Charness and Dufwenberg (Am. Econ. Rev. 101(4):1211–1237, 2011) have recently demonstrated that cheap-talk communication raises efficiency in bilateral contracting situations with adverse selection. We replicate their main finding and extend their design to include competition between agents. We find that communication and competition act as “substitutes:” communication raises efficiency in the absence of competition but not with competition, and competition raises efficiency without communication but lowers efficiency with communication. We briefly review some behavioral theories that have been proposed in this context and show that each can explain some but not all features of the observed data patterns. Our findings highlight the fragility of cheap-talk communication and may serve as a guide to refine existing behavioral theories.
We analyze the effect of exposure to international trade on earnings and employment of U.S. workers from 1992 through 2007 by exploiting industry shocks to import competition stemming from China’s spectacular rise as a manufacturing exporter paired with longitudinal data on individual earnings by employer spanning close to two decades. Individuals who in 1991 worked in manufacturing industries that experienced high subsequent import growth garner lower cumulative earnings, face elevated risk of obtaining public disability benefits, and spend less time working for their initial employers, less time in their initial two-digit manufacturing industries, and more time working elsewhere in manufacturing and outside of manufacturing. Earnings losses are larger for individuals with low initial wages, low initial tenure, and low attachment to the labor force. Low-wage workers churn primarily among manufacturing sectors, where they are repeatedly exposed to subsequent trade shocks. High-wage workers are better able to move across employers with minimal earnings losses and are more likely to move out of manufacturing conditional on separation. These findings reveal that import shocks impose substantial labor adjustment costs that are highly unevenly distributed across workers according to their skill levels and conditions of employment in the pre-shock period.
Neuroeconomics strives to use knowledge from neuroscience to improve models of decisionmaking. Here we introduce a biologically plausible, drift-diffusion model that is able to jointly predict choice behavior and response times across different choice environments. The model has both normative and positive implications for economics. First, we consistently observe that decisionmakers inefficiently allocate their time to choices for which they are close to indifference. We demonstrate that we can improve subjects' welfare using a simple intervention that puts a time limit on their choices. Second, response times can be used to predict indifference points and the strength of preferences.
Poverty remains one of the most pressing problems facing the world; the mechanisms through which poverty arises and perpetuates itself, however, are not well understood. Here, we examine the evidence for the hypothesis that poverty may have particular psychological consequences that can lead to economic behaviors that make it difficult to escape poverty. The evidence indicates that poverty causes stress and negative affective states which in turn may lead to short-sighted and risk-averse decision-making, possibly by limiting attention and favoring habitual behaviors at the expense of goal-directed ones. Together, these relationships may constitute a feedback loop that contributes to the perpetuation of poverty. We conclude by pointing toward specific gaps in our knowledge and outlining poverty alleviation programs that this mechanism suggests.
There is a growing body of evidence that many entrepreneurs seem to enter and persist in entrepreneurship despite earning low risk-adjusted returns. This has lead to attempts to provide explanations—using both standard economic theory and behavioral economics—for why certain individuals may be attracted to such an apparently unprofitable activity. Drawing on research in behavioral economics, in the sections that follow, we review three sets of possible interpretations for understanding the empirical facts related to the entry into, and persistence in, entrepreneurship. Differences in risk aversion provide a plausible and intuitive interpretation of entrepreneurial activity. In addition, a growing literature has begun to highlight the potential importance of overconfidence in driving entrepreneurial outcomes. Such a mechanism may appear at face value to work like a lower level of risk aversion, but there are clear conceptual differences—in particular, overconfidence likely arises from behavioral biases and misperceptions of probability distributions. Finally, nonpecuniary taste-based factors may be important in motivating both the decisions to enter into and to persist in entrepreneurship.
This paper explores the limitations of intention-based social preferences as an explanation of gift-exchange between a firm and a worker. In a framework with one self-interested and one reciprocal player, gift-giving never arises in equilibrium. Instead, any equilibrium in a large class of multistage games must involve mutually unkind behavior of both players. Besides gift-exchange, this class of games also includes moral hazard models and the rotten kid framework. Even though equilibrium behavior may appear positively reciprocal in some of these games, the self-interested player never benefits from reciprocity. We discuss the relation of these results to the theoretical and empirical literature on gift-exchange in employment relations.
To examine the impact of globalization on managerial remuneration, we consider a matching model where firms compete both in the product market and in the managerial market. We show that globalization, i.e., the simultaneous integration of product markets and managerial pools, leads to an increase in the heterogeneity of managerial salaries. Typically, while the most able managers obtain a wage increase, less able managers are faced with a reduction in wages. Hence our model is consistent with the increasing heterogeneity of CEO remuneration that has been observed in the last few decades.
An increasingly influential "technological-discontinuity" paradigm suggests that IT-induced technological changes are rapidly raising productivity while making workers redundant. This paper explores the evidence for this view among the IT-using US manufacturing industries. There is some limited support for more rapid productivity growth in IT-intensive industries depending on the exact measures, though not since the late 1990s. Most challenging to this paradigm, and to our expectations, is that output contracts in IT-intensive industries relative to the rest of manufacturing. Productivity increases, when detectable, result from the even faster declines in employment.
China wird sich nicht von der EU abwenden, nur weil es einen Gasdeal mit Russland schließt. Das sagt der italienische Ökonom und Chinakenner Fabrizio Zilibotti. Interview: Axel Hansen
Wenn die EU gerettet werden soll, muss im Spitzenpersonal eine «Verschrottung» à la Renzi stattfinden. Nun ist Mut gefragt, und Deutschland muss die Führung übernehmen. Ein Kommentar von Fabrizio Zilibotti.
