We document that in the European car industry, exchange rate pass-through is larger for low than for high quality cars. To rationalize this pattern, we develop a model of quality pricing and international trade based on the preferences of Musa and Rosen (1978). Firms sell goods of heterogeneous quality to consumers that differ in their willingness to pay for quality. Each firm produces a unique quality of the good and enjoys local market power, which depends on the prices and qualities of its closest competitors. The market power of a firm depends on the prices and qualities of its direct competitors in the quality dimension. The top quality firm, being exposed to just one direct competitor, enjoys the highest market power and equilibrium markup. Because higher quality exporters are closer to the technological leader, markups are generally increasing in quality, exporting is relatively more profitable for high quality than for low quality firms, and the degree of exchange rate pass-through is decreasing in quality.
Deviations of national industrial production indexes from trend explain time variation in excess returns on the G7 countries' stock markets. This paper highlights that this finding is driven by a global, common component in the national production gaps. The global component is not a mirror image of the U.S. business cycle. Quite to the contrary, a "rest-ofthe-world" production gap explains time variation in U.S. stock market excess returns while the U.S.-specific production gap does not. However, both U.S.-specific and global gap components explain time-varying excess returns on U.S. bonds. The relative importance of the U.S.-specific risk gap increases with the maturity of bonds.
In this paper we follow the recent empirical literature that has specified reduced-form models for price setting that are closely tied to (S, s)-pricing rules. Our contribution to the literature is twofold. First, we propose an estimator that relaxes distributional assumptions on the unobserved heterogeneity. Second, we use the estimator to examine asymmetries in price-setting behavior. Using micro price data underlying the Swiss CPI we find that a substantial share of asymmetries in the frequency of price changes can be traced back to a rising aggregate price level. We show that asymmetries would be reduced substantially in the absence of aggregate inflation.
Financial markets are known for overreacting to public information. Central banks can reduce this overreaction either by disclosing information to a fraction of market participants only (partial publicity) or by disclosing information to all participants but with ambiguity (partial transparency). We show that, in theory, both communication strategies are strictly equivalent in the sense that overreaction can be indifferently mitigated by reducing the degree of publicity or by reducing the degree of transparency. We run a laboratory experiment to test whether theoretical predictions hold in a game played by human beings. In line with theory, the experiment does not allow the formulation of a clear preference in favor of either communication strategy. This paper then discusses the opportunity for central banks to choose between partial transparency and partial publicity to control market reaction to their disclosures.
In this paper we assess whether persistently too low interest rates can cause housing bubbles. For a sample of 14 OECD countries, we calculate the deviations of house prices from their (theoretically implied) fundamental value and define them as bubbles. We then estimate the impact that a deviation of short term interest rates from the Taylor-implied interest rates have on house price bubbles. We additionally assess whether interest rates that have remained low for a longer period of time have a greater impact on house price overvaluation. Our results indicate that there is a strong link between low interest rates and housing bubbles. This impact is especially strong when interest rates are "too low for too long". We argue that, by ensuring that rates do not deviate too far from Taylorimplied rates, central banks could lean against house price fluctuations without considering house price developments directly. If this is not possible, e.g. because a single monetary policy is confronted with a very heterogenous economic development within the currency area, alternative counter cyclical measures have to be considered.
Cross-country variation in average retirement age is usually attributed to institutional differences that affect individuals' incentives to retire. We suggest a different approach. Since workers in different occupations naturally retire at different ages, the composition of occupations within an economy matters for its average retirement age. Using U.S. data we infer the average retirement age by occupation, which we then use to predict the retirement age of 38 countries according to the occupational composition of these countries. Our findings suggest that the differences in occupational composition explain up to 39.2% of the observed cross-country variation in retirement age.
We model the choice of loan currency in a framework which features a trade-off between lower cost of debt and the risk of firm-level distress costs. Under perfect information, if foreign currency funds come at a lower interest rate, all foreign currency earners as well as those local currency earners with high revenues and/or low distress costs choose foreign currency loans. When the banks have imperfect information on the currency and level of firm revenues, even more local earners switch to foreign currency loans, as they do not bear the full cost of the corresponding credit risk. Thus information asymmetry between banks and firms can be a potential driver of "dollarization" in credit markets.
Cross-border asset and liability holdings allow countries to insulate their consumption streams from idiosyncratic output shocks, i.e. consumption risk sharing. By contrast, banks' international interconnectedness spread the U.S. subprime mortgage crisis to various economies with adverse macroeconomic consequences. This paper evaluates the partial impact of banks' cross-border links on the ability of their host countries to share consumption risk internationally. It shows that the impact of banks' links to the non-bank sector in the rest-of-the-world on consumption risk sharing is negligible while strong interbank links are associated with relatively little consumption risk sharing of banks' host countries.
We define risk spillover as the dependence of a given asset variance on the past covariances and variances of other assets. Building on this idea, we propose the use of a highly flexible and tractable model to forecast the volatility of an international equity portfolio. According to the risk management strategy proposed, portfolio risk is seen as a specific combination of daily realized variances and covariances extracted froma high frequency dataset, which includes equities and currencies. In this framework, we focus on the risk spillovers across equities within the same sector (sector spillover), and fromcurrencies to international equities (currency spillover). We compare these specific risk spillovers to a more general framework (full spillover) whereby we allow for lagged dependence across all variances and covariances. The forecasting analysis shows that considering only sector- and currency-risk spillovers, rather than full spillovers, improves performance, both in economic and statistical terms.
This paper argues that the expansion in reserves following recent quantitative easing programs of the Federal Reserve may have affected long-term interest rates through liquidity effects. The data lends some support for liquidity effects, in that reserves were negatively correlated with long-term yields at the zero lower bound. Estimates suggest that between January 2009 and 2011, 10-year US Treasury yields fell 46-85 basis points as a result of liquidity effects. The liquidity effect is separate from the portfolio balance effect of the change in the public supply of Treasury bonds, which is estimated to have reduced yields by another 20 basis points during that period.
