Beim Produkt Yasmin® ist die Risikodeklaration sowohl gegenüber den Patientinnen als auch gegenüber den Ärzten irreführend und in zentralen Punkten unvollständig. Es ist nicht auszuschliessen, dass die Kosten der Nebenwirkungen höher als die erwirtschafteten Gewinne sind. Die Kostenfolgen der Nebenwirkungen muss aber die Allgemeinheit tragen.
Different social contexts have been used when measuring distributional preferences. This could be problematic as contextual variance may inadvertently muddle the measurement process. We use a within-subjects design and measure distributional preferences in resource allocation tasks with role certainty, role uncertainty, decomposed games, and matrix games. Results show that, at the aggregate level, role uncertainty and decomposed games lead to higher degrees of prosociality when compared to role certainty. At the individual level, we observe considerable differences in behavior across the social contexts, indicating that the majority of people are sensitive to these different social settings but respond in different ways.
Der liberale Reformvorschlag sieht eine Aufteilung der Krankenpflegeversicherung in eine obligatorische Hochrisikoversicherung (ab CHF 10.000/Jahr) und eine freiwillige Grundpflegeversicherung (bis CHF 10.000/Jahr) vor, letztere mit risikoorientierten Prämien. Die Prämie für die obligatorische Deckung sinkt dadurch um 60%. Die Prämie für die Grundpflegeversicherung kann so festgelegt
werden, dass knapp 2/3 der Versicherten gegenüber dem Status quo besser gestellt würden. Zieht man die Kostenspareffekte einer solchen Reform, die stärker auf Selbstverantwortung setzt, in Betracht, so steigt der Prozentanteil besser gestellter Versicherter noch einmal an.
Ein Blick in die Literatur zeigt: Der Einfluss der Selbstdispensation(SD) auf die Medikamentenkosten ist äusserst umstritten. Die vorliegende Arbeit unterzieht diesen Zusammenhang einer erneuten Prüfung.
We analyze the endogenous formation of R&D networks, where firms are active in different product markets and can benefit from R&D spillovers form collaborating firms within or across different industries. R&D spillovers help firms to introduce process innovations to lower their production costs. Product innovations introduce an escape-competition effect, through which firms can enter new markets with fewer competitors. We provide a complete equilibrium char- acterization in which both, the network of R&D collaborations as well as the market structure, are endogenously determined. We show that the coevolution of market and network structure matter for the relationship between competition and innovation. Moreover, our model allows us to explain differences in the R&D network structures observed across different industries, and how they are related to different levels of competition in these industries.
We analyze binary choice models in communication networks, in which both, the formation of links in the network as well as the action choices are endogenous. We provide a complete characterization of the equilibrium action choices and networks, where agents choose their strategies – actions and links – according to a perturbed best response update rule. We show that a threshold exists in the linking cost and the conformity parameter, giving rise to either a sparse or a densely connected communication network. Moreover, we show how the theoretical model can be efficiently estimated using cross sectional data on agents choices and their network of interactions.
This paper analyzes how changing the expected length of intellectual property (IP) protection affects economic growth and the welfare of rich and poor consumers. The analysis is based on a product-variety model with non-homothetic preferences and endogenous markups in which, in accordance with empirical evidence, rich households consume a larger variety of goods than poorer ones. The effects of IP protection on growth can be either positive or negative, depending on the distribution of income and wealth. Given that increasing the length of IP protection increases growth, poorer households prefer a shorter length of protection than richer ones.
