We study international business cycles and capital flows in the UK, the United States and the Emerging Periphery in the period 1885-1939. Based on the same set of parameters, our model explains current account dynamics under both the Classical Gold Standard and during the Interwar period. We interpret this as evidence for Gold Standard mentality: the expectation formation mechanism with respect to major macroeconomic variables driving the current account – output, exchange rates and interest rates – has remained fundamentally stable between the two periods. Nonetheless, the macroeconomic environment changed: Volatility increased generally, but less so for international capital flows than for GDP. This pattern is consistent with shocks in the Interwar period becoming more persistent and more global.
I study the effect of fatigue and innate ability on performance in a model with incomplete contracts, lumpy tasks requiring multiple periods of work and stochastic productivity shocks. I find that increasing ability or reducing fatigue does not lead necessarily to more productive efficiency, since it may exacerbate the incentive for agents take "too much" on-the-job leisure. In a world with heterogenous agents, the problem may be ameliorated by the introduction of a dual labour market with free-lancers (who can take breaks at their discretion) and regular workers (who work on a fixed schedule).
Several European countries have followed the United States in introducing prospective payment for hospitals with the expectation of achieving cost efficiency gains. This article examines whether theoretical expectations of cost efficiency gains can be empirically confirmed. In contrast to previous studies, the analysis of Switzerland provides a comparison of a retrospective per diem payment system with a prospective global budget and a payment per patient case system. Using a sample of approximately 90 public financed Swiss hospitals during the years 2004 to 2009 and Bayesian inference of a standard and a random parameter frontier model, cost efficiency gains are found, particularly with a payment per patient case system. Payment systems designed to put hospitals at operating risk are more effective than retrospective payment systems. However, hospitals are heterogeneous with respect to their production technologies, making a random parameter frontier model the superior specification for Switzerland.
Am Beispiel des Untergangs der Lusitania und der Titanic wird analysiert, ob und in welchem Maße finanzielle und physische Macht sowie soziale Normen über Leben und Tod entscheiden. In einem quasi-natürlichen Experiment werden multivariate Probit-Schätzungen von öffentlich verfügbaren Sekundärdaten der Schiffsuntergänge durchgeführt. Die Analyse kommt zum Ergebnis, dass es im Wesentlichen von der Zeitspanne zwischen der Beschädigung des Schiffes und seinem Untergang abhängt, welche Rolle physische Stärke, gesellschaftlicher Status oder soziale Normen in lebensbedrohenden Situationen spielen. In zeitlich eng begrenzten Extremsituationen verdrängen Angst und Stress wertbezogenes, rationales Handeln. Es kommt zu einem rücksichtslosen Kampf ums eigene Überleben. Bleibt jedoch in Empfinden und Wahrnehmung der Betroffenen ein größerer Zeitraum bis zum endgültigen Versinken des Schiffes, bestimmen in stärkerem Maße soziale und ethische Werte das Verhalten der Menschen.
This paper uses microdata to evaluate the impact on the steady-state unemployment rate of an increase in maximum benefit duration. We evaluate a policy change in Austria that extended maximum benefit duration and use this policy change to estimate the causal impact of benefit duration on labor market flows. We find that the policy change leads to a significant increase in the steady-state unemployment rate and, surprisingly, most of this increase is due to an increase in the inflow into rather than the outflow from unemployment.
We explore the relationship between outcomes in a coordination game and a pre-play asset market where asset values are determined by outcomes in the subsequent coordination game. Across two experiments, we vary the payoffs from the market relative to the game, the degree of interdependence in the game, and whether traders' asset payoffs are dependent on outcomes in their own or another game. Markets lead to significantly lower efficiency across treatments, even when they produce no distortion of incentives in the game. Market prices forecast game outcomes. Our experiments shed light on how financial markets may influence affiliated economic outcomes.
We study the effects of deliberation on collective decisions. In a series of experiments, we vary groups' preference distributions (between common and conflicting interests) and the institutions by which decisions are reached (simple majority, two-thirds majority, and unanimity). Without deliberation, different institutions generate significantly different outcomes, tracking the theoretical comparative statics. Deliberation, however, significantly diminishes institutional differences and uniformly improves efficiency. Furthermore, communication protocols exhibit an array of stable attributes: messages are public, consistently reveal private information, provide a good predictor for ultimate group choices, and follow particular (endogenous) sequencing.
Gordon Tullock is one of the most important of the founders and contributors to Public Choice. Two innovations are typical “Tullock Challenges.” The first relates to method: the measurement of subjective well-being, or happiness. The second relates to digital social networks, such as Facebook, Twitter, and to some extent Google. Both innovations lead to strong incentives by governments to manipulate the policy outcomes. In general, “What is important will be manipulated by the government.” To restrain government manipulation, one has to turn to Constitutional Economics and increase the possibilities for direct popular participation and federalism or introduce random mechanisms.
Hart and John Moore (2008) introduce new behavioral assumptions that can explain long-term contracts and the employment relation. We examine experimentally their idea that contracts serve as reference points. The evidence confirms the prediction that there is a trade-off between rigidity and flexibility. Flexible contracts—which would dominate rigid contracts under standard assumptions—cause significant shading in ex post performance, while under rigid contracts much less shading occurs. The experiment appears to reveal a new behavioral force: ex ante competition legitimizes the terms of a contract, and aggrievement and shading occur mainly about outcomes within the contract. (JEL D44, D86, J41)
