This dissertation consists of three empirical studies, which contribute to the academic debate on [http://www.eventstudytools.com/competitive-dynamics competitive dynamics]. The first study contributes to research on strategic group dynamics by pioneering a behavioral theory on how managers reposition their firms vis-à-vis the strategic group their firm is part of. The second study adds to the development of an action-based theory of interfirm rivalry in competitive markets by incorporating the effects of market shocks. The third study contributes to research investigating the performance implications of a distinct type of competitive action (i.e., divestitures) and reveals how strategic interrelationships between individual actions, as well as experience and timing effects, impact the stock market responses to these actions.
Ereignisstudien erlauben die Analyse des Kapitalmarkteffektes diskreter Ereignisse. Diese Studienart greift auf die Ereignisstudientechnik (event study methodology) zurück, welche eine Standardmethode in der Kapitalmarktforschung darstellt. Da die Methode in Ihrer Anwendung kompliziert ist, bedarf es i.A. dedizierte Instrumente zur Nutzung der Methode.
This book explores causes and consequences of interfirm rivalry within the global insurance industry. Based on three empirical studies, the book investigates (1) the mechanisms driving firm positioning and strategic group dynamics, (2) the impact of market shocks on firms' competitive behavior, and (3) the determinants of stock market responses to individual competitive actions. The book's insights offer important implications for academics and practitioners alike.
Companies extend their boundaries through acquisitions to new industries, product lines, technologies, markets and geographic locations. Diversification research has focused predominantly on boundary extensions across industries. Using data on 167 intra-industry acquisitions in the pharmaceuticals industry between 1991 and 1996, we study boundary extension in an industry, integrating existing arguments to examine how proximity in intraindustry networks, geographic location, and technological domain influences the likelihood of acquisition. As expected, the proximity of two firms in these search contexts increases the likelihood that one will acquire the other, but the contexts are partial substitutes, proximity in one search context overcoming distance in other contexts.Thus, we find that while pharmaceutical companies are more likely to acquire technologically similar foreign companies, they are more likely to acquire technologically dissimilar alliance partners. Our results contribute to an improved understanding of who buys whom and in doing so, organizational boundary spanning through acquisitions.
Construal level theory provides an intriguing theoretical perspective to study managerial myopia and suggests a novel psychological mechanism to study distance (spatial, temporal, social). Particularly, we propose that a high perceived psychological distance evokes a high level, abstract, and decontextualized mental representation of the environmental stimulus that translates into managerial myopia, mediated by several cognitive limitations. Moreover, construal level theory provides a theoretical basis to study managerial myopia in a more integrative manner mapping multiple objective distances as well as moderating factors on a common underlying, unitary psychological distance. While the objective distances would suggest that all managers perceive an environmental stimulus as equally psychological distant, we identify organizational- and individual-level factors that moderate the relationship between objective distances and perceived psychological distance allowing to explain differences across managers. The article makes particularly two contributions. First, it elaborates on the psychological foundations of managerial myopia suggesting the perceived psychological distance as driving force of myopia. Second, it provides a more integrative framework to study managerial myopia necessary as managerial myopia persists as long as any objective distance remains far away.
Chief strategy officers (CSOs) often perceive a varying degree of managerial discretion. We develop and test a model on how structural, expert, and prestige power affect the CSO's perception of discretion across different decision domains and its consequences for the firm's strategy. Using archival and unique survey data of 116 CSOs of European firms, we find some support for these relationships, however, notably, reveal that these effects depend on the power of other top managers, specifically the CEO and the chief operating officer (COO). By considering individual-level differences in the CSO's perception of discretion as well as the powerplay with other top managers, the study contributes to research on managerial discretion
and functional top managers.
We build on intraorganizational power literature to study the influence of the chief strategy officer (CSO) within organizations. We argue that the CSO's individual characteristics - structural power, expert power, and prestige power - as well as institutional forces of the firm's environment - cultural power distance and industry power level - affect the extent of the CSO's actual power over a broad range of strategic decisions. Further, we hypothesize that the CSO's actual power is positively associated with firm performance. An analysis of survey and archival data of 104 European firms reveals that the host country's cultural power distance and the industry's power level, however, not the CSO's individual characteristics, determine the CSO's actual power within the firm. Moreover, we find that firms benefit from powerful CSOs.
In our study, we develop and test a conceptual model of the individual-level sources and consequences of the chief strategy officer's (CSO's) perceived discretion in different organizational situations. Using archival and unique survey data of 121 CSOs of European firms, we find that the variation in the perceptions of discretion is partially a consequence of the CSO's structural and expert power as well as of the CSO's cultural power distance. We also find that the CSO's perceived discretion negatively affects firm performance, however, only in situations in which the CSO actually has little discretion. The study contributes to research on managerial discretion by extending the analysis to the individual level and by considering the discretion of an important senior executive other than the CEO.
Strategische Programme stellen das Management vor mehrere Herausforderungen - nicht zuletzt hinsichtlich des organisationalen Designs [1]. Hierbei lassen sich zwei Aspekte unterscheiden [2]: Auf der Design-Ebene wird zwischen der Gesamtunternehmensebene und der Einheitenebene (z.B. strategische Programme) differenziert wobei aus Sicht der Design-Komponenten/-Elemente verschiedene Dimensionen wie die formale und informale Organisation näher betrachtet werden [3]. Auf Basis dieser zwei Aspekte ergeben sich beim "Organisieren" von strategischen Programmen vor allem drei Gestaltungsfelder, die in diesem Kapitel betrachtet werden: (1) die Analyse der Organisation strategischer Programme im Kontext des Gesamtunternehmens hilft, strategische Programme einerseits zielgerichtet in das Gesamtunternehmen einzubetten und sie andererseits aber auch von der Primärorganisation abzugrenzen; (2) die formale Organisation des strategischen Programms beinhaltet, die einzelnen Organisationseinheiten zu kennen, Programme entsprechend zu organisieren und zu strukturieren sowie Entscheidungen über den geeigneten Zentralisierungsgrad zu treffen; und (3) die informale Organisation des strategischen Programms zu berücksichtigen, insbesondere hinsichtlich der Einbettung der strategischen Programme in soziale Netzwerke und der Möglichkeiten der Virtualisierung der Zusammenarbeit.
