Bei echter Unsicherheit ist die Verteilung der erwarteten Nachfrage nicht bekannt, sondern muß erst aus vergangenen Erfahrungen, neuen Informationen und subjektiven Einschätzungen abgeleitet werden. Die vorliegende Arbeit konzentriert sich auf Unsicherheitssituationen, in denen das Vertrauen in die vergangenen Erfahrungen schwach ist und neue Informationen kaum verfügbar sind. Es wird gezeigt, daß in solchen Situationen (z. B. nach Trendbrüchen, in dünnen Märkten, bei innovativen Investitionen) der Einfluß der Profitabilität an Bedeutung gewinnt. Gleichzeitig stellt die Arbeit einen rigorosen Modellierungsversuch des “state of confidence” von Keynes dar.
This paper analyzes the behavior of an expected-utility maximizing tax evader who is aware of the fact that he gets some benefit in exchange for the taxes. Within this framework, the equity argument that the proportion by which a tax payer evades taxes decreases if the share in public expenditures that is for his benefit increases, cannot be confirmed unambiguously. There is, therefore, some theoretical support for the supposition that the equity argument is an ex post rationalization of otherwise motivated tax evasion.
The theoretical analysis of tax evasion has typically concentrated on the role of Abstract penalties and on the probability of being investigated and penalized. This article introduces into the standard model of tax evasion the possibility of pecuniary rewards as an economic incentive for taxpaying. The analysis shows that introducing a reward for payment of taxes leads to a welfare improvement over non-prohibitive penalty regimes. An optimal penalty-reward mix is derived that guarantees a certain tax yield for the government and, at the same time, maximizes the taxpayer's utility.
Empirical evidence shows that the perception of information is strongly concentrated in those environments in which a mass of producers and users of knowledge interact through a distribution medium. This paper considers the consequences of this fact for economic equilibrium analysis. In particular, it examines how the ranking schemes applied by the distribution technology affect the use of knowledge, and it then describes the characteristics of an optimal ranking scheme. The analysis is carried out using a model in which agents’ productivity is based on the stock of knowledge used. The value of a piece of information is assessed in terms of its contribution to productivity.
In small groups norm enforcement is provided by mutual punishment and reward. In large societies we have enforcement institutions. This paper shows how such institutions can emerge as a decentralized equilibrium. In a first stage, individuals invest in a public enforcement technology. This technology generates a sanctioning system whose effectiveness depends on the aggregate amount of invested resources. In a second stage, in which individuals contribute to the provision of a public good, the sanctioning system imposes penalties and rewards on deviations from the endogenous norm contribution. It is shown that even if group size goes to infinity public norm enforcement is supported in a noncooperative equilibrium. Psychological factors are not necessary but can be favorable for the emergence of effective public norm enforcement.
