This paper studies a large class of imperfectly discriminating contests, referred to as elastic contests, that induce players to either overbid a standing bid or to abstain from bidding altogether. Many common forms of contest are elastic. In any equilibrium of an elastic contest, there is complete rent dissipation for all but at most one player. This result is used to show that in any suffciently decisive anonymous standard contest, any equilibrium is an all-pay auction equilibrium. Thus, the analysis offers strong support for the robustness of the all-pay auction. The approach also delivers definite answers regarding the extent of rent dissipation in Tullock contests with intermediate values of the decisiveness parameter.
This paper presents a general equilibrium model with technological uncertainty, financial markets and imperfect information. The future consists of uncertain environments that are more or less clearly distinguishable (measurable). This limits the possibilities of specialization and diversification. Households have no direct information about the productivity of risky technologies. They rely on the information conveyed by the set of financial products provided by the financial sector, the pay-off promises of the products and their prices. Unreliable information-processing by financial markets leads to deception of households. As a result, extending the space spanned by financial products is not unambiguously good. This suggests a policy rule which ties financial innovations to the experience base of the economy.
We introduce a simple two-stage game of endogenous network formation and information sharing for reasoning about the optimal design of social networks like Facebook or Google+. We distinguish between unilateral and bilateral connections and between targeted and collective information sharing. Agents value being connected to other agents and sharing and receiving information. We consider multiple utility specifications. We show that the game always has an equilibrium in pure strategies and then we study how the network design and the utility specifications affect welfare. Surprisingly, we find that in general, targeted information sharing is not necessarily better than collective information sharing. However, if all agents are either "babblers" or "friends", irrespective of whether the network is unilateral or bilateral, in equilibrium, targeted information sharing yields higher welfare than collective information sharing.
Excess zeros are encountered in many empirical count data applications. We provide a new explanation of extra zeros, related to the underlying stochastic process that generates events. The process has two rates, a lower rate until the first event, and a higher one thereafter. We derive the corresponding distribution of the number of events during a fixed period and extend it to account for observed and unobserved heterogeneity. An application to the socio-economic determinants of the individual number of doctor visits in Germany illustrates the usefulness of the new approach.
What determines risk-bearing capacity and the amount of leverage in financial markets? Using unique archival data on collateralized lending, we show that personal experience can affect individual risk-taking and aggregate leverage. When an investor syndicate speculating in Amsterdam in 1772 went bankrupt, many lenders were exposed. In the end, none of them actually lost money. Nonetheless, only those at risk of losing money changed their behavior markedly – they lent with much higher haircuts. The rest continued as before. The differential change is remarkable since the distress was public knowledge. Overall leverage in the Amsterdam stock market declined as a result.
Major bubble episodes are rare events. In this paper, we examine what factors might cause some asset price bubbles to become very large. We recreate, in a laboratory setting, some of the specific institutional features investors in the South Sea Company faced in 1720. Several factors have been proposed as potentially contributing to one of the greatest periods of asset overvaluation in history: an intricate debt-for-equity swap, deferred payment for these shares, and the possibility of default on the deferred payments. We consider which aspect might have had the most impact in creating the South Sea bubble. The results of the experiment suggest that the company’s attempt to exchange its shares for government debt was the single biggest contributor to the stock price explosion, because of the manner in which the swap affected fundamental value. Issuing new shares with only partial payments required, in conjunction with the debtequity swap, also had a significant effect on the size of the bubble. Limited contract enforcement, on the other hand, does not appear to have contributed significantly.
Contingent sovereign debt can create important welfare gains. Nonetheless, there is almost no issuance today. Using hand-collected archival data, we examine the first known case of large-scale use of state-contingent sovereign debt in history. Philip II of Spain entered into hundreds of contracts whose value and due date depended on verifiable, exogenous events such as the arrival of silver fleets. We show that this allowed for effective risk-sharing between the king and his bankers. The existence of statecontingent debt also sheds light on the nature of defaults – they were simply contingencies over which Crown and bankers had not contracted previously.
Empirical evidence shows that workers care about the mission of their job in addition to their wage. This suggests that employers can use the job mission to incentivize and screen their workers. I study a model in which a principal selects an agent to develop a project and influences the agent's ex post level of effort not by outcome-contingent rewards, but by the choice of the project mission. The principal's and the agents' preferences about the mission are misaligned and the degree to which an agent cares about the mission is private information. I derive the optimal mechanism (allocation rule, project mission, payment) to select and motivate the agent. I show that under the optimal mechanism the project mission is distorted towards the principal's ideal mission compared to the full information optimum. As a consequence, effort is lower. If the mission must be chosen prior to the allocation of the project, competition brings the principal to align the mission more with the agent's preferences, which increases his effort. Finally, in the presence of budget constraints, the principal should offer the same mission and the same payment to all types of agents. Several applications and links to the empirical evidence are discussed.
A key stated objective of the Australian Plain Packaging Act 2011 is to influence smoking prevalence, in particular of minors. We use the Roy Morgan Single Source (Australia) data set on minors, (that is, Australians aged 14 to 17 years) over the time period January 2001 to December 2013 to analyze whether there is evidence that this goal has been achieved. We carry out a statistical trend analysis to study the (possible) effect of plain packaging on smoking prevalence of minors in Australia. More specifically, we fit a linear time trend that explains well the fact that observed smoking prevalence has declined steadily over the last 13 years. Two informative analyses help to draw conclusions on the (actual) effect of plain packaging on smoking prevalence of Australian minors. First, we look at the year of data before plain packaging was introduced, which happened in December 2012. Second, we compute confidence intervals around the estimated treatment effects (that is, around the deviations from the fitted trend line) from 12/2012 on. Both analyses fail to find any evidence for an actual plain packaging effect on Australians aged 14 to 17 years. Several reasonable variations to our methodology are discussed. All of these would only result in findings even more indicative of an absence of any plain packaging effect.
There is widespread interest in identifying computational and neurobiological mechanisms that influence the ability to choose long-term benefits over more proximal and readily available rewards in domains such as dietary and economic choice. We present the results of a human fMRI study that examines how neural activity relates to observed individual differences in the discounting of future rewards during an intertemporal monetary choice task. We found that a region of left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC) BA-46 was more active in trials where subjects chose delayed rewards, after controlling for the subjective value of those rewards. We also found that the connectivity from dlPFC BA-46 to a region of ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) widely associated with the computation of stimulus values, increased at the time of choice, and especially during trials in which subjects chose delayed rewards. Finally, we found that estimates of effective connectivity between these two regions played a critical role in predicting out-of-sample, between-subject differences in discount rates. Together with previous findings in dietary choice, these results suggest that a common set of computational and neurobiological mechanisms facilitate choices in favor of long-term reward in both settings.
