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A simple mechanism for the efficient provision of public goods: experimental evidence

The author reports on a series of experiments designed to investigate the factor of incentive mechanisms in the case of private provisions of public goods. In the Control treatment, there was no mechanism so that subjects faced strong free-riding incentives. In the so-called Falkinger mechanism treatment, the author implemented the Falkinger mechanism. The studies explored the impact…

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English / 01/01/2000

Education, Educational Policy and Growth

This paper reviews the recent theoretical and empirical literature that relates education to growth, and draws some lessons for the Swedish experience. First, the “human capital accumulation” approach is discussed: agents decide, at each moment of their lives, to forego time or resources to improve their future productivity. The quality of the educational system is argued to be a…

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English / 01/01/2000

Chess-like games are dominance solvable in at most two steps

We show that strictly competitive, finite games of perfect information that may end in one of three possible ways can be solved by applying only two rounds of elimination of dominated strategies.

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English / 01/01/2000

“Yes men”, integrity, and the optimal design of incentive contracts

In a pioneering approach towards the explanation of the phenomenon of “yes man” behavior in organizations, Prendergast [American Economic Review 83 (1993) 757–770] argued that incentive contracts in employment relationships generally make a worker distort his privately acquired information. This would imply that there is a trade-off between inducing a worker to exert costly effort…

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English / 01/01/2000

Strategic transfer pricing, absorption costing, and observability

This paper analyses the use of transfer pricing as a strategic device in divisionalized firms facing duopolistic price competition. When transfer prices are observable, both firms’ headquarters will charge a transfer price above the marginal cost of the intermediate product to induce their marketing managers to behave as softer competitors in the final product market. When transfer…

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English / 01/01/2000

Strategic transfer pricing, absorption costing, and observability

This paper analyses the use of transfer pricing as a strategic device in divisionalized firms facing duopolistic price competition. When transfer prices are observable, both firms’ headquarters will charge a transfer price above the marginal cost of the intermediate product to induce their marketing managers to behave as softer competitors in the final product market. When transfer…

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English / 01/01/2000

Inequality, Redistribution, and Economic Growth

This paper provides a critical review of the recent literature on inequality and growth. After discussing historical and more recent distributional trends as well as empirical evidence on the relationship between inequality and growth, I focus on recent explanations of the inequality-growth puzzle. I consider both the impact of the functional and the personal distribution on long-run…

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English / 01/01/2000

Is there a Golden Rule for the Stochastic Solow Growth Model?

This paper analyzes the dependence of average consumption on the saving rate in a one-sector neoclassical Solow growth model with production shocks and stochastic rates of population growth and depreciation where arbitrary ergodic processes are considered. The long-run behavior of the stochastic capital intensity and hence average consumption is uniquely determined by a random fixed…

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English / 01/01/2000

Fast high precision decision rules for valuing manufacturing flexibility

The valuation of Flexible Manufacturing Systems is one of the most frequently undertaken productivity improvement activities. In practice, the introduction of an FMS into industry must be done on the basis of cost justification. Recently developed techniques for the evaluation of the value of flexibility typically include the computation of stochastic dynamic programs. However, the…

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English / 01/01/2000

Managerial Power and Compensation

According to the widely used Managerial Power Model, a higher hierarchical position with associated higher power leads to higher compensation. In contrast, the Compensating Wage Differentials Model argues that there is a non-positive relationship between positional power and total compensation. Both power and income yield utility and in equilibrium managers are prepared to trade-off…

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English / 01/12/1999

Ecological Tax Reform with Exemptions for the Export Sector in a two Sector two Factor Model

This present paper analyzes an energy tax reform that exempts the energy-intensive export sector from paying the energy tax and uses the additional revenue to cut existing taxes in all sectors. To that end, a two sector two factor model of an open economy that is small on the import side but not on the export side is applied. Within this model, an equivalence between a tax reform…

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English / 01/12/1999

Business Cycle Phenomena in Overlapping Generations Economies with Stochastic Production

This paper analyzes economic fluctuations in an overlapping generations economy with productive capital in which random shocks in aggregate productivity are present. Under specific assumptions we obtain an explicit solution of the model. Applying random dynamical systems theory, we can prove that the long-run behavior of the economy is uniquely described by an asymptotically stable…

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English / 01/12/1999

Outcome, Process & Power in Direct Democracy

Based on survey data for Switzerland, new empirical findings on direct democracy are presented. In the first part, we show that, on average, public employees receive lower financial compensation under more direct democratic institutions. However, top bureaucrats are more constrained in direct democracies and have to be compensated by higher wages for that loss of power. In the second…

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English / 01/11/1999

Motivation, Knowledge Transfer, and Organizational Forms

"Employees are motivated intrinsically as well as extrinsically. Intrinsic motivation is crucial when tacit knowledge in and between teams must be transferred. Organizational forms enable different kinds of motivation and have different capacities to generate and transfer tacit knowledge. Since knowledge generation and transfer are essential for a firm’s sustainable…

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English / 01/11/1999

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