How long shall a country take to learn the world technological frontier? What would happen if that country found the same difficulties in learning the true model of its economy? After all, countries catching up often experience life-changing transformations during the catch-up to a balanced growth path. We show that an open economy, learning rational expectations alongside foreign technology, may be characterized by excessive saving and current account surpluses, as often observed in the data and at odds with the standard open economy theoretical predictions, and not fully explained by standard adaptations such as habit formation. Moreover, such a learning process in a large developing country can upset the savings behavior of a fully rational expectations advanced country. In a US-China calibration, we show that this effect can be so strong as to explain important current account imbalances, the savings glut hypothesis, as well as the distribution of factor income.
How long shall a country take to learn the world technological frontier? What would happen if that country found the same difficulties in learning the true model of its economy? After all, countries catching up often experience life-changing transformations during the catch-up to a balanced growth path. We show that an open economy, learning rational expectations alongside foreign technology, may be characterized by excessive saving and current account surpluses, as often observed in the data and at odds with the standard open economy theoretical predictions, and not fully explained by standard adaptations such as habit formation. Moreover, such a learning process in a large developing country can upset the savings behavior of a fully rational expectations advanced country. In a US-China calibration, we show that this effect can be so strong as to explain important current account imbalances, the savings glut hypothesis, as well as the distribution of factor income.
The debate on volunteering has paid insufficient attention to the relationship between public spending and volunteering. Recently, the importance of this relationship was highlighted by the current British government's "Big Society" plan, which asserts that withdrawing public agencies and spending will be compensated by an increase in volunteering. This idea is based on the widely held belief that a high degree of government intervention decreases voluntary activities. This paper uses a multidisciplinary approach to develop a more refined understanding of how public spending affects the decision to volunteer. A theoretical model conceptualizes this relationship in terms of time donation by employed individuals. The model is empirically developed through an econometric analysis of two survey data sets and interpretative analysis of narratives of local volunteers and public professionals. The results suggest that volunteering is likely to decline when government intervention is decreased and recommend a collaborative approach to sustaining volunteering.
First generation endogenous growth models had the counterfactual implication that the long-term growth of per-capita GDP increased with the population size. Two influential growth paradigms, the semi-endogenous and the second generation fully endogenous, eliminated this strong scale effect. Both solutions have useful aspects and insights, but very different policy implications. This paper combines both approaches into a single hybrid model class, and shows that no matter the weight assigned to each paradigm, the long-run predictions of the semi-endogenous policy dominate with high enough population growth rates, while the long-run predictions of the fully endogenous policy dominate at low population growth rates.
First generation endogenous growth models had the counterfactual implication that the long-term growth of per-capita GDP increased with the population size. Two influential growth paradigms, the semi-endogenous and the second generation fully endogenous, eliminated this strong scale effect. Both solutions have useful aspects and
insights, but very different policy implications. This paper combines both approaches into a single hybrid model class, and shows that no matter the weight assigned to each paradigm, the long-run predictions of the semi-endogenous policy dominate with high enough population growth rates, while the long-run predictions of the fully endogenous
policy dominate at low population growth rates.
What if the statutory fiscal depreciation of buildings was higher than their effective economic depreciation? This would imply that markets would value buildings more than their social fundamental value. I prove that this would allow house price bubbles to emerge and open the door to sudden crashes. This paper provides an example of how a misaligned fiscal policy measure could generate potentially destabilizing self-fulfilling prophecies even in an economy with fully rational and forward-looking individuals.
This paper shows that combining the semi-endogenous and the fully endogenous growth mechanisms with a general CES aggregator, either growth process can prevail in the balanced growth path depending on their degree of complementarity/substitutability. Policy-induced long-run economic switches to the fully endogenous steady state as the R&D employment ratio surpasses a positive threshold are possible if the two growth engines are gross substitutes.
We study general dynamic programming problems with continuous and discrete choices and general constraints. The value functions may have kinks arising (1) at indifference points between discrete choices and (2) at constraint boundaries. Nevertheless, we establish a general envelope theorem: first-order conditions are necessary at interior optimal choices. We only assume differentiability of the utility function with respect to the continuous choices. The continuous choice may be from any Banach space and the discrete choice from any non-empty set.
This study explores the long-run effects of inflation in a two-country Schumpeterian growth model with cash-in-advance constraints on consumption and R&D investment. We find that increasing domestic inflation reduces domestic R&D investment and the growth rate of domestic technology. Given that economic growth in a country depends on both domestic and foreign technologies, increasing foreign inflation also affects the domestic economy. When each government conducts its monetary policy unilaterally to maximize the welfare of domestic households, the Nash-equilibrium inflation rates are generally higher than the optimal inflation rates chosen by cooperative governments who maximize the welfare of both domestic and foreign households. Under the CIA constraint on R&D (consumption), a larger market power of firms amplifies (mitigates) this inflationary bias. We use cross-country panel data to estimate the effects of inflation on R&D and also calibrate the two-country model to data in the Euro Area and the US to quantify the welfare effects of decreasing the inflation rates from the Nash equilibrium to the optimal level.
This study explores the macroeconomic effects of labor unions in a two-country R&D-based growth model in which the market size of each country determines the incentives for innovation. We find that an increase in the bargaining power of a wage-oriented union leads to a decrease in employment in the domestic economy. This result has two important implications on innovation. First, it reduces the rates of innovation and economic growth. Second, it causes innovation to be directed to the foreign economy, which in turn causes a negative effect on domestic wages relative to foreign wages in the long run. We also derive welfare implications and calibrate our model to data in the US and the UK to quantify the effects of labour unions on social welfare and wage inequality across countries. Our calibrated model is able to explain about half of the decrease in relative wage between the US and the UK from 1980 to 2007. Furthermore, the decrease in unions' bargaining power leads to quantitatively significant welfare gains in the two countries.
