Insurers traditionally use risk-specific characteristics of insureds to classify them according to risk. In this article, the practical relevance of information about multiple risks is demonstrated for the case of content insurance of a Swiss company. Two types of such information prove important: information about "spillover moral hazard" caused by mandated prevention affecting preventive effort in an unregulated line, and information about "common impulses" reflected in the loss experience of related lines. Both contribute to an improved prediction of loss probability.
Much progress has been made in recent years in developing and applying a direct measure of utility using survey questions on satisfaction with income and with life in general. In this paper we apply this new type of measurement to the study of money illusion. Using data from the German Socio-Economic Panel for the years 1993 to 2003, we cannot reject the hypothesis of no money illusion.
Famous cultural monuments are often regarded as unique icons, making them an attractive target for terrorists. Despite huge military and police outlays, terrorist attacks on important monuments can hardly be avoided. We argue that an effective strategy for discouraging terrorist attacks on iconic monuments is for the government to show a firm commitment to swift reconstruction. Using a simple game-theoretic model, we demonstrate how a credible claim to rebuild any cultural monuments destroyed discourages terrorist attacks by altering the terrorists’ expectations and by increasing the government’s reputation costs if they fail to rebuild.
Laut ökonomischer Standardtheorie sollen Arbeitsanreize mittels Geldzahlungen vermittelt werden. Materielle Anreize in nicht-monetärer Form sind demgegenüber weniger effizient, sind aber dennoch weit verbreitet. Auszeichnungen in Form von Titeln, Orden, Medaillen und Ehrungen (Preisen) wurden bisher nicht beachtet. Es handelt sich dabei um extrinsische, nicht-materielle Anreize die ihre Wirkung über den Urtrieb der Individuen nach sozialer Anerkennung und Status entfalten. Wir analysieren wie sich monetäre Anreize und Auszeichnungen unterscheiden: Auszeichnungen sind in der Regel billig, begründen soziale Beziehungen, sind nicht direkt mit der Leistung verknüpft und verfügen über eine Signalwirkung. Darüber hinaus unterstützen Auszeichnungen die intrinsische Motivation, können die Wohlfahrt erhöhen und sind steuerfrei. Auszeichnungen sind ein wichtiges zusätzliches Instrument im Arsenal der Prinzipal-Agenten-Theorie. In vielen Kontexten wirken sie besser als Geld.
In this paper we analyze the behavioral consequences of control on motivation. Wenstudy a simple experimental principal-agent game, where the principal decides whethernhe controls the agent by implementing a minimum performance requirement before the agent chooses a productive activity. Our main finding is that a principal's decisionnto control has a negative impact on the agent's motivation. While there is substantial individual heterogeneity among agents, most agents reduce their performance as a response to the principals' controlling decision. The majority of the principals seem to anticipate the hidden costs of control and decide not to control. In several treatmentsnwe vary the enforceable level of control and show that control has a non-monotonic effect on the principal's payoff. In a variant of our main treatment principals can also set wages. In this gift-exchange game control partly crowds out agents' reciprocity. The economic importance and possible applications of our experimental results are further illustrated by a questionnaire study which reveals hidden costs of control in various real-life labor scenarios. We also explore possible reasons for the existence of hidden costs of control. Agents correctly believe that principals who control expect to get less than those who don't. When asked for their emotional perception of control, most agents who react negatively say that they perceive the controlling decision as a signal of distrust and a limitation of their choice autonomy.
In binary choice between discrete outcome lotteries, an individual may prefer lottery L1 tonlottery L2 when the probability that L1 delivers a better outcome than L2 is higher than thenprobability that L2 delivers a better outcome than L1. Such a preference can be rationalizednby three standard axioms (solvability, convexity and symmetry) and one less standard axiom (a fanning-in). A preference for the most probable winner can be represented by a skewsymmetric bilinear utility function. Such a utility function has the structure of a regret theory when lottery outcomes are perceived as ordinal and the assumption of regret aversion isnreplaced with a preference for a win. The empirical evidence supporting the proposed systemnof axioms is discussed.
In view of recent corporate scandals, it is argued that corporate governance can learnnfrom public governance. Institutions devised to control and discipline the behavior of executives in the political sphere can give new insights into how to improve the governance of firms. Proposals in four specific areas are discussed: manager compensation, the division of power within firms, rules of succession in top positions, and institutionalized competition in core areas of the corporation.
Most previous studies on intertemporal labor supply found very small or insignificantnsubstitution effects. It is not clear, however, whether these results are due to institutionalnconstraints on workers’ labor supply choices or whether the behavioral assumptions of thenstandard life cycle model with time separable preferences are empirically invalid. We conducted a randomized field experiment in a setting in which workers were free to choose their working times and their efforts during working time. We document a large positive wage elasticity of overall labor supply and an even larger wage elasticity of labor hours, which implies that the wage elasticity of effort per hour is negative.nWhile the standard life cycle model cannot explain the negative effort elasticity, we show that a modified neoclassical model with preference spillovers across periods and a model withnreference dependent, loss averse preferences are consistent with the evidence. With the help of anfurther experiment we can show that only loss averse individuals exhibit a significantly negativeneffort response to the wage increase and that the degree of loss aversion predicts the size of the negative effort response.
This paper argues that endogenous restructuring processes within firms towards analytical and interactive non-routine tasks (like problem-solving and organizational activities, respectively), triggered by advances in information and communication technologies (ICT) and rising supply of educated workers, are associated with an increase of wage inequality within education groups. We show that this may be accompanied by a decline or stagnation of between-group wage dispersion. The mechanisms proposed in this research are not only consistent with the evolution of the distribution of wages in advanced countries, but also with the evolution of task composition in firms and a frequently confirmed complementarity between skill-upgrading, new technologies and knowledge-based work organization.
The consequences of international outsourcing in traditional models of trade are already well understood. However, with regard to empirical research there seem to be still some important shortcomings. Empirical studies on the labor market effects of outsourcing are mainly based on the same techniques that have been used for years. In terms of the adopted econometric specifications, one assumption is typical and – as we will show – critical in this regard. Practically all studies we are aware of assume independence between industries and neglect any spillover and feedback effects across industries. In fact, this is at odds with multi-sector general equilibrium models of trade. It is this paper's focus to relax this restrictive assumption and to suggest the use of different econometric methods. We consider national input–output linkages and cross industrial flows of workers as two important channels of inter-industrial spillovers in labor market effects. We focus on these transmission channels in an Austrian panel data set of 21 two-digit industries in the 1990s and find that industrial interdependencies induce a multiplier effect for changes in industry-specific variables such as international outsourcing. Disregarding spillover effects, therefore, leads to a substantial underestimation of the labor market implications of international outsourcing.
