This paper provides an empirical assessment of race-to-the-bottom unilateralism. It suggests that decades of unilateral tariff cutting in Asia‟s emerging economies have been driven by a competition to attract FDI from Japan. Using spatial econometrics, I show that tariffs on parts and components, a crucial locational determinant for Japanese firms, converged across countries following a contagion pattern. Tariffs followed those of competing countries if the latter were lower, if FDI jealousy was high, and when competing countries were at a similar level of development.
This paper provides an empirical assessment of race-to-the-bottom unilateralism. It suggests that decades of unilateral tariff cutting in Asia‟s emerging economies have been driven by a competition to attract FDI from Japan. Using spatial econometrics, I show that tariffs on parts and components, a crucial locational determinant for Japanese firms, converged across countries following a contagion pattern. Tariffs followed those of competing countries if the latter were lower, if FDI jealousy was high, and when competing countries were at a similar level of development.
This paper provides an empirical assessment of race-to-the-bottom unilateralism. It suggests that decades of unilateral tariff cutting in Asia‟s emerging economies have been driven by a competition to attract FDI from Japan. Using spatial econometrics, I show that tariffs on parts and components, a crucial locational determinant for Japanese firms, converged across countries following a contagion pattern. Tariffs followed those of competing countries if the latter were lower, if FDI jealousy was high, and when competing countries were at a similar level of development.
This paper provides an empirical assessment of race-to-the-bottom unilateralism. It suggests that decades of unilateral tariff cutting in Asia‟s emerging economies have been driven by a competition to attract FDI from Japan. Using spatial econometrics, I show that tariffs on parts and components, a crucial locational determinant for Japanese firms, converged across countries following a contagion pattern. Tariffs followed those of competing countries if the latter were lower, if FDI jealousy was high, and when competing countries were at a similar level of development.
This paper provides an empirical assessment of race-to-the-bottom unilateralism. It suggests that decades of unilateral tariff cutting in Asia‟s emerging economies have been driven by a competition to attract FDI from Japan. Using spatial econometrics, I show that tariffs on parts and components, a crucial locational determinant for Japanese firms, converged across countries following a contagion pattern. Tariffs followed those of competing countries if the latter were lower, if FDI jealousy was high, and when competing countries were at a similar level of development.
This paper documents the novel fact that Regional Trade Agreements (RTA) decrease bilateral trade imbalances as measured by conventional measure of the net export share in gross trade. While on average an RTA decreases bilateral trade imbalance by 7%, greater trade integration through a deeper RTA is associated with a reduction of up to 50% among the sample of over 160 countries since 1960. This implies, that the recent surge in net trade balances has appeared on behalf of the trade between countries that are not involved in RTA integration. The driving channel is the enhancement of cross-border activity and increase in the global value chain integration among RTA members. Overall, this paper implies that the levels of RTA integration should be accounted for in the assessment of aggregate trade balances as the share of GDP, as trade flows bounded by different level of RTA integration will have different reactions to the same shocks. Additionally, I show that RTAs made trade more balanced among its members, and that global increase in the global trade imbalances happened on the expense of the non-RTA trading partners.
This paper shows that a regional bias resulting from trade integration alters the transmission of a country's monetary policy by shifting the burden of the exchange rate adjustment towards the less integrated trading partners. I first develop a simple model which illustrates how a concentration of trade flows among regional trading partners a↵ects the sensitivity of the trade balance to the terms-of-trade. In particular, the trade balance becomes less sensitive to the terms-of-trade vis-'avis regional partners and more sensitive to the terms-of-trade vis-'a-vis the other country. I then test the implication of the model using a panel of 133 countries between 1985 - 2010 that includes information on Regional Trade Agreements (RTA). I find that movements in the terms-of-trade vis-'a-vis non-RTA members a↵ect a country's trade balance, while movements vis-'a-vis RTA partners do not.
This paper provides an empirical assessment of race-to-the-bottom unilateralism. It suggests that decades of unilateral tariff cutting in Asia‟s emerging economies have been driven by a competition to attract FDI from Japan. Using spatial econometrics, I show that tariffs on parts and components, a crucial locational determinant for Japanese firms, converged across countries following a contagion pattern. Tariffs followed those of competing countries if the latter were lower, if FDI jealousy was high, and when competing countries were at a similar level of development.
This paper provides an empirical assessment of race-to-the-bottom unilateralism. It suggests that decades of unilateral tariff cutting in Asia‟s emerging economies have been driven by a competition to attract FDI from Japan. Using spatial econometrics, I show that tariffs on parts and components, a crucial locational determinant for Japanese firms, converged across countries following a contagion pattern. Tariffs followed those of competing countries if the latter were lower, if FDI jealousy was high, and when competing countries were at a similar level of development.
This paper provides an empirical assessment of race-to-the-bottom unilateralism. It suggests that decades of unilateral tariff cutting in Asia‟s emerging economies have been driven by a competition to attract FDI from Japan. Using spatial econometrics, I show that tariffs on parts and components, a crucial locational determinant for Japanese firms, converged across countries following a contagion pattern. Tariffs followed those of competing countries if the latter were lower, if FDI jealousy was high, and when competing countries were at a similar level of development.
