The Hotelling game of pure location allows interpretations in spatial competition, political theory, and professional forecasting. In this paper, the doubly symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium for n ≥ 4 firms is characterized as the solution of a well-behaved boundary value problem. The analysis suggests that, in contrast to the cases n = 3 and n → ∞ , the equilibrium for a finite number of n ≥ 4 firms tends to overrepresent locations at the periphery of its support interval. Moreover, in the class of examples considered, an increase in the number of firms universally leads to a wider range of location choices and to a more dispersed distribution of individual locations. The results are used to comment on the potential benefit of competition in forecasting markets.
We study whether leaders influence the unethical conduct of followers. To avoid selection issues present in natural environments, we use a laboratory experiment in which we form groups and assign leadership roles at random. We study an environment in which groups compete, with dishonest behavior enhancing group earnings to the detriment of social welfare. We vary, by treatment, two instruments through which leaders can influence follower conduct-prominent statements to the group and the allocation of monetary incentives. In general, the presence of active group leaders gives rise to significantly more dishonest behavior. Moreover, appointing leaders who are likely to have acted dishonestly in a preliminary stage of the experiment yields groups with significantly more unethical conduct. The analysis of leaders' strategies reveals that leaders' statements have a stronger effect on follower behavior than the ability to distribute financial rewards, and that leaders' propensity to act dishonestly correlates with their use of statements or incentives as a means for encouraging dishonest follower conduct.
Social capital is often associated with desirable political and economic outcomes. This paper connects a growing literature on the "dark side" of social capital with institutional change. We examine the downfall of democracy in interwar Germany. Using new data on Nazi Party entry in a cross-section of cities, we show that dense networks of civic associations such as bowling clubs, choirs, and animal breeders went hand-in-hand with a more rapid rise of the Nazi Party. Towns with one standard deviation higher association density saw at least one-third faster entry. All types of associations – veteran associations and non-military clubs, "bridging" and "bonding" associations – positively predict NS Party entry. Party membership, in turn, predicts electoral success. These results suggest that social capital aided the rise of the Nazi movement that ultimately destroyed Germany's first democracy. We also show that the effects of social capital were more important in the starting phase of the Nazi movement, and in towns less sympathetic to its message.
A stated objective of the Australian Plain Packaging Act 2011 is to reduce smoking prevalence. We use the Roy Morgan Single Source (Australia) data set over the time period January 2001 to December 2013 to analyze whether this goal has been achieved in the first year since the implementation. In particular, we carry out a statistical trend analysis to study the (possible) effect of plain packaging on smoking prevalence. Two informative analyses help to draw conclusions on the (actual) effect of plain packaging on smoking prevalence in Australia. First, we look at the year of data before plain packaging was introduced, which happened in December 2012. Second, we compute confidence intervals around the estimated treatment effects. Our main results can be summarized as follows. First, if a statistical significance level of 5% is required, then there is no evidence at all for a plain packaging effect on smoking prevalence. Second, if one is willing to accept a relatively low level of statistical significance (that is, 10%), then there is evidence for a very short-lived plain packaging effect on smoking prevalence, namely in December 2012 only (after which smoking prevalence is statistically indistinguishable from its pre-existing trend). A formal power analysis demonstrates that the power of our inference methods is remarkably high.
We model capital flows among Chinese provinces using a theory-based variance decomposition that allows us to gauge the importance of various channels of external adjustments at the regional level: variation in intertemporal prices - domestic and international interest rates and the real exchange rate - and intertemporal variation in quantities (cash flows of output, investment and government spending). We find that our simple framework can account for around 85 percent of the variation in regional capital flows over the 1985-2010 period. Our results suggest that the relative importance of private and state-owned enterprises, a province's level of integration into the world economy and its sectoral composition play an important role for external adjustment vis-à-vis the rest of China and the world. Specifically, we find strong empirical support for the view that differential access of private and state-owned enterprises to finance is a key driver of China's surpluses. We discuss implications of our results for global imbalances in capital flows.
While China has been pivotal in discussions and academic research on global imbalances, little is known about macroeconomic external imbalances among Chinese regions and the factors driving them. We use aggregate regional data and estimate provincial total factor productivity growth over 1984-2010. We observe that provinces that caught up relatively to national TFP had capital outflows while those that fell behind had capital inflows: there seems to be a capital allocation puzzle at the regional level inside China. We follow up by identifying the drivers of this pattern using the methodology developed in Gourinchas and Jeanne (2013) to compute regional investment and saving wedges. By relating those frictions with TFP catch-up parameters, we find an investment and a saving puzzle: regions that caught up relative to the rest of China seem to have lower investment rate (higher investment tax) and higher saving (lower saving tax) relative to the prediction of the neoclassical model. We exploit Chinese cross-regional variation in key characteristics suggested by the literature and find robust explanatory variables of the wedges: factors related to the ownership type, the level of integration into the world economy and the economic structure are highly correlated with the identified frictions.
This paper studies whether people can avoid punishment by remaining willfully ignorant about possible negative consequences of their actions for others. We employ a laboratory experiment, using modified dictator games in which a dictator can remain willfully ignorant about the payoff consequences of his decision for a receiver. A third party can punish the dictator after observing the dictator’s decision and the resulting payoffs. On the one hand, willfully ignorant dictators are punished less if their actions lead to unfair outcomes than dictators who reveal the consequences before implementing the same outcome. On the other hand, willfully ignorant dictators are punished more than revealing dictators if their actions do not lead to unfair outcomes. We conclude that willful ignorance can circumvent blame when unfair outcomes result, but that the act of remaining willfully ignorant is itself punished, regardless of the outcome
In historical accounts of the world economic crisis of the 1930s, Switzerland is known for its staunch defense of the gold standard and the rise of corporatist policies. Yet, so far, the literature has not discussed the implications of these two features. This paper tries to show how the combination of hard-currency policy and nominal rigidities introduced by corporatist policies proved to be fatal for growth. Estimating a New Keynesian small open economy model for the period 1926-1938, we show that the decision to participate in the Gold Bloc after 1933 at an overvalued currency can be identified as the main reason for the unusual long lasting recession and that price rigidities from 1931 to 1936 significantly slowed down the adjustment process.
Understanding differences in business cycle phenomena between Emerging Market Economies (EMEs) and industrialized countries has been at the center of recent research on macroeconomic fluctuations. The purpose of this paper is to investigate the importance of certain credit market imperfections in different EMEs. To this end, we develop a small open economy Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) framework featuring both permanent and transitory productivity shocks, differentiated home and foreign goods, and endogenous exchange rate movements. Furthermore, our model incorporates liability dollarization as a particular form of financial frictions in EMEs. In this vein, we account for the fact that emerging markets traditionally have had difficulties in borrowing in domestic currency on international capital markets and thus allow for valuation effects in our analysis. We estimate our model using Bayesian techniques for a number of EMEs and thereby control for potential heterogeneity across countries. Contrary to previous studies in this strand of the literature, we include a (vector-)autoregressive measurement error component to capture off-model dynamics. Regarding business cycles in emerging markets, our main findings are that (i) even though we incorporate financial frictions in the framework, trend shocks are the main determinant of macroeconomic fluctuations, (ii) accounting for liability dollarization ameliorates the model fit, and (iii) valuation effects on average stabilize changes in the net foreign asset position.
