Public Good Provision in a Federalist Country: Tiebout Competition, Fiscal Equalization, and Incentives for Efficiency in Switzerland
Accéder
Auteur(s)
Accéder
Texte intégral indisponibleBeschreibung
The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, it measures the efficiency in the provision of public goods by local jurisdictions applying Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA). Second, it relates ef- ficiency scores to a fiscal equalization scheme designed to mitigate the negative consequences of Tiebout competition. The data come from the 26 cantons of Switzerland (2000-2004), a country characterized by marked federalism. Results show the equalization scheme to indeed have a negative influence on performance, resulting in an efficiency-equity trade-off (Stiglitz, 1988). However, substitution of earmarked payments by lump-sum payments as part of the 2008 reform is likely to enhance cantonal performance.
Institution partenaire
Langue
Datum
Le portail de l'information économique suisse
© 2016 Infonet Economy