We conduct an experiment assessing the extent to which people trade off the economic costs of truthfulness against the intrinsic costs of lying. The results allow us to reject a type-based model. People's preferences for truthfulness do not identify them as only either "economic types" (who care only about consequences) or "ethical types" (who care only about process). Instead, we find that preferences for truthfulness are heterogeneous among individuals. Moreover, when examining possible sources of intrinsic costs of lying and their interplay with economic costs of truthfulness, we find that preferences for truthfulness are also heterogeneous within individuals.
We conduct an empirical investigation of the exposure of U.S. REIT returns to commonality in liquidity. Taking advantage of the specific characteristics of REITs, we study three types of commonality in liquidity: within-asset commonality, cross-asset commonality (with the stock market), and commonality with the underlying property market. We find evidence that the three types of commonality in liquidity represent significant risk factors for REIT returns but only during bad market conditions. We also find that using a linear approach, rather than a conditional, would have underestimated the role of commonality in liquidity risk. This could explain (at least partly) the small impact of commonality on asset prices documented in the extant literature. We also analyze the economic sources of commonality in liquidity and find that demand-side factors prevail over supply-side factors.
This article analyzes the effect of liquidity risk on the performance of equity hedge fund portfolios. Similarly to Avramov, Kosowski, Naik, and Teo (2007),(2011), we observe that, before accounting for the effect of liquidity risk, hedge fund portfolios that incor- porate predictability in managerial skills generate superior performance. This outperfor-mance disappears or weakens substantially for most emerging markets, event-driven, and long/short hedge fund portfolios once we account for liquidity risk. Moreover, we show that the equity market-neutral and long/short hedge fund portfolios' “alphas” also entail rents for their service as liquidity providers. These results hold under various robustness tests.
We argue that the prospect of an imperfect enforcement of debt contracts in default reduces shareholder-debtholder conflicts and induces leveraged firms to invest more and take on less risk as they approach financial distress. To test these predictions, we use a large panel of firms in 41 countries with heterogeneous debt enforcement characteristics. Consistent with our model, we find that the relation between debt enforcement and firms' investment and risk depends on the firm-specific probability of default. A difference-in-differences analysis of firms' investment and risk taking in response to bankruptcy reforms that make debt more renegotiable confirms the cross-country evidence.
The eurozone has a single short-term nominal interest rate, but monetary policy conditions measured by real short-term interest rates varied substantially across countries in the period 2003–2010. We use this cross-country variation in the (local)tightness of monetary policy to examine its influence on equity and money market flows. In line with a powerful risk-shifting channel, we find that fund investors in countries with decreased real interest rates shift their portfolio investment out of the money market and into the riskier equity market,causing significant equity price inflation in countries where investment home bias is the strongest
