Alberto Alesina and Edward Glaeser's recent book, Fighting Poverty in the US and Europe, exemplifies the recent incursion of economists into the domains of political science and sociology. In thinking about welfare states, economists have traditionally been interested in their effects on the distribution of income and, above all, their implications for efficiency and growth. Alesina and Glaeser instead set out to explain why the American welfare state is so small by comparison to European welfare states. This, then, is a book about American exceptionalism in the realm of social policy, but Alesina and Glaeser's discussion also addresses the general problem of accounting for cross-national variation in the public provision of social welfare. Their project is to provide an account of the exceptional nature of the American welfare state that is consistent with and sheds light on differences among other welfare states as well. This makes for an audacious book that deserves critical scrutiny.
This article examines a model of the domestic political economy of subjective employment insecurity in advanced industrial societies. Based on data on people’s attitudes toward their job as well as levels of and kinds of social protection collected in 15 OECD countries, it shows that there are distinct manifestations of job insecurity that are affected differently by distinct aspects of social protection programs. While the analysis shows that social protection measures reduce employment insecurity, it also reveals that overall levels welfare state generosity do not have any systematic effect on whether workers feel secure. The article’s findings suggest the need to decompose the different components of employ- ment insecurity as well as disaggregate national systems of social protection when examining the impact of welfare states on job insecurity.
We use data from the Luxembourg Income Study to examine household market inequality, redistribution, and the relationship between market inequality and redistribution in affluent OECD countries in the 1980s and 1990s. We observe sizeable increases in market household inequality in most countries. This development appears to have been driven largely, though not exclusively, by changes in employment: in countries with better employment performance, low-earning households benefited relative to high- earning ones; in nations with poor employment performance, low-earning households fared worse. In contrast to widespread rhet- oric about the decline of the welfare state, redistribution increased in most countries during this period, as existing social-welfare programs compensated for the rise in market inequality. They did so in proportion to the degree of increase in inequality, producing a very strong positive association between changes in market inequality and changes in redistribution. We discuss the relevance of median-voter theory and power resources theory for understanding differences across countries and changes over time in the extent of compensatory redistribution.
This paper explores temporal variation in partisan effects on social spending growth in OECD countries over the period 1971–2002. We argue that partisan effects are jointly conditioned by globalization and the mobilizational capacity of organized labour. We present three main empirical findings. First, we show that partisan effects increased from the mid-1970s to the late 1980s and then dis- appeared in the 1990s. Second, we show that partisan effects rose with globaliza- tion in the 1970s and early 1980s, a period characterized by rising labour strength in many OECD countries, but this is not true for the post-1990 period, characterized by declining labour strength. Third, we show that globalization was associated with declining partisan effects in countries that experienced union decline in the 1980s and 1990s, but it was associated with rising partisan effects in countries in which unions remained strong.
Against the current consensus among comparative political economists, we argue that inequality matters for redistributive politics in advanced capitalist societies, but it is the structure of inequality, not the level of inequality, that matters. Our theory posits that middle-income voters will be inclined to ally with low-income voters and support redistributive policies when the distance between the middle and the poor is small relative to the distance between the middle and the rich. We test this proposition with data from 15 to 18 advanced democracies and find that both redistribution and nonelderly social spending increase as the dispersion of earnings in the upper half of the distribution increases relative to the dispersion of earnings in the lower half of the distribution. In addition, we present survey evidence on preferences for redistribution among middle-income voters that is consistent with our theory and regression results indicating that the left parties are more likely to participate in government when the structure of inequality is characterized by skew.
Why is it that some countries have witnessed significant increases in inequality since the 1960s while at the same time experiencing very little change in the way politics is conducted? And why is it that in other countries, where inequality has increased much less, the Left has become substantially more redistributive? The answer, the authors argue, has to do with the interaction between inequality and political mobilization of low-income voters. The authors make two points in this article. First, high levels of inequality move Left parties to the left. Second, although increasing inequality pushes the core constituencies of Left parties to the left, it also makes some individuals less likely to be involved in politics. The authors argue that Left parties will respond to an increase in inequality only when low-income voters are politically mobilized. They explore these claims through a comparative analysis of Left party programs in 10 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development countries over the period 1966 to 2002.
This article draws on a new data set that enables the authors to compare the distribution of income from employment across OECD countries. Specifically, the article conducts a pooled cross-sectional time-series analysis of the determinants of wage inequality in sixteen countries from 1973 to 1995. The analysis shows that varieties of capitalism matter. The authors find that the qualities that distinguish social market economies from liberal market economies shape the way political and institutional variables influence wage inequality. Of particular interest to political scientists is the finding that the wage-distributive effects of government partisanship are contingent on institutional context. Union density emerges in the analysis as the single most important factor influencing wage inequality in both institutional contexts.
Can egalitarianism itself contribute to growth? This political scientist looks at the recent success of the Nordic states and answers "yes." He also cites other characteristics that have made the Nordic economies work, not least their investment in education and policies to promote female employment.
Explaining why the German speaking Swiss were so reluctant about joining the European Economic Area and the French German speaking were so enthusiastic.
Since the 2000s, local communities responsible for the management of common-pool resources, such as water or forest, have started to organize themselves regionally in order to promote their mode of community-based governance. Such a change in the scale of governance and in the agency of local communities reflects the on-going globalization of common-pool resources. Furthermore, it illustrates the evolving nature of global environmental governance that now includes new actors from civil society. Relying on a comparison of two transnational community-based networks in Latin America, the paper will first study the strategies and interests of such communities in the transformation of global norms affecting the management of their resources. Secondly, it will analyze the extent to which the relationships between those communal groups and nation states still remain decisive. Finally, it will question how this involvement of grassroots movements modifies both the essence of natural resources and their scales of governance.
