infonet-economy

We develop an algorithm to compute asset allocations for Kahneman and Tversky’s (Econometrica, 47(2), 263–291, 1979) prospect theory. An application to benchmark data as in Fama and French (Journal of Financial Economics, 47(2), 427–465, 1992) shows that the equity premium puzzle is resolved for parameter values similar to those found in the laboratory experiments of Kahneman and…

A new point estimator for the AR(1) coefficient in the linear regression model with arbitrary exogenous regressors and stationary AR(1) disturbances is developed. Its construction parallels that of the median--unbiased estimator, but uses the mode as a measure of central tendency. The mean--adjusted estimator is also considered, and saddlepoint approximations are used to lower the…

Both institutional and private investors often have only limited flexibility in timing their investment decision. They look for investments that will ideally be independent of the timing decision. In this article, a new class of derivative products whose payoff is linked to the trend of the underlying instrument is introduced. By linking the trend to the payoff, the timing of the…

In spite of the fact that they can draw on a larger, more liquid and more diversiedpool of capital than the equity of reinsurance companies, nancial markets have failedto displace reinsurance as the primary risk-sharing vehicle for natural catastropherisk. We show that this failure can be explained by dierences in information gatheringincentives between nancial markets and…

Shareholder agreements govern the relations among shareholders in privately held firms, such as joint ventures and venture capital-backed companies. We provide an economic explanation for key clauses in such agreements 14namely, put and call options, tag-along and drag-along rights, demand and piggy-back rights, and catch-up clauses. In a dynamic moral hazard setting, we show that…

When information is costly, a seller may wish to prevent prospective buyers from acquiring information, for the cost of information acquisition ultimately is borne by the seller. A seller can achieve the desired prevention through posted-priceselling, by offering prospective buyers a discount. No such prevention is possible in the case of an auction. We establish the result that the…

This paper studies how the investors' attitude towards earnings surprises a®ects the managers' incentives to manipulate earnings in an intertemporal context, where the consensus forecast of the analysts is not exogenously given but determined by the strategic interaction between the analysts and the managers. Our analysis shows that given the asymmetric investors'…

In this paper I demonstrate how one can generalize finitely many examples to statements about (infinite) classes of economic models. If there exist upper bounds on the number of connected components of one-dimensional linear subsets of the set of parameters for which a conjecture is true, one can conclude that it is correct for all parameter values in the class considered, except for…