. Citizens are willing to honestly declare income even if they do not receive a full public good equivalent to their tax payments as long as the political process is perceived to be fair and legitimate. At the procedural level, a friendly treatment of taxpayers by the tax office in auditing processes increases tax compliance.
