A new method to retrieve the risk-neutral probability measure from observed option prices is developed and a closed form pricing formula for European options is obtained by employing a modified Gram-Charlier series expansion, known as the Gauss-Hermite expansion. This expansion converges for fat-tailed distributions commonly encountered in the study of financial returns. The expansion coefficients can be calibrated from observed option prices and can also be computed, for example, in models with the probability density function or the characteristic function known in closed form. We investigate the properties of the new option pricing model by calibrating it to both real-world and simulated option prices and find that the resulting implied volatility curves provide an accurate approximation for a wide range of strike prices. Based on an extensive empirical study, we conclude that the new approximation method outperforms other methods both in-sample and out-of-sample.
In this paper we develop a one-factor non-affine stochastic volatility option pricing model where the dynamics of the underlying is endogenously determined from micro-foundations. The interaction and herding of the agents trading the underlying asset induce an amplification of the volatility of the asset over the volatility of the fundamentals. Although the model is non-affine, a closed form option pricing formula can still be derived by using a Gauss-Hermite series expansion methodology. The model is calibrated using S&P 500 index options for the period 1996-2013. When its results are compared to some benchmark models we find that the new non-affine one-factor model outperforms the affine one-factor Heston model and it is competitive, especially out-of-sample, with the affine two-factor double Heston model.
Stock market investment decisions of individuals are positively correlated with that of co-workers. Sorting of unobservably similar individuals to the same workplaces is unlikely to explain our results, as evidenced by the investment behavior of individuals that move between plants. Purchases made under stronger co-worker purchase activity are not associated with higher returns. Moreover, social interaction appears to drive the purchase of within-industry stocks; an investment mistake. Overall, our results suggest a strong influence of co-workers on investment choices, but not an influence that improves the quality of investment decisions.
Making use of a structural model that allows for optimal liquidity management, we study the role that repos play in a bank's financing structure. In our model the bank's assets consist of illiquid loans and liquid reserves and are financed by a combination of repos, long--term debt, deposits and equity. Repos are a cheap source of funding, but they are subject to an exogenous rollover risk. We show that their use adds to the cost of long--term debt financing, which limits the bank's appetite for unstable repo funding. This effect is, however, weakened under poor returns on assets, abundant deposit funding and the depositor preference rule. We also analyze the impact of a liquidity coverage ratio, payout restrictions and a leverage ratio on the bank's financing choices and show that all these tools are able to curb the bank's reliance on repos.
In this paper we analyze which graphical representation of risk is most effective in supporting investors to assess the risk and return characteristics of a fund. Moreover, we test on which criteria the investors base their risk taking behavior. To this end we compare return bar charts and price line charts, combined with some additional information such as a risk scale or a gain and loss range.
We find that the risk communication with bar charts performs relatively well, except with regard to communicating the possibility of losses. Furthermore, we find that people generally underestimate risks and overestimate return. We additionally find that risk perception has the strongest influence on risk taking behavior, and in particular that a higher risk perception leads to less risk taking.
Bhattacharya et al. (2012) shows that many investors are reluctant to accept and follow financial advice. This study analyzes three possibilities which could cause this misbehavior: non-monetary costs, willingness to become informed and comprehensibility of financial information. As so many investors do not accept financial advice, the study further analyzes if it is beneficial to nudge investors to do what is good for them (i.e. a risk profiling task). In order to improve the comprehensibility of financial information, the study further tests if different kinds of investors prefer different kinds of risk description formats. The results show that non-monetary costs and the comprehensibility of financial information are not the reasons why so many investors are reluctant to become informed investors. Moreover, nudging investors to do what is good for them is especially beneficial for investors who are intrinsically insufficiently motivated to become informed and who are financially unexperienced. Last but not least, the data clearly shows that different kinds of investors prefer different kinds of risk description formats.
We investigate price discovery over the 24-hour trading day for equities, currencies, bonds, and commodities. Sizable price discovery occurs around the clock for most assets. For a given asset, intraday risk and return distributions are fairly similar, indicating a broadly constant risk-return-relationship during the day. Although the amount of price discovery varies significantly during the day and differs across assets, price discovery is generally efficient around the clock. Most assets do not exhibit the U-shaped intraday volatility pattern that has been documented for US equities, even if only main trading hours are considered. Intraday spikes in volatility are driven by the open or close of the market for the respective asset or other assets and by macroeconomic announcements. Both diffusion and jump risk are important drivers of intraday volatility patterns, and US macroeconomic news account for a sizable fraction of jump-driven volatility. For some -- but not all -- assets, the relationship between volume and volatility that can generally be observed during the trading day does not hold at the time of jumps, suggesting that traders anticipate large price moves at the time of scheduled announcements and market depth falls accordingly.
We use an early episode of negotiations between Switzerland and the European Union to investigate the value of banking secrecy for four Swiss banks: two universal banks and two private banks. We nd that the value of banking secrecy to private banks is large, accounting for at least 8 to 14% of their market value. Perhaps surprisingly, banking secrecy appears to account for only a very small fraction of the market value of the universal banks.
Empirical investigations of analysts forecast surveys concerning earnings realizations find significant time varying biases usually attributed to the analysts liability to cognitive limitations. For example, a positive autocorrelation of analysts forecast errors is commonly explained by analysts underreaction. In this paper we develop a random dynamical system describing the evolution of analysts forecasts and firms prices and show that managerial guidance is capable to explain such inefficiencies in the analysts forecasting behavior. This result is well supported by empirical tests. In particular, we find that the managers of growth firms guide stronger than the managers of value firms, which allows further conclusions on the precision and efficiency of earnings forecasts released for value and growth stocks in line with the literature.
