Attempts at modifying public opinions, attitudes, and beliefs range from advertising and schooling to "brainwashing." Their effectiveness is highly controversial. In this paper, we use survey data on anti-Semitic beliefs and attitudes in a representative sample of Germans surveyed in 1996 and 2006 to show that Nazi indoctrination--with its singular focus on fostering racial hatred--was highly effective. Between 1933 and 1945, young Germans were exposed to anti-Semitic ideology in schools, in the (extracurricular) Hitler Youth, and through radio, print, and film. As a result, Germans who grew up under the Nazi regime are much more anti-Semitic than those born before or after that period: the share of committed anti-Semites, who answer a host of questions about attitudes toward Jews in an extreme fashion, is 2-3 times higher than in the population as a whole. Results also hold for average beliefs, and not just the share of extremists; average views of Jews are much more negative among those born in the 1920s and 1930s. Nazi indoctrination was most effective where it could tap into preexisting prejudices; those born in districts that supported anti-Semitic parties before 1914 show the greatest increases in anti-Jewish attitudes. These findings demonstrate the extent to which beliefs can be modified through policy intervention. We also identify parameters amplifying the effectiveness of such measures, such as preexisting prejudices.
From 2004 to 2012, the German social health insurance levied a co-payment for the first doctor visit in a calendar quarter. We develop a new model for estimating the effect of such a co-payment on the individual number of visits per quarter. The model allows for a one time increase in the otherwise constant hazard rate determining the timing of doctor visits, and uses a difference-in-differences strategy to identify the reform effect. The model can be adapted to a situation where the reporting period and the calendar quarter differ. Using data from the German Socio-Economic Panel, we do not find an effect of the co-payment on demand for doctor visits.
We measure the welfare consequences of endogenous quality choice in imperfectly competitive markets. We introduce the concept of a "quality markup" and measure the relative importance for welfare of market power over price versus market power over quality. For U.S. cable-television markets between 1997-2006, we find that prices are 33% to 74% higher and qualities 23% to 55% higher than socially optimal. This "quality inflation" contradicts classic results in the literature and reflects our flexible specification of consumer preferences. Furthermore, we find market power over quality is responsible for 54% of the total welfare change from endogenous prices and qualities.
We study the impact of research collaborations in coauthorship networks on total research output. Through the links in the collaboration network researchers create spillovers not only to their direct coauthors but also to researchers indirectly linked to them. We characterize the interior equilibrium when multiple agents spend effort in multiple, possibly overlapping projects, and there are interaction effects in the cost of effort.
We use experimental methods to investigate whether pledges of commitment can improve cooperation in endogenously formed partnerships facing a social dilemma. Treatments vary in terms of the individual’s (a) opportunity to commit to their partner, (b) the cost of dissolving committed partnerships, and (c) the distribution of these dissolution costs between partners. Our findings show that pledges of commitment alone can increase cooperation and welfare in committed partnerships . The introduction of relatively large and equally split costs yields similar gains. In contrast, when costs to dissolve committed partnerships fall solely on the individual choosing to break up, pledges of commitment fail to improve cooperation and welfare.
The probability triangle (also called the Marschak-Machina triangle) allows for compact and intuitive depictions of risk preferences. Here, we develop an analogous tool for choice under uncertainty - the ambiguity triangle - and show that indifference curves in this triangle capture preferences for unknown probabilities. In particular, the ambiguity triangle allows us to examine whether subjects adhere to the generalized axiom of revealed preference (GARP) and satisfy a non-parametric test for constant ambiguity attitudes. We find that more than 95% of subjects adhere to GARP and that about 60% satisfy our test for a constant ambiguity attitude. Yet, among these 60% of subjects there is substantial preference heterogeneity. We characterize this heterogeneity with finite-mixture estimates of a one-parameter extension of Expected Utility Theory wherein 48% of subjects are ambiguity averse, 22% are ambiguity seeking, and 30% are close to ambiguity neutral. The ambiguity triangle also highlights how variable ambiguity attitudes arise mainly because indifference curves are 'fanning-in' across the triangle. This fanning-in property implies that aversion to ambiguity increases as the likelihood of receiving a good outcome increases. We capture this behavior with a simple parametric model that also allows for finite mixture characterizations of preference heterogeneity for these subjects. We show that for a substantial share of these subjects (43%) their fanning-in is so strong that, although they are initially ambiguity seeking, they become strongly ambiguity averse as the likelihood of receiving a good outcome increases.
The evolutionary legacy hypothesis proposes that an evolved reciprocity-based psychology affects human behavior in anonymous one-shot interactions when reciprocity is not explicitly possible. Empirical support rests on experiments showing that altruism among adults increases in the presence of stylized eye spots or faces. Such stimuli do not affect material payoffs, but they are assumed to activate a person’s reciprocity-based psychology. We identify two versions of the evolutionary legacy hypothesis. The weak hypothesis posits that reputational concerns can generate altruism in the absence of opportunities for a good reputation. The strong hypothesis posits that reputational concerns alone can explain anonymous one-shot altruism, and they can do so specifically in lieu of explanations based on group selection. A number of experimental studies support the weak hypothesis but are merely consistent with the strong hypothesis. To address both the weak and strong hypotheses, we conducted an eye spot experiment with children. Altruism can vary by age or sex in childhood, and under the strong hypothesis this kind of variation should reveal associated variation in sensitivity to eye spots. Although we found significant variation in altruism among children, we found no corresponding variation in sensitivity to eye spots. More generally, we found no eye spot effects of any kind. We discuss the possibility that eye spots might only affect altruism under specific conditions. We further argue that conditional effects do not refute the weak hypothesis in any way, but they do suggest potential limitations on the explanatory scope of the strong hypothesis.
Despite the importance of valuing another person’s welfare for prosocial behavior, currently we have only a limited understanding of how these values are represented in the brain and, more importantly, how they give rise to individual variability in prosociality. In the present study, participants underwent functional magnetic resonance imaging while performing a prosocial learning task in which they could choose to benefit themselves and/or another person. Choice behavior indicated that participants valued the welfare of another person, although less so than they valued their own welfare. Neural data revealed a spatial gradient in activity within the medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC), such that ventral parts predominantly represented self-regarding values and dorsal parts predominantly represented other-regarding values. Importantly, compared with selfish individuals, prosocial individuals showed a more gradual transition from self-regarding to other-regarding value signals in the MPFC and stronger MPFC–striatum coupling when they made choices for another person rather than for themselves. The present study provides evidence of neural markers reflecting individual differences in human prosociality.
The axiomatic route to the foundation of contest success functions (CSF) has proved to be both useful and prolific. The standard approach in the literature is based on the decision-theoretic notion that choice probabilities should be independent of irrelevant alternatives (Skaperdas, Economic Theory 1996). The present paper develops an alternative approach that suggests itself once the contest is re-interpreted as a common-pool resource problem. Proceeding along these lines, new axiomatizations are obtained for a variety of popular classes of CSFs, including the logit, Tullock, and difference-form CSFs. The axiomatizations provided are particularly parsimonious in the important special case of two contestants.
Why did the country that borrowed the most industrialize first? Earlier research has viewed the explosion of debt in 18th century Britain as either detrimental, or as neutral for economic growth. In this paper, we argue instead that Britain’s borrowing boom was beneficial. The massive issuance of liquidly traded bonds allowed the nobility to switch out of low-return investments such as agricultural improvements. This switch lowered factor demand by old sectors and increased profits in new, rising ones such as textiles and iron. Because external financing contributed little to the Industrial Revolution, this boost in profits in new industries accelerated structural change, making Britain more industrial more quickly. The absence of an effective transfer of financial resources from old to new sectors also helps to explain why the Industrial Revolution led to massive social change – because the rich nobility did not lend to or invest in the revolutionizing industries, it failed to capture the high returns to capital in these sectors, leading to relative economic decline.
