infonet-economy

The aim of this paper is to compare pricing and performance of mutual funds with two types of guarantees: a lookback guarantee and an interest rate guarantee. In a simulation analysis of different portfolios based on stock, bond, real estate, and money market indices, we first calibrate guarantee costs to be the same for both investment guarantee funds. Second, their performance is contrasted, measured with the Sharpe ratio, Omega, and Sortino ratio, and a test with respect to first, second, and third order stochastic dominance is provided. We further investigate the impact of the underlying funds strategy, first looking at a conventional fund having a constant average rate of return and standard deviation over the contract term, and then at a Constant Proportion Portfolio Insurance managed fund. This analysis is intended to provide insights for investors with different risk-return preferences regarding the interaction of guarantee costs and the performance of different mutual funds with embedded investment guarantees

In general, conglomeration leads to a diversification of risks (the diversification benefit)and to a decrease in shareholder value (the conglomerate discount). Diversification benefitsin financial conglomerates are typically derived without accounting for reducedshareholder value. However, a comprehensive analysis requires competitive conditionswithin the conglomerate, i.e., shareholders and debtholders should receive risk-adequatereturns on their investment. In this paper, we extend the literature by comparing the diversificationeffect in conglomerates with and without accounting for the altered shareholdervalue. We derive results for a holding company, a parent-subsidiary structure, andan integrated model. In addition, we consider different types of capital and risk transferinstruments in the parent-subsidiary model, including intra-group retrocession and guarantees.We conclude that under competitive conditions, diversification does not matter tothe extent frequently emphasized in the literature. The analysis aims to contribute to theongoing discussion on group solvency regulation and enterprise risk management

Purpose
– Definitions of pooling effects in insurance companies may convey the impression that the achieved risk reduction effect will be beneficial for policyholders, since typically lower premiums are paid for the same safety level with an increasing number of insureds, or a higher safety level is achieved for a given premium level for all pool members. However, this view is misleading and the purpose of this paper is to reexamine this apparent merit of pooling from the policyholder's perspective.

Design/methodology/approach
– This is achieved by comparing several valuation approaches for the policyholders' claims using different assumptions of the individual policyholder's ability to replicate the contract's cash flows and claims.

Findings
– The paper shows that the two considered definitions of risk pooling do not offer insight into the question of whether pooling is actually beneficial for policyholders.

Originality/value
– The paper contributes to the literature by extending and combining previous work, focusing on the merits of pooling claims (using the two definitions above) from the policyholder's perspective using different valuation approaches.

A change in the corporate tax level can have a significant impact on rate making and capital structure for insurance companies. The purpose of this paper is to study this effect on competitive equity-premium combinations for different asset and liability models while retaining a fixed safety level. This is a crucial consideration as a change in the tax rate leads, in general, to a different risk of insolvency. Hence, fixing the safety level serves to isolate the effect of taxes without shifting the insurer's risk situation whenever taxes are varied. The model framework includes stochastic assets as well as stochastic claims costs. We further compare the results for liability models with and without a jump component. Insurance rate making is conducted using option pricing theory.

The purpose of this paper is to provide a detailed analysis of industry loss warranties (ILWs), an alternative risk transfer instrument which has become increasingly popular throughout the last few years.

The authors first point out key characteristics of ILWs important to investor and cedent, including transaction costs, moral hazard, basis risk, counterparty risk, industry loss index, and regulation. Next, the authors present and discuss the adequacy of actuarial and financial approaches for pricing ILWs, as well as the aspects of basis risk. Finally, drivers of demand and associated models frameworks from the purchaser's viewpoint are studied.

Financial pricing approaches for ILWs are highly sensitive to input parameters, which is important given the high volatility of the underlying loss index. In addition, the underlying assumption of replicability of the claims is not without problems. Due to their simple and standardized structure and the dependence on a transparent industry loss index, ILWs are low-barrier products, which can also be offered by hedge funds. In principle, traditional reinsurance contracts are still preferred as a measure of risk transfer, especially since these are widely accepted for solvency capital reduction. However, the main important impact factor for the demand of ILWs from the perspective of market participants, i.e. large diversified reinsurers and hedge funds, is the lower price due to rather low transaction costs and less documentation effort. Hence, ILWs are attractive despite the introduction of basis risk and the still somewhat opaque regulatory environment.

An important issue for future research is how reinsureds deal with the basis risk inherent in ILWs. Another central point is the development of a European industry loss index and the creation of an exchange platform to enable an even higher degree of standardization and a faster processing of transactions.

ILWs feature an industry loss index to be triggered, and, in some cases, a double-trigger design that includes a company indemnity trigger. ILW contracts belong to the class of alternative risk transfer instruments that have become increasingly popular, especially in the retrocession reinsurance market. There has been no comprehensive analysis of these instruments in academic literature to date. Consequently, the authors believe that this paper provides a high degree of originality.

Participating life insurance contracts typically contain various types of implicit options. These implicit options can be very valuable and can thus represent a significant risk to insurance companies if they practice insufficient risk management. Options become especially risky through interaction with other options included in the contracts, which makes their evaluation even more complex. This article provides a comprehensive overview and classification of implicit options in participating life insurance contracts and discusses the relevant literature. It points out the potential problems particularly associated with the valuation of rights to early exercise due to policyholder exercise behavior. The risk potential of the interaction of implicit options is illustrated with numerical examples by means of a life insurance contract that includes common implicit options, i.e., a guaranteed interest rate, stochastic annual surplus participation, and paid-up and resumption options. Valuation is conducted using risk-neutral valuation, a concept that implicitly assumes the implementation of risk management measures such as hedging strategies.

In an environment of increasingly frequent consolidation activity, the advantages and risks of corporate diversification are of great interest to regulatory authorities, financial group management and management of individual group entities. In general, conglomeration leads to a diversification of risks (the diversification benefit) and to a decrease in shareholder value (the conglomerate discount). Diversification benefits in financial conglomerates are typically derived without accounting for reduced shareholder value, even though a comprehensive analysis requires competitive conditions within the conglomerate, i.e.shareholders and debtholders receive risk-adequate returns