Following the vote for Brexit, the UK is facing a formidable challenge: designing a new trade policy to address its new strategic interests. Considering the different and frequently opposing interests, this task is far from straightforward.
Despite initial intentions to better align transatlantic regulation and associated practices in the negotiation of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), this was not possible for rules concerning genetically modified organisms and data privacy. By 2016 both matters effectively fell off the TTIP negotiating agenda. This paper identifies the factors responsible, specifically the critical role played by independent regulatory agencies and associated bureaucratic politics, transnational coalitions of private sector organizations, and non-government organizations and contingency. These factors are not exclusive to the two salient regulations considered here, with the implication that the identification of cross-border spillovers is at best a necessary condition for the successful negotiation of binding trade rules on behind-the-border government policies.
This article attempts to show that from 12 December 2016, WTO Members can no longer use the analogue country or similar methodologies as the basis for normal value calculations in anti-dumping proceedings targeting China and should rather use Chinese domestic prices or costs. However, contrary to what some would like decision-makers to believe, this does not mean that the EU or other WTO Members will have no defence against genuine Chinese dumping practices. Other provisions in either the ADA or the SCM Agreement offer sufficient guarantees against that. Furthermore, our assessment of the manner in which the Commission has conducted MES reviews casts doubt on the quality of the evidentiary base used, on the apparent willingness to give some trading partners the benefit of the doubt but not to others, and on the utility of the review process as a lever to encourage reforms in transition economies, such as China.
Wie bereitet man Manager auf die Anforderungen einer VUCA-Welt vor? Was muss sich aufgrund steigender Komplexität und Unsicherheit ändern an der Art und Weise, wie wir Studierende und Praktiker für ihre Arbeit qualifizieren? Wie trainiert man dabei Fertigkeiten wie Resilienz, Agilität oder Empathie und was können Manager dabei von Informatikern lernen?
This special issue focuses on the difficulties of negotiating the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), with contributions by scholars from different perspectives. This introductory article briefly examines the trend to mega-FTAs of which TTIP is a leading example. It then reviews the contributions to this special issue, drawing on an analytical approach that reflects extant work on transnational and transgovernmental relations. This approach, we contend, helps to understand the stark mismatch between the desire of some parties to negotiate binding trade rules on behind-the-border regulatory policies in certain key sectors of national economies and the progress made in TTIP talks. We then highlight the significance of some key actors in a case study of failed E.U. attempts to include financial sector reforms and associated regulatory processes in TTIP.
The creation of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995 was a landmark in the development of the liberal international economic order. Yet the global economic crisis of 2008 put the spotlight on the longstanding question whether WTO membership limited the policy choices of governments coping with distress. This Special Issue of Business and Politics uses the crisis as a “stress test” for evaluating the prominent thesis that multilateral trade rules presently impose sharp limits on national industrial policies. The evidence from a wide range of sectoral and national contexts suggests that the WTO’s ability to con- strain member governments’ use of industrial policy is highly exaggerated. As we argue in this introductory essay, and as the studies in this Issue show, assertions of the WTO’s strength do not reflect the incomplete and contested nature of its accords and the imperatives of policymaking in an era when many governments simultaneously intervene in national economies.
This paper critically evaluates the contention that the implementation of the Trans-Pacific Partnership would adversely affect the centrality of the World Trade Organization. Not only are many Asian nations members of the WTO, but some undertook major reforms to join. Contrary to much existing literature, it is argued here that governments in the Asia-Pacific region should not be alarmed by the fate of this mega-regional trade deal.
