Variations in cost and demand do not have symmetrical impact on the optimal price of the imperfectly competitive firm. This asymmetry is not so important as long as information regarding both cost and demand is sufficient. However, it becomes crucially important in case of incomplete information. Usually firms have more complete or ‘harder’ information on cost than on demand. This difference in information status on the cost and on the demand side can explain both cost-based pricing and slow price adjustment to demand in an optimizing framework with Bayesian learning about changed demand conditions.
This paper employs ICP expenditure data to investigate the relationship between income and product diversity. It turns out that per-capita income has a strong positive impact on the number of products consumed at a non-negligible level in a country, and a significant negative impact on the concentration of consumers' expenditure across different goods categories. Inequality in the size distribution of incomes has a significant positive impact on the number of consumed goods, but no clear effect on the concentration of expenditure.
This paper offers a theory of development that links the degree of market incompleteness to capital accumulation and growth. At early stages of development, the presence projects limits the degree of risk spreading (diversification) that the economy can achieve. The desire to avoid highly risky investments slows down capital accumulation, and the inability to diversify idiosyncratic risk introduces a large amount of uncertainty in the growth process. The typical development pattern will consist of a lengthy period of “primitive accumulation” with highly variable output, followed by takeoff and financial deepening and, finally, steady growth. “Lucky” countries will spend relatively less time in the primitive accumulation stage and develop faster. Although all agents are price takers and there are no technological spillovers, the decentralized equilibrium is inefficient because individuals do not take into account their impact on others' diversification opportunities. We also show that our results generalize to economies with international capital flows.
The retirement decisions of spouses may be interdependent for various reasons: similarity of tastes, joint assets, sharing rules for income and housework, or complementarity of leisure. Because of data limitations, only a few empirical studies exist on this topic. From a policy point of view interdependent retirement could become important if legislators in different EC countries are forced to synchronize minimum retirement ages, which are lower now for females than males in a number of countries. In the theoretical part, the reaction of spouses to changes in the retirement age of their partners is analysed for typical family patterns. In the empirical part, the possibility of interdependent retirement is studied for Austrian data. The findings show an asymmetry: husbands react to changes in wives' legal minimum retirement age, wives don't react vice versa. The cross effect on men's participation rates -- resulting from a rise in women's minimum retirement age --is almost half as big as the first-round effect upon the women themselves.
This paper proposes the following incentive scheme for the private provision of public goods: government should reward and penalize deviations from the mean contribution by an appropriate factor. This makes efficient contribution individually rational even if individuals see through the government budget constraint.
