The current crisis is not only one of financial markets, but also of macroeconomics. Leading scholars call for a paradigm shift away from dynamic general equilibrium models, though some argue that the profession's arsenal already contains the tools and historical lessons needed to deal with such crises. Taking this view to the limit, this note demonstrates that the workhorse models of undergraduate macroeconomics not only permit a refined view and classification of financial crises. These models also identify scenarios under which either policymakers would be ill advised to follow conventional prescriptions, or full-scale depressions loom that cannot be fought by means of fiscal or monetary policy alone.
This article narrates Ireland's recent odyssey from the pride and envy of Europe to kneeling supplicant through the eyes of an econometric model of the government bond market. The exercise suggests that, in essence, two developments triggered and propelled Ireland's drift towards sovereign default: first, the global financial crisis that drove Ireland into a severe recession with collapsing tax revenues and increasing unemployment; second, a gap between the post-2007 increase in sovereign default risk that can actually be linked to macroeconomic fundamentals and the much bigger increase in perceived risk reflected by high interest rates and communicated by the massive downgrades of Ireland's sovereign debt rating.
The global financial crisis triggered different policy responses in Europe and the United States. Interestingly, survey results suggest that there is also a significant difference in how undergraduate macroeconomics instructors responded to the crisis, with U.S. instructors placing significantly more emphasis on financial topics than their European peers. This note considers whether such differences may be attributed to differences in instructors' profiles and teaching environments. The results suggest that, rather than explaining this gap, the transatlantic divide becomes even wider when analyzed in a multivariate setting.
Competence behind sovereign ratings is crucial, given that the government bond market may be vulnerable to multiple equilibria and self-fulfilling prophecies. With this in mind, this paper reviews and scrutinises official Standard & Poor's publications that address key issues surrounding the government bond market and the role of ratings. It presents a lack of competence, revealed in an inadequate grasp of crucial concepts such as multiple equilibria and self-fulfilling prophecy, obliviousness to Standard and Poor's own rating methodology, and a nonchalant treatment of facts that casts a poor light on the agency's integrity.
