I analyse the effects of two macroprudential policy measures implemented in Switzerland: the activation of the countercyclical capital buffer (CCyB) and a cap on the loan-to-value (LTV) ratios. I use a difference-in-differences method to estimate the effects of these measures on risk indicators, such as their LTV and loan-to-income (LTI) ratios and mortgage growth rates. I find that both the CCyB and the LTV cap led to a reduction in high LTV mortgages. The banks affected by the CCyB also reduced their mortgage growth rates. I do not find any evidence that these measures had unintended consequences on LTI risks or on non-mortgage credit growth.
In a negative interest rate environment, banks have generally proved reluctant to pass on negative interest rates to their retail depositors. Thus, banks that are more dependent on deposit funding face higher funding costs relative to other banks. This raises questions about the effect of negative interest rates on bank lending and monetary policy transmission. To study the transmission of negative interest rates, we use an unexpected policy decision by the Swiss National Bank in combination with a comprehensive and granular micro data set on individual Swiss corporate loans. We find that banks relying more heavily on deposit funding take more risks and offer looser lending terms than other banks. This result is consistent with the risk-taking channel, where a lower policy rate spurs bank risk-taking to maintain profits.
We examine empirically the effect of two types of expectations-related shocks - "news" (increases in expected future productivity) and "sentiment" (surges in optimism unrelated to future productivity) - on gross capital flows. We find that news shocks lead to a decrease in both gross capital inflows and outflows, while sentiment shocks lead to an increase in both gross inflows and outflows. Both these shocks drive a positive correlation between gross inflows and outflows but only sentiments shocks generate procyclical gross flows. These effects are not driven by global shocks or financial shocks. They are consistent with the existence of asymmetric information between domestic and foreign investors about the country's fundamentals.
We construct recursive solutions for, and study the properties of the dynamic equilibrium of an economy with three types of agents: (i) household/investors who supply labor with a finite elasticity, consume a large variety of goods that are not perfect substitutes and trade government bonds; (ii) firms that produce those varieties of goods, receive productivity shocks and set prices in a Calvo manner; (iii) a government that collects an exogenous fiscal surplus and acts mechanically, buying and selling bonds in accordance with a Taylor policy rule based on expected inflation. In this setting we show that stock market returns are much less than one-for-one related to inflation over a one-year holding period, which means that stock securities have a strong nominal character. We also show that their nominal character diminishes as the length of the stock-holding period increases, in accordance with empirical evidence.
