With the help of a standard 2 × 2 trade model, we develop several hypotheses on the effects of cross-border sourcing on skill intensity in production. The focus is on cross-border sourcing of low-skill-intensive components of exports and import-competing products. We test the aforementioned hypotheses with panel data for manufacturing in the European Union (EU). We find that outward processing is more prevalent in import-competing industries, which are also the EU’s relatively intensive users of low-skilled labor. Outward processing in export industries is found to reduce the skill-to-low-skill ratio in EU industries, while outward processing in import-competing industries has more ambiguous effects.
We set up a partial equilibrium model of Cournot competition, where firms can strategically choose their outsourcing intensity. This decision is based on a trade-off between lower marginal production costs and higher fixed costs. In this model, a lower number of identical firms leads to higher market concentration and higher outsourcing activities. The theoretical hypothesis of a positive correlation between market concentration and international outsourcing is confirmed by rank correlation coefficients and a fixed effects panel data analysis using data on the intermediate goods imports to output ratio and market concentration in the EU12 countries. In the fixed effects regression analysis we show that market concentration has to be treated as an endogenous variable to avoid biased and inconsistent estimates.
Many technologies used by the LDCs are developed in the OECD economies and are designed to make optimal use of the skills of these richer countries' workforces. Differences in the supply of skills create a mismatch between the requirements of these technologies and the skills of LDC workers, and lead to low productivity in the LDCs. Even when all countries have equal access to new technologies, this technology-skill mismatch can lead to sizable differences in total factor productivity and output per worker. We provide evidence in favor of the cross-industry productivity patterns predicted by our model, and also show that technology-skill mismatch could account for a large fraction of the observed output per worker differences in the data.
We construct a model where the equilibrium organization of firms changes as an economy approaches the world technology frontier. In vertically integrated firms, owners (managers) have to spend time both on production and innovation activities, and this creates managerial overload, and discourages innovation. Outsourcing of some production activities mitigates the managerial overload, but creates a holdup problem, causing some of the rents of the owners to be dissipated to the supplier. Far from the technology frontier, imitation activities are more important, and vertical integration is preferred. Closer to the frontier, the value of innovation increases, encouraging outsourcing.
We set up a model, in which firms in a small industrialized country outsource part of their production to a foreign economy, which is rich in low-skilled labour. We analyse, how a decline in trade costs affects outsourcing activities and the production structure in the small economy. A stimulation of cross-border outsourcing raises wage dispersion and, if labour markets are unionized, also the employment of high-skilled relative to low-skilled labour. Using a panel of Austrian industries, we find, first, that decreasing trade barriers - as observed after the fall of the Iron Curtain - indeed stimulate outsourcing to Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, and, second, that outsourcing to these countries significantly shifts relative employment in favour of high-skilled labour.
We analyze a myopic strategy adjustment process in strategic-form games. It is shown that the steady states of the continuous time limit, which is constructed assuming frequent play and slow adjustment of strategies, are exactly the best-reply matching equilibria, as discussed by Droste, Kosfeld, and Voorneveld (2000. Mimeo, Tilburg University). In a best-reply matching equilibrium every player ‘matches’ the probability of playing a pure strategy to the probability that this pure strategy is a best reply to the pure-strategy profile played by his opponents. We derive stability results for the steady states of the continuous time limit in 2×2 bimatrix games and coordination games. Analyzing the asymptotic behavior of the stochastic adjustment process in discrete time shows convergence to minimal curb sets of the game. Moreover, absorbing states of the process correspond to best-reply matching equilibria of the game.
This paper provides an analytical characterization of Markov perfect equilibria in a model with repeated voting, where agents vote over distortionary income redistribution. A key result is that the future constituency for redistributive policies depends positively on current redistribution, since this affects both private investments and the future distribution of voters. The model features multiple equilibria. In some equilibria, positive redistribution persists forever. In other equilibria, even a majority of beneficiaries of redistribution vote strategically so as to induce the end of the welfare state next period. Skill-biased technical change makes the survival of the welfare state less likely.
We study a new equilibrium concept in non-cooperative games, where players follow a behavioral rule called best-reply matching. Under this rule a player matches the probability of playing a pure strategy to the probability that this strategy is a best reply. Kosfeld, Droste, and Voorneveld [Games and Economic Behavior 40 (2002) 270] show that best-reply matching equilibria are stationary states in a simple model of social learning, where newborns adopt a best-reply to recent observations of play. In this paper we analyze best-reply matching in more detail and illustrate the concept by means of well-known examples. For example in the centipede game it is shown that players will continue with large probability.
This paper establishes stylized facts about business cycles in the late 19th century, using spectral analysis techniques which allow an intuitive description and analysis of cyclical structure in economic fluctuations. Analysis of industrial production data for 13 countries permits the following generalizations. In the advanced North Atlantic economies, a fairly regular long cycle with a periodicity of 7–10 years is identified in all countries. This component explains a substantial fraction of overall variation in industrial production. There is some evidence of a less regular, less powerful short cycle of 3–5 years duration. In peripheral economies experience is varied, but it is more often the short cycle that exercises greater influence. The long cycle component is shown to be highly correlated among the core economies, much less so between core and peripheral economies, and least of all among peripheral economies. The long cycle is more highly correlated among countries with important trading ties and those on a metallic monetary standard throughout the period.
Long-run recursive identification schemes are very popular in the structural VAR literature. This note suggests a two-step procedure based on QR decompositions as a solution algorithm for this type of identification problem. Our procedure will always deliver the exact solution and it is much easier to implement than a Newton-type iteration algorithm. It may therefore be very useful whenever quick and precise solutions of a long-run recursive scheme are required, e.g. in bootstrapping confidence intervals for impulse responses.
