This paper investigates empirically the effect of import diversity on government size and provides evidence for the love of variety effect on government spending described in Hanslin (2008). I argue that crowding out of firms is an important cost of public good provision. However, due to the access to foreign varieties, national costs of public good provision are lower and therefore, public good provision is higher. Especially for OECD countries this channel seems to exist. The diversity of imported products has a positive effect on government consumption, particularly when these goods are classified as differentiated. In addition, this positive effect is decreasing in home market size. Further, the direct effect of the share of differentiated in total imported products on the government share is negative.
The sustainability of the welfare state ultimately depends on citizens’ preferences for income redistribution. They are elicited through a Discrete Choice Experiment performed in 2008 in Switzerland. Attributes are redistribution as GDP share, its uses (the unemployed, old-age pensioners, people with ill health etc.), and nationality of bene?ciary. Estimated marginal willingness to pay (WTP) is positive among those who deem bene?ts too low, and negative otherwise. However, even those who state that government should reduce income inequality exhibit a negative WTP on average. The major ?nding is that estimated average WTP is maximum at 21% of GDP, clearly below the current value of 25%. Thus, the present Swiss welfare state does not appear sustainable.
This contribution contains an international comparison of preferences. Using two Discrete Choice Experiments (DCE), it measures willingness to pay for health insurance attributes in Germany and the Netherlands. Since the Dutch DCE was carried out right after the 2006 health reform, which made citizens explicitly choose a health insurance contract, two research questions naturally arise. First, are the preferences with regard to contract attributes (such as Managed-Care-type restrictions of physician choice) similar between the two countries? Second, was the information campaign launched by the Dutch government in the context of the reform effective in the sense of reducing status quo bias? Based on random-effects Probit estimates, these two questions can be answered as follows. First, while much the same attributes have positive and negative willingness to pay values in the two countries, their magnitudes differ, pointing to differences in preference structure. Second, status quo bias in the Netherlands is one-half of the German value, suggesting that Dutch consumers were indeed made to bear the cost of decision making associated with choice of a health insurance contract.
This paper analyzes the identifying power of weak convexity assumptions in treatment effect models with endogenous selection. The counterfactual distributions are constrained either in terms of the response function, or conditional on the realized treatment, and sharp bounds on the potential outcome distributions are derived. The methods are applied to bound the effect of education on smoking.
This study seeks to provide evidence for deciding whether or not a pharmaceutical innovation should be included in the benefit list of social health insurance. A discrete choice experiment (DCE) was conducted in Germany to measure preferences for modern insulin therapy. Of the 1,100 individuals interviewed in 2007, 200 suffered from type 1 diabetes, 150 from insulin-treated type 2 diabetes, and 150 from insulin-naive type 2 diabetes. The long-acting insulin analogue ”Insulin Detemir” is compared to human insulin as the status quo. The DCE contains two price attributes, copayment and increased contributions to health insurance. As one would expect, non-affected non-diabetics and insulin-naive diabetics exhibit higher willingness-to-pay (WTP) values through copayment (adjusted for probability of contracting diabetes), while affected type 1 and insulin-treated type 2 diabetics have higher WTP through increased contributions. However, WTP values exceed the extra treatment cost in both financing alternatives, justifying inclusion of the innovation in the benefit list from a cost-benefit point of view.
In this paper, preferences for income redistribution in Switzerland are elicited through a Discrete Choice Experiment (DCE) performed in 2008. In addition to the amount of redistribution as a share of GDP, attributes also included its uses (working poor, the unemployed, old-age pensioners, families with children, people in ill health) and nationality of bene?ciary (Swiss, Western European, others). Willingness to pay for redistribution increases with income and education, contradicting the conventional Meltzer-Richard (1981) model. The Prospect of Upward Mobility hypothesis [Hirschman and Rothschild (1973); Benabou and Ok (2001)] receives partial empirical support.
The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, it measures the efficiency in the provision of public goods by local jurisdictions applying Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA). Second, it relates ef- ficiency scores to a fiscal equalization scheme designed to mitigate the negative consequences of Tiebout competition. The data come from the 26 cantons of Switzerland (2000-2004), a country characterized by marked federalism. Results show the equalization scheme to indeed have a negative influence on performance, resulting in an efficiency-equity trade-off (Stiglitz, 1988). However, substitution of earmarked payments by lump-sum payments as part of the 2008 reform is likely to enhance cantonal performance.
Using a general two-stage framework, this paper gives sufficient conditions for increasing competition to have negative or positive effects on R&D-investment, respectively. Both possibilities arise in plausible situations, even if one uses relatively narrow definitions of increasing competition. The paper also shows that competition is more likely to increase the investments of leaders than those of laggards. When R&D-spillovers are strong, competition is less likely to increase investments. The paper also identifies conditions under which low initial levels of competition make a positive effects of competition on investment more likely. Extending the basic framework, the paper shows that separation of ownership and control, endogenous entry and cumulative investments make positive effects of competition on investment more likely. Imperfect upstream competition weakens the effects of competition on investment.
We estimate the effects of labor market entry conditions on wages for male individuals first entering the Austrian labor market between 1978 and 2000. We find a large negativ effect of unfavorable entry conditions on starting wages as well as a sizeable negative long-run effect. Specifically, we estimate that a one percentage point increase in the initial local unemployment rate is associated with an approximate shortfall in lifetime earnings of 6.5%. We also show that bad entry conditions are associated with lower quality of a worker's first job and that initial wage shortfalls associated with bad entry conditions only partially evaporate upon involuntary job change. These and additional findings support the view that initial job assignment, in combination with accumulation of occupation or industry-specific human capital while on this first job, plays a key role in generating the observed wage persistencies.
This paper argues that the per-capita income of importers is an important determinant of the extensive margin of trade. I formalize this by incorporating preferences that allow for binding nonnegativity constraints into an otherwise standard Ricardian model. This implies that agents adjust the set of goods from which they consume with income, which in turn affects the extensive margin of bilateral trade. I quantify the model using data on US consumer behavior and aggregate values of bilateral trade flows. I find that the behavior of the model’s extensive margin of bilateral trade is consistent with elasticities measured in the data. Two counterfactual experiments demonstrate the quantitative importance of the mechanism outlined in this paper.
