Die Gesundheitsökonomin Anna Sax legt mit «Einheitskasse – warum nicht?» eine Wirkungsanalyse von Wettbewerb und Einheitskasse in der Schweizer Krankenversicherung vor. Der selbst deklarierte Anspruch dieser von der SP Bundeshaus-Fraktion in Auftrag gegebenen Studie ist hoch: Ständerätin Egerszegi verspricht im Vorwort eine Prüfung des Modells einer «öffentlichen Krankenkasse für die Grundversicherung ohne ideologische Scheuklappen» (S. 5), «nicht nur Zündstoff, sondern vor allem Fakten» (S. 6) und gemäss Sax (S. 9) besteht das Ziel darin, «in erster Linie den Leserinnen und Lesern zu ermöglichen, sich ein differenziertes Urteil zu bilden.»
We propose that heterogeneous asset trading behavior is the result of two distinct, non-convertible mental dimensions: analytical (“quantitative”) capability and mentalizing (“perspective-taking”) capability. We develop a framework of mental capabilities that yields testable predictions about individual trading behavior, revenue distribution and aggregate outcomes. The two-dimensional structure of mental capabilities predicts the existence of four mental types with distinguishable trading patterns and revenues. Individuals will trade most successfully if and only if they have both capabilities. On the other hand, subjects who can mentalize well but have poor analytical capability will suffer the largest losses. As a consequence, being able in just one dimension does not assure trading success. We test these implications in a laboratory environment, where we first independently elicit subjects’ capabilities in both dimensions and then conduct a standard asset market experiment. We find that individual trading gains and patterns are consistent with our theoretical predictions. Our results suggest that two mental dimensions are necessary to encompass the complex heterogeneous behaviors in asset markets; a one-dimensional measure of mental capability will lead to biased conclusions. The findings have potential implications for financial institutions, which can use the measures to select successful traders, or for policy-makers, helping them to prevent the formation of asset bubbles. Finally, our conceptual framework and the empirical screening method could be applied to explain heterogeneous behavior in other games.
Work and trade relationships are often governed by relational contracts, in which incentives for cooperative action today stem from the prospective future benefits of the relationship. In this paper, we study how reductions in clarity about the financial consequences of actions, induced by incomplete information about the costs of providing quality, affect relational contracts in buyer-seller relation- ships. Under incomplete information, payoffs to actions become private infor- mation. This can impede the joint understanding of what constitutes cooperative behavior, and may thus inject mistrust into relationships, even if credibility is held constant. Comparing seller-buyer relationships with and without complete infor- mation about seller costs in the laboratory, we find that such a lack of clarity has effects on the terms of relational contracts. However, these effects only concern the distribution of rents, and not efficiency.
Background: In Switzerland, age is the predominant driver of solidarity transfers in risk adjustment (RA). Concerns have been voiced regarding growing imbalances in cost sharing between young and old insured due to demographic changes (larger fraction of elderly >65 years and rise in average age). Particularly young adults aged 19–25 with limited incomes have to shoulder increasing solidarity burdens. Between 1996 and 2011, monthly inter generational solidarity payments for young adults have doubled from CHF 87 to CHF 182, which corresponds to the highest absolute transfer increase of all age groups.
Results: By constructing models for age-specific RA growth and for calculating the lifetime sum of RA transfers we investigated the causes and consequences of demographic changes on RA payments. The models suggest that the main driver for RA increases in the past was below average health care expenditure (HCE) growth in young adults, which was only half as high (average 2% per year) compared with older adults (average 4% per year). Shifts in age group distributions were only accountable for 2% of the CHF 95 rise in RA payments.
Despite rising risk adjustment debts for young insured the balance of lifetime transfers remains positive as long as HCE growth rates are greater than the discount rate used in this model (3%). Moreover, the life-cycle model predicts that the lifetime rate of return on RA payments may even be further increased by demographic changes.
Nevertheless, continued growth of RA contributions may overwhelm vulnerable age groups such as young adults. We therefore propose methods to limit the burden of social health insurance for specific age groups (e.g. young adults in Switzerland) by capping solidarity payments.
Conclusions: Taken together, our mathematical modelling framework helps to gain a better understanding of how demographic changes interact with risk adjustment and how redistribution of funds between age groups can be controlled without inducing further selection incentives. Those methods can help to construct more equitable systems of health financing in light of population aging.
Second moments of asset returns are important for risk management and portfolio selection. The problem of estimating second moments can be approached from two angles: time series and the cross-section. In time series, the key is to account for conditional heteroskedasticity; a favored model is Dynamic Conditional Correlation (DCC), derived from the ARCH/GARCH family started by Engle (1982). In the cross-section, the key is to correct in-sample biases of sample covariance matrix eigenvalues; a favored model is nonlinear shrinkage, derived from Random Matrix Theory (RMT). The present paper marries these two strands of literature in order to deliver improved estimation of large dynamic covariance matrices.
These days, it is common practice to base inference about the coefficients in a hetoskedastic linear model on the ordinary least squares estimator in conjunction with using heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors. Even when the true form of heteroskedasticity is unknown, heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors can also used to base valid inference on a weighted least squares estimator and using such an estimator can provide large gains in efficiency over the ordinary least squares estimator. However, intervals based on asymptotic approximations with plug-in standard errors often have coverage that is below the nominal level, especially for small sample sizes. Similarly, tests can have null rejection probabilities that are above the nominal level. In this paper, it is shown that under unknown hereroskedasticy, a bootstrap approximation to the sampling distribution of the weighted least squares estimator is valid, which allows for inference with improved finite-sample properties. For testing linear constraints, permutations tests are proposed which are exact when the error distribution is symmetric and is asymptotically valid otherwise. Another concern that has discouraged the use of weighting is that the weighted least squares estimator may be less efficient than the ordinary least squares estimator when the model used to estimate the unknown form of the heteroskedasticity is misspecified. To address this problem, a new estimator is proposed that is asymptotically at least as efficient as both the ordinary and the weighted least squares estimator. Simulation studies demonstrate the attractive finite-sample properties of this new estimator as well as the improvements in performance realized by bootstrap confidence intervals.
This paper constructs a novel equilibrium in the chopstick auction of Szentes and Rosenthal (Games and Economic Behavior, 2003a, 2003b). In contrast to the existing solution, the identified equilibrium strategy allows a simple and intuitive characterization. Moreover, its best-response set has the same Hausdorff dimension as its support, which may be seen as a robustness property. The analysis also reveals some new links to the literature on Blotto games.
