This paper explores the effects of capital controls and policies regulating interest rates and the exchange rate in a model of economic transition applied to China. It builds on Song, Storesletten, and Zilibotti (2011) who construct a growth model consistent with salient features of the recent Chinese growth experience: high output growth, sustained returns on capital investment, extensive reallocation within the manufacturing sector, sluggish wage growth, and accumulation of a large trade surplus. The salient features of the theory are asymmetric financial imperfections and heterogeneous productivity across private and state-owned firms. Capital controls and regulation of banks’ deposit rates stifle competition in the banking sector and hamper the lending to productive private firms. Removing such regulation would accelerate the growth in productivity and output. A temporarily undervalued exchange rate reduces real wages and consumption, stimulating investments in the high-productivity entrepreneurial sector. This fosters productivity growth and a trade surplus. A high interest rate mitigates the disadvantage of financially constrained firms, reduces wages, and increases the speed of transition from low- to high-productivity firms.
In this study, I provide evidence that the educational achievement of second-generation immigrants in German-speaking Switzerland is greater than in Germany. The impact of the first-generation immigrants’ destination decision on their offspring’s educational achievement seems to be much more important than has been recognized by the existing literature. I identify the test score gap between these students that cannot be explained by differences in individual and family characteristics. Moreover, I show how this gap evolves over the test score distribution and how the least favorably-endowed students fare. My results suggest that the educational system
of Switzerland, relative to the German system, enhances the performance of immigrants’ children substantially. This disparity is largest when conditioning on the language spoken at home, and prevails even when comparing only students whose parents migrated from the same country of origin.
This paper carries out an empirical investigation of the impact on bond spreads of the announcement, purchases and exit from the Swiss National Bank’s bond purchase program in 2009–2010. We find evidence in favor of a narrowing yield spread of covered bonds as a result of the program. The effect materialized in the days following the announcement of the Swiss National Bank’s intention to buy bonds issued by private sector borrowers, as markets learned that covered bonds were being bought. The specification of the bond spreads used allows us to identify this effect as a discounted portfolio balance effect of the expected purchases, as distinct from policy signaling. In contrast, we find no evidence of a further effect of the actual purchases and subsequent sales on bond spreads.
We conducted an anonymous survey in December 2013 asking around 200 economists worldwide to provide an interval (a to b) of average inflation in the US expected "over the next two years". The respondents were also instructed to give a probability of inflation being higher or lower than the mid-interval (a+b)/2. The aggregate distribution of inflation expectations we obtain closely resembles the outcome of the Survey of Professional Forecasters for 1Q2014. More importantly, we find that the subjective probability mass on either side of the mid-interval is not statistically different from 0.5, which means that the subjective distributions are symmetric. Our results align well with several papers evaluating the Survey of Professional Forecasters or similar data sets and finding no significant departures from symmetry.
The assumption that payoff-relevant information is observable but not verifiable is important for many core results in contract, organizational and institutional economics. However, subgame-perfect implementation (SPI) mechanisms - which are based on off-equilibrium arbitration clauses that impose fines for lying and the inappropriate use of arbitration - can be used to render payoff-relevant observable information verifiable. Thus, if SPI mechanisms work as predicted they undermine the foundations of important economic results based on the observable but non-verifiable assumption. Empirical evidence on the effectiveness of SPI mechanisms is, however, scarce. In this paper we show experimentally that SPI mechanisms have severe behavioral limitations. They induce retaliation against legitimate uses of arbitration and thus make the parties reluctant to trigger arbitration. The inconsistent use of arbitration eliminates the incentives to take first-best actions and leads to costly disagreements such that individuals - if given the choice - opt out of the mechanism in the majority of the cases. Incentive compatible redesigns of the mechanism solve some of these problems but generate new ones such that the overall performance of the redesigned mechanisms remains low. Our results indicate that there is little hope for SPI mechanisms to solve verifiability problems unless they are made retaliation-proof and, more generally, robust to other-regarding preferences.
We examine mortgage pricing before and after Switzerland was the first country to activate the Counter-Cyclical Capital Buffer of Basel III. Observing multiple mortgage offers per request, we obtain three core findings. First, capitalconstrained and mortgage-specialized banks raise their rates relatively more. Second, risk-weighting schemes supposed to discriminate against more risky borrowers do not amplify the effect of higher capital requirements. Third, CCB-subjected banks and CCB-exempt insurers raise mortgage rates, but insurers raise rates by on average 8.8 bp more. To conclude, lenders welcome the opportunity to increase mortgage rates, but stricter capital requirements do not discourage banks from risky mortgage lending.
How does our brain choose the best course of action? Choices between material goods are thought to be steered by neural value signals that encode the rewarding properties of the choice options. Social decisions, by contrast, are traditionally thought to rely on neural representations of the self and others. However, recent studies show that many types of social decisions may also involve neural value computations. This suggests a unified mechanism for motivational control of behaviour that may incorporate both social and non-social factors. In this Review, we outline a theoretical framework that may help to identify possible overlaps and differences between the neural processes that guide social and non-social decision making.
