Who is the best Formula 1 driver? Until today it was impossible to answer this question because the observable performance of a driver depends both on his talent and the quality of his cars. In this article we separate for the first time driver talent from car quality by econometrically analyzing data for 57 years of Formula 1 racing. Our estimates also control for the number of drivers finishing, technical breakdowns and many other variables that influence race results. While Michael Schumacher is often believed to be the best driver, he is overtaken by Juan Manuel Fangio and Jim Clark
1. CHAPITRE PRELIMINAIRE 1.1 Introduction Cette étude a pour objet les problèmes de coordination et d'harmonisation fiscales dans un système fédéral. Pris au sens général, la coordination et l'harmonisation fiscales se réfèrent à l'ensemble des mesures permettant de passer d'un système fiscal épars à un système uniforme, puis unifié. Par système fiscal épars, on entend un système dans lequel la souveraineté fiscale, respectivement les compétences de définir et de prélever des impôts, sont éparpillées entre les niveaux de gouvernement et, à chaque niveau, entre les gouvernements, d'où une situation de conflits. Par système fiscal uniforme, on entend un système fiscal dans lequel les gouvernements appliquent des règles semblables; si ces dernières sont identiques, alors le système fiscal est réputé >
This article discusses the smallness of subsidiary jurisdictions as a third dimension of centrality, besides vertical centrality and fragmentation (horizontal centrality). A panel analysis concerning all 26 Swiss cantons (from 1990 to 2003) shows that public expenditure per capita increases with the number of inhabitants of a canton. This holds for the aggregate expenditure level and for six expenditure categories of the Government Finance Statistics. The positive elasticity of per capita expenditure with respect to population size can be understood as an indicator for increasing government failure in jurisdictions with bigger population size
The purpose of this paper is to deal with two features of the multinational behaviour not found in previous models of transfer pricing. First on the contrary to earlier literature, we assume that quantity (or price) decisions are no more centralised but are delegated to exporting and importing affiliates. Second, we underline the importance of strategic interactions with other firms in local markets to calculate the optimal transfer price. We find that the existence of Cournot (or Bertrand) competition on local markets implies that the transfer price should deviate from the marginal cost of the exporting affiliate because of three effects: (1) a profit shifting effect; (2) a stratégic effect on the foreign market; (3) a cost effect on the national market. The optimal transfer price generally depends on both the nature of the competition and the relative magnitude of the later effects. Finally the paper deals with both cost asymetries effects on the transfert price charged by the multinational and conditions under which the multinational will forclose the rival firm when it supply to the rival an input that is monopolised
Research on leadership in economics has developed in parallel to the literature in management and psychology and links between the fields have been sparse. Whereas modern leadership scholars mostly focus on transformational and related leadership styles, economists have mainly emphasized the role of contracts, control rights, and incentives. We argue that both fields could profit from enriching their approach with insights from the other field. We review and synthesize the economics literature on leadership in organizations and discuss how leadership scholars in management and psychology can benefit from the detailed understanding of transactional methods that economists have developed. We link the contributions in economics to a broad set of topics including the foundations of leadership, leader emergence, and leader effectiveness. At the same time, we also point out limitations of the economic approach and outline how the integration of leadership research and economics would broaden the scope of future studies.
There is a growing body of evidence that many entrepreneurs seem to enter and persist in entrepreneurship despite earning low risk-adjusted returns. This has lead to attempts to provide explanations—using both standard economic theory and behavioral economics—for why certain individuals may be attracted to such an apparently unprofitable activity. Drawing on research in behavioral economics, in the sections that follow, we review three sets of possible interpretations for understanding the empirical facts related to the entry into, and persistence in, entrepreneurship. Differences in risk aversion provide a plausible and intuitive interpretation of entrepreneurial activity. In addition, a growing literature has begun to highlight the potential importance of overconfidence in driving entrepreneurial outcomes. Such a mechanism may appear at face value to work like a lower level of risk aversion, but there are clear conceptual differences—in particular, overconfidence likely arises from behavioral biases and misperceptions of probability distributions. Finally, nonpecuniary taste-based factors may be important in motivating both the decisions to enter into and to persist in entrepreneurship.
Since the seminal contribution of Jackson and Wolinsky (J Econ Theory 71(1):44–74, 1996) it has been widely acknowledged that the formation of social networks exhibits a general conflict between individual strategic behavior and collective outcome. What has not been studied systematically are the sources of inefficiency. We approach this omission by analyzing the role of positive and negative externalities of link formation. This yields general results that relate situations of positive externalities with stable networks that cannot be “too dense” in a well-defined sense, while situations with negative externalities tend to induce “too dense” networks. Those results are neither restricted to specific assumptions on the agents’ preferences (e.g. homogeneity), nor to a specific notion of stability or efficiency.
Traded corporations are required by law to have a majority of outside directors on their board. This requirement allows the existence of directors who sit on the board of two or more corporations at the same time, generating what is commonly known as interlocking directorates. While research has shown that networks of interlocking directorates facilitate the transmission of information between corporations, little is known about the extent to which such interlocking networks can explain the fluctuations of stock price returns. Yet, this is a special concern since the risk of amplifying stock fluctuations is latent. To answer this question, here we analyze the board composition, traders’ perception, and stock performance of more than 1,500 US traded corporations from 2007-2011. First, we find that the fewer degrees of separation between two corporations in the interlocking network, the stronger the temporal correlation between their stock price returns. Second, we find that the centrality of traded corporations in the interlocking network correlates with the frequency at which financial traders talk about such corporations, and this frequency is in turn proportional to the corresponding traded volume. Third, we show that the centrality of corporations was negatively associated with their stock performance in 2008, the year of the big financial crash. These results suggest that the strategic decisions made by interlocking directorates are strongly followed by stock analysts and have the potential to correlate and amplify the movement of stock prices during financial crashes. These results may have relevant implications for scholars, investors, and regulators.
