This paper provides evidence on the strategic lending decisions made by banks facing a negative funding shock. Using bank-firm level credit data, we show that banks reallocate credit within their domestic loan portfolio in at least three different ways. First, banks reallocate to sectors where they have high sector presence. Second, they also reallocate to sectors in which they are heavily specialized. Third, they reallocate credit towards low-risk firms. These reallocation effects are economically large. A standard deviation improvement in sector presence, sector specialization or firm risk reduces the transmission of the funding shock to credit supply by 20, 13 and 10%, respectively. We also provide insight in the timing of these reallocation decisions. Reallocation to sectors in which a bank has a high sector presence is almost instantaneous, while sector specialization starts playing a role four to five months after the shock.
We develop a model that captures, at the same time, the temporal dynamics of single-firm credit risk and the contagion across banks via a network of obligations and common assets. In particular, we enrich the continuous-time modelling approach of default by accounting explicitly for the procyclical loop between asset prices and leverage. Contagion can spread well before any default occurs, through the value of the obligations held by counterparties. Moreover, the extent of procyclicality effects depends explicitly on the structure of both the interbank network and the asset bank network. We analyse the model in a simplified scenario of a densely connected core of banks and we carry out a systematic investigation of how procyclicality emerges from the multiplicative interplay of market illiquidity and tightness of capital requirements.
The purpose of this paper is to dispel some common misunderstandings about capital adequacy rules based on Expected Shortfall. We establish that, from a theoretical perspective, Expected Shortfall based regulation can provide a misleading assessment of tail behavior, does not necessarily protect liability holders’ interests much better than Value-at-Risk based regulation, and may also allow for regulatory arbitrage when used as a global solvency measure. We also show that, for a value-maximizing financial institution, the benefits derived from protecting its franchise may not be sufficient to disincentivize excessive risk taking. We further interpret our results in the context of portfolio risk measurement. Our results do not invalidate the possible merits of Expected Shortfall as a risk measure but instead highlight the need for its cautious use in the context of capital adequacy regimes and of portfolio risk control.
Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation (REDD) projects are being designed and implemented across tropical countries, intending to curb the contribution of deforestation to greenhouse gas emissions. An important aspect of REDD implementation is the baseline against which reductions are measured. The baseline estimates the business-as-usual emissions from deforestation and forest degradation. We solve a dynamic model of land conversion from forest to agriculture in the presence of REDD, and assess the performance of four baselines. We show that none of the analysed baselines dominates in all performance aspects, and that the final baseline choice needs to maximise the trade-off between the effectiveness to reduce deforestation, cost-efficiency, and changes in income. The frequently used historical average baseline could be improved by using a forward-looking one, which is shown to better account for the opportunity costs faced by landowners. This result hinges on the ability of the baseline to predict deforestation rates without significant underestimations. We advocate the switch from a single-threshold baseline to a corridor methodology, which would provide continued incentives to reduce deforestation, even during periods of high opportunity costs. We finally show how the selection of certain baseline attributes, such as corridor bandwidth and symmetry, can enhance performance.
We present results from the first large-scale international survey on time preference, conducted in 53 countries. All countries exhibit hyperbolic discounting patterns, i.e., the immediate future is discounted more than far future. We also observe higher heterogeneity for shorter time horizons, consistent with the pattern reviewed by Frederick, Loewenstein, and O’Donoghue (2002). Cultural factors as captured by the Hofstede cultural dimensions (Hofstede, 1991) contribute significantly to the variation of time discounting, even after controlling for economic factors, such as GDP, inflation rate and growth rate. In particular, higher levels of Uncertainty Avoidance are associated with stronger hyperbolic discounting, whereas higher degrees of Individualism and Long Term Orientation predict stronger tendency to wait for larger payoffs. We also find the waiting tendency is correlated with innovation, environmental protection, crediting rating, and body mass index at country level after controlling for county wealth. These results help us to enhance the understanding of differences across financial markets and economic behavior worldwide.
Making use of a structural model that allows for optimal liquidity management, we study the role that repos play in a bank׳s financing structure. In our model the bank׳s assets consist of illiquid loans and liquid reserves and are financed by a combination of repos, long-term debt, deposits and equity. Repos are a cheap source of funding, but they are subject to an exogenous rollover risk. We show that the use of repos inflicts two types of indirect (“shadow”) costs on the bank׳s shareholders: first, it induces the bank to maintain higher liquid reserves in order to alleviate the additional default risk; second, it adds to the cost of long-term debt financing. These shadow costs limit the bank׳s appetite for cheap but unstable repo funding. This effect is, however, weakened under poor returns on risky assets, access to deposit funding and the depositor preference rule. We also analyze the impact of a liquidity coverage ratio, payout restrictions and a leverage ratio on the bank׳s financing choices and show that all these tools are able to curb the bank׳s reliance on repos.
In this paper the solutions to several variants of the so-called dividend-distribution problem in a multi-dimensional, diffusion setting are studied. In a nutshell, the manager of a firm must balance the retention of earnings (so as to ward off bankruptcy and earn interest) and the distribution of dividends (so as to please the shareholders). A dynamic-programming approach is used, where the state variables are the current levels of cash reserves and of the stochastic short-rate, as well as time. This results in a family of Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman variational inequalities whose solutions must be approximated numerically. To do so, a finite element approximation and a time-marching scheme are employed.
We develop a continuous-time general-equilibrium model to rationalise the dynamics of insurance prices in a competitive insurance market with financial frictions. Insurance companies choose underwriting and financing policies to maximise shareholder value. The equilibrium price dynamics are explicit, which allows simple numerical simulations and generates testable implications. In particular, we find that the equilibrium price of insurance is (weakly) predictable and the insurance sector always realises positive expected profits. Moreover, rather than true cycles, insurance prices exhibit asymmetric reversals caused by the reflection of the aggregate capacity process at the dividend and recapitalisation boundaries.
