infonet-economy

This paper presents a model in which final goods producers outsource intermediate input
production. Intermediate inputs are differentiated and their production can be located at home or abroad. The model is used to examine competitive location policy in a (two-country) free trade area (FTA). It is shown that national public infrastructure investment has a positive effect on both the
number of intermediate input producers and the return to the immobile factor in the home country. International outsourcing from home declines. Opposite effects are triggered in the partner country. In a welfare analysis we characterize national infrastructure policies that aim to maximize national income (net of tax costs) and compare the non-cooperative FTA-equilibrium with optimal policies from an integrated point of view. We show whether or not there is a need for policy coordination.
Firm subsidies are discussed as an alternative to public infrastructure investment.

We present a model in which workers must be educated to get a good job and firms must innovate in order to increase productivity. Education as well as innovation and production require skilled labor as inputs. This, together with the fact that learning opportunities differ across workers, determine simultaneously the long-run level of skilled employment and the long-run rate of growth. We study the impact of changes in the factors which affect the education of workers and the incentives to innovate, and discuss the growth and employment effects of labor market policy measures.

DEUTSCH: Dieser Beitrag setzt sich zum Ziel, zwei miteinander verbundene Fragen zu
beantworten: 1. Was ist der Auftrag der Krankenversicherung? Oder in anderen
Worten: Warum gibt es eine Nachfrage nach sozialer (bzw. staatlicher)
Krankenversicherung? Ist sie der Grund dafu¨ r, dass in den meisten entwickelten
La¨ndern die private Krankenversicherung ein Schattendasein fu¨hrt?
2. Wo liegen die Grenzen der Sozialen Krankenversicherung? Kann man
sagen, es gebe ein Zuviel an Sozialer Krankenversicherung in mindestens
einer der beiden Dimensionen? Sollte ihre Vorherrschaft zu Gunsten der
privaten Krankenversicherung gebrochen werden? Ist das heutige Ausmaß
der Deckung zu hoch?

ENGLISH: This contribution seeks to answer two questions, (1) What are the reasons for a demand for social health insurance (SHI)?, and (2) What are the limits to the growth of SHI? A review of the reasons for the existence of SHI reveals that while economists have emphasized the possible contribution of SHI to efficiency, the available evidence points to public choice reasons, which also seem to explain better the growth of SHI. Indeed, since private insurance redistributes as well (albeit governed by chance), it is tempting for politicians to use SHI for systematic redistribution (the extent of which cannot easily be detected by net payers). Turning to the supply of SHI, two dimensions are studied in some detail, viz. efforts at product innovation and at risk selection. Competing suppliers of SHI, while hampered by risk adjustment which sanctions innovators for attracting the young, are predicted to invest in innovation. A monopolistic public SHI scheme, by way of contrast, does not need to select risks and, on the other hand, it is predicted to refrain from product innovation. This is but one limit to the growth of SHI; the ultimate one is citizens' lack of willingness to pay for its continuing expansion, about which some evidence for the case of Switzerland is presented.

Probleme der Finanzierung sind für die Marktdiffusion innovativer Energietechnologien ebenso wichtig wie ihre technischen Eigenschaften oder der erwartete Nutzen aus der Technologieanwendung. Welche Rolle spielt dabei die Eigentümerstruktur des Innovators? Welchen Einfluss hat die Finanzierungsform des Investitionsvorhabens—und damit das finanzielle Risiko—auf die Attraktivität einer Energieinvestition?

The macro evidence of increased adjustment pressure since the early 1970s suggests that job mobility should have increased. Hence, retrospective and spell data from the German Socio-Economic Panel are combined in order to test the hypothesis that job stability for German workers declined between 1974 and 1994. Using count data regression models in which we control for labour market experience, various demographic factors, and occupation, we find that job stability did not decrease, but if anything increased, between 1974 and 1994. Our finding suggests that labour market inflexibility is an important factor in explaining the European unemployment problem.

A new parametric model for the econometric analysis of non-negative integers is proposed. Its distinguishing feature is that it allows for more flexible variance-mean relationships than the models used hitherto. Estimation with maximum likelihood is illustrated using a dataset on ship damage incidents.

The study introduces a distinction between two types of labor mobility: direct job to job changes (which are assumed to be voluntary) and job changes after experiencing an unemployment spell (assumed to be involuntary). Exploiting the close relationship between those two phenomena we adopt a bivariate regression framework for our empirical analysis of data on male individuals in the German labor market. To account for the non-negative and discrete nature of the two counts of job changes in a ten year interval a new econometric model is proposed: the bivariate Poisson regression proves to be superior to the univariate specification. Further, the empirical content of distinguishing between two types of mobility is subject to a test, and, in fact, supported by the data: The hypothesis that both measures are observationally equivalent can be rejected.

Key demographic variables, such as the number of children and the number of marriages or divorces, can only take integer values. This papers deals with the estimation of single equation models in which the counts are regressed on a set of observed individual characteristics such as age, gender, or nationality. Most empirical work in population economics has neglected the fact that the dependent variable is a nonnegative integer. In the few cases where this feature was recognized, the authors advocated the use of the Poisson regression model. The Poisson model imposes, however, the equality of conditional mean and variance, a restriction which is often rejected by the data. We propose a generalized event count model to simultaneously allow for a wide class of count data models and account for over- and underdispersion. This model is successfully applied to German data on fertility, divorces and mobility.

This paper explores the relation between non-exponential waiting times between events and the distribution of the number of events in a fixed time interval. It is shown that within this framework the frequently observed phenomenon of overdispersion, i.e. a variance that exceeds the mean, is caused by a decreasing hazard function of the waiting times, while an increasing hazard function leads to underdispersion. Using the assumption of i.i.d. gamma distributed waiting times, a new count data model is derived. Its use is illustrated in two applications: the number of births, and the number of doctor consultations.

We use data from the German Socio-Economic Panel to investigate how individual happiness is affected by unemployment. Unemployment has a large and negative effect even after controlling for individual specific fixed effects. Nonparticipation, in contrast, is much less harmful to happiness. Further, we decompose the total well-being costs of unemployment and find that well above three quarters are non-pecuniary, and below one quarter pecuniary. One implication is that income support programs for the unemployed do very little at mitigating the adverse effects of unemployment, and such transfers are unlikely to generate unemployment.