This paper uses the World Bank's Enterprise Surveys as a sample of 18 developing and emerging economies to investigate the causal relationship between global value chains and the transfer of technology to manufacturing firms in developing nations. It focuses on one specific channel for technology transfer, namely the licensing of foreign technology. By using a propensity score matching difference-in-differences technique, I show that there is a positive and causal impact of being involved in complex international activities (i.e. being a two-way trader) on the licensing of technology. Importantly, domestic firms becoming two-way traders are more likely to acquire foreign-licensed technology than domestic firms starting to either export or import. These findings suggest that the complexity associated with the trading activity determines whether or not foreign technology is licensed.
The paper presents some evidence on the overwhelming relevance of systemic risk and the lesser importance of US interest rates in the global transmission of shocks. This evidence suggests that the literature could benefi t from incorporating global con dence variables into global frameworks in the study of the global transmission of shocks. As framework, we used a global semi-structural model (GSSM) augmented with common factors for country risk and country credit. We approximated country risk with historical stock volatility, a measure that is uniform and available across countries; in addition, we measured spillovers as the share of forecast error variance explained by different volatility factors. We found that systemic risk is the main volatility factor in all systemic economies, and also accounts for the bulk of spillovers into non systemic economies. Other volatility factors such as global credit, foreign interest rates and trade-related factors rarely accounted for shares of forecast error variance above one percent.
Relative to the study of free trade agreements, customs unions (CUs) have been neglected in international law scholarship, despite the fact that by no means do they constitute a recent phenomenon. The present article aims to fill this gap by conducting a scoping analysis of the concept of customs union and identifying key issues in CU designs. The article problematizes what is understood by the concept of CU and what is entailed by the foremost definition of CUs, found in Article XXIV of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). It further investigates how recurrent design issues are resolved in practice by different CUs considering the inherent tension between the enactment of common rules and institutions and state sovereignty. We find variety in the historical, economic and legal conceptualizations of CUs, flexibility and lacunas in Article XXIV GATT, and diversity of CU designs along with a discernible concern for the legal arrangements’ impact on state sovereignty.
For multiple decades, activists have sought to institute an international legal regime that limits the ability of despotic governments to borrow money and then shift those obligations onto more democratic successor governments. Our goal in this article is to raise the possibility of an alternate legal path to raising the costs of borrowing for despotic regimes. All countries have systems of domestic laws that regulate agency relationships and try to deter corruption; otherwise the domestic economy would not function. Despotic governments, we conjecture, are especially likely to engage in transactions that are legally problematic. The reason being that despotic governments, by definition, lack the support of the populace; meaning that there is a high likelihood that actions that they take on behalf of the populace can be challenged as unrepresentative and contrary to the interests of the true principals. The foregoing conditions, if one translates them into the context of an ordinary principal-agent relationship, would constitute a voidable transaction in most modern legal systems. That means that if opposition parties in countries with despotic governments today were to monitor and make public the potential problems with debt issuances by their despotic rulers under their own local laws, it would raise the cost of capital for those despots. To support our argument, we use both the concrete example of the debt issuance shenanigans of the Maduro government in Venezuela and a more general analysis of the relationship between corruption, democracy and a nation's borrowing costs.
On March 22, 2018, Trump proposed to impose tariffs on up to $50 billion of Chinese imports leading to a significant concern over the "Trade War" between the US and China. We evaluate the market responses to this event for firms in both countries, depending on their direct and indirect exposures to US-China trade. US firms that are more dependent on exports to and imports from China have lower stock and bond returns but higher default risks in the short time window around the announcement date. We also find that firms' indirect exposure to US-China trade through domestic input-output linkages affects their responses to the announcement. These findings suggest that the structure of US-China trade is much more complex than the simplistic view of global trade that engendered Trump's "Trade War" against China.
This paper reviews the economic and historical literature on debt mutualization in Europe with reference to pre-1914 guaranteed bonds and current Eurobonds debate. We emphasize that, notwithstanding the differences in scale and nature, debt mutualization solutions similar to Eurobonds were tried before, and the closest historical examples to the present debate are the pre-1914 guaranteed bonds. We highlight three key characteristics of debt mutualization, which are apparent both in the current debate and in history: moral hazard, debt dilution and conditionality. We show that the fears about short-run dilution and moral hazard were not unknown to pre-1914 market participants. These problems were partly addressed by mechanisms of conditionality such as international financial control. The historical evidence suggests that the dilution of outstanding obligations may be overplayed in the current debate. On the contrary, creditors' moral hazard (ignored in current debt mutualization proposals) was as problematic as the usual debtor's moral hazard –especially when the groups of countries guaranteeing the bonds and the creditor nations did not overlap entirely.
Contrary to widespread presumption, a surprisingly large number of countries have been able to finance a significant fraction of their investment for extended periods using foreign finance. While many of these episodes are in countries where official finance is important, we also identify episodes where a substantial fraction of domestic investment is financed by private capital inflows. Although there is evidence of a positive growth effect of such inflows in the short run, that positive impact dissipates after 5 years and turns negative over longer horizons. Many such episodes end abruptly, with compression of the current account and sharp slowdowns in investment and growth. Summing over the inflow (current account deficit) episode and its aftermath, we find that growth is slower than when countries rely on domestic savings. The implication is that financing growth and investment out of foreign savings, while not impossible, is risky and too often counterproductive.
We show that an increase in aggregate uncertainty -measured by stock market volatility- reduces productivity growth more in industries that depend heavily on external finance. The mechanism at play is that during periods of high uncertainty, firms that are credit constrained switch the composition of investment by reducing productivity-enhancing investment- such as on ICT capital- which is more subject to liquidity risks (Aghion et al., 2010). The effect is larger during recessions, when financing constraints are more likely to be binding, than during expansions. Our statistical method-a difference-in-difference approach using productivity growth of 25 industries from 18 advanced economies over the period 1985–2010-mitigates concerns with omitted variable bias and reverse causality. The results are robust to the inclusion of other sources of interaction effects, instrumental variable approaches, and different datasets. The results also hold if economic policy uncertainty (Baker et al., 2016) is used instead of stock market volatility as a measure of aggregate uncertainty.
Using a cross-country panel of 925 banks from 19 advanced economies, for the period 1981-2016, I examine how the bank lending channel of monetary policy has evolved over time. I find that the sensitivity of lending to bank balance sheet liquidity declines over time, with nearly all the reduction occurring between the early 1990s and the early 2000s. Contrary to normal times, during recessions, more liquid banks reinforce the impact of monetary policy shocks on lending relative to their less liquid counterparts. The sensitivity of non-interest income to lending increases sharply from the late 1990s till the global financial crisis of 2008, and declines in the post-crisis period, indicating pro-cyclicality. Moreover, the relative ability of banks with higher non-interest income to mitigate monetary policy shocks increases sharply towards the end of the sample period, capturing the impact of the prolonged low inter- est rate environment on transmission process. These findings suggest that the structural changes in the banking industry and the state of the economy have a significant impact on the strength of the bank lending channel.
This article examines the recent evolution of the EU anti-money-laundering (AML) and counter-terrorist financing (CTF) legislative framework, focusing on the relationship between the main international standards in the field and the newest EU legislation. It suggests that international soft law norms—in particular, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) Recommendations—have had a decisive influence on the latest development of legislation at the EU level and within its member states. It further argues that mainly the preventive component of the AML/CTF legislation will be strengthened by the EU instruments adopted in mid-2015. However, this Article concludes that the adoption of global soft standards has posed significant challenges to the EU legislative framework. The arguments are developed in four parts. The Article first highlights the main regulatory prescriptions that stem from the study of the phenomenology and the economics of AML/CTF regulation and underpin the current international regulatory paradigm. Second, it explores the evolution of the main international instruments in the field with a special focus on the role played by the FATF Recommendations. It also illustrates the relation between these instruments and the adoption of the new EU AML/CTF legislation from two different, but complementary, angles: (1) noting that the current international AML/CTF framework has a multidisciplinary approach, the Article focuses on the framework's repressive component and assessing the limits of the EU criminal approach against money laundering and terrorist financing; and (2) examining the recent EU preventive legislation and addressing the main challenges posed to the EU legislative framework when attempting to accommodate global standards, especially regarding tensions with fundamental freedoms and human rights protected within the EU.
