This paper unpacks the operation of foreign debt bondholder committees before the creation of the British Corporation of Foreign Bondholders (CFB) in 1868. I argue that many ideas about this period need to be revisited. In particular, my evidence (which uses archival work to describe market microstructures) shows the importance of the London Stock Exchange as a Court of Arbitration. I show how the LSE General Purpose Committee set up a system of Collective Action Clauses, requiring majority agreement among bondholders to sanction a restructuring deal and permit market access. I argue that (unlike what research has argued thus far) this created powerful incentives for bondholders to get organized as they did. Previous models and formal analyses need to be recast. The CFB appears to have been an experiment in statutory restructurings rather than one in coordination.
In this paper, I use a stratified Cox Proportional Hazard Model to econometrically evaluate the effects of intra-Africa regional trade cooperation and other underlying factors on Africa`s export survival. Using a highly disaggregated dataset of bilateral trade flows at HS 6 digit level for 49 African countries for the period 1995 to 2009, I obtain 3 key main empirical results. First, intra-Africa regional trade cooperation do increase the likelihood of Africa`s export survival. The results show that the depth of regional integration matters on lowering Africa`s export hazard rates relative to countries that are not in any regional cooperation. Second, I find evidence that supports the “learning by export hypothesis”. That is export experience within regional as well as rest of the world markets increases the likelihood of Africa`s export survival. Finally, results suggests that infrastructure related trade frictions such as costs to export, time to export, and customs procedures to export as well as weak export supporting institutions have a negative effect on Africa`s export survival. Similarly macroeconomic developments particularly exchange rate volatility, financial underdevelopment, “inappropriate” foreign direct investment hurt chances of an African export survival. The results also show that interaction effects between regional integration initiatives and a variety of these trade frictions namely: costs to export, time to export and customs procedures effects on hazard rates diminish in significance with the depth of regional integration over time.
The primary purpose of this paper is to seek empirical answers to the above question. Using a highly disaggregated bilateral trade flows at HS 6 digit level for African countries for a period 1995-2009 and a conditional logit technique, I find 3 main empirical results. First, intra-Africa regional trade cooperation enhances the likelihood of an African nation exporting across the new-product, new-market margin. Second, I also find evidence that both product and market experience help to increase the chances of African exporters exporting on new-product and new market margins thus providing support for the learning effects hypothesis. The third result shows that infrastructure related trade frictions such as export costs; time to export; procedures to export as well as weak export supporting institutions have a negative effect on African export diversification. Similarly macroeconomic developments particularly exchange rate volatility, financial underdevelopments and inappropriate foreign direct investments hurt African nation’s chances to diversify its exports. In policy terms this study suggests that for African exporters learning to export from regional markets before exploring major distant markets, a reduction in intra-African trade barriers, deepening and strengthening regional trade cooperation could be a significant channel for encouraging export diversification in Africa.
This paper develops a macroeconomic framework where the representative bank is owned by inside and outside owners and copes with capital requirements that vary countercyclically. The issuance of outside equity is characterized getting insights from the literature on corporate governance, especially that on corporate governance and investor protection. The insider receives utility benefits from the diversion of dividends, but the costs of diversion increase with the size of bank equity owned by outsiders. The goal is to see to what extent the willingness of insiders to share the bank with outsiders is affected by capital regulation. I find a negative link, which holds only if capital restrictions vary countercyclically. Thinking of a positive shock, the justification for such a negative link is that the shock leads not only to tighter regulation, but also to higher expected dividends and, relatedly, to higher agency costs affecting the distribution of earnings.
This paper investigates how expectations about future government spending affect the transmission of fiscal policy shocks. We study the effects of two different types of government spending shocks in the United States: (i) spending shocks that are accompanied by an expected reversal of public spending growth below trend; (ii) spending shocks that are accompanied by expectations of future spending growth above trend. We use the Ramey (2011)’s time series of military build-ups to measure exogenous spending shocks, and deviations of forecasts of public spending with respect to past trends, evaluated in real-time, to distinguish shocks into these two categories. Based on a structural VAR analysis, our results suggest that shocks associated with an expected spending reversal exert expansionary effects on the economy and accelerate the correction of the initial increase in public debt. Shocks associated with expected spending growth above trend, instead, are characterized by a contraction in aggregate demand and a more persistent increase in public debt. The main channel of transmission seems to run through agents’ perception of the future macroeconomic environment.
