This paper introduces three methodological advances to study the optimal design of static and dynamic markets. First, we apply a mechanism design approach to characterize all incentive-compatible market equilibria. Second, we conduct a normative analysis, i.e. we evaluate alternative competition and innovation policies from a welfare perspective. Third, we introduce a reliable way to measure competition in dynamic markets with non-linear pricing. We illustrate the usefulness of our approach in several ways. We reproduce the empirical finding that innovation levels are higher in markets with lower price-cost margins, yet such markets are not necessarily more competitive. Indeed, we prove the Schumpeterian conjecture that more dynamic markets characterized by higher levels of innovation should be less competitive. Furthermore, we demonstrate how our approach can be used to determine the optimal combination of market regulation and innovation policies such as R&D subsidies or a weakening of the patent system. Finally, we show that optimal markets are characterized by strictly positive price-cost margins.
The results of a new experimental study reveal highly systematic violations ofnexpected utility theory. The pattern of these violations is exactly the opposite of thenclassical common ratio effect discovered by Allais (1953). Two recent decision theories—nstochastic expected utility theory (Blavatskyy, 2007) and perceived relative argumentnmodel (Loomes, 2008)—predicted the existence of a reverse common ratio effect. However, these theories can rationalize only one part of the new experimental data reported in this paper. The other part appears to be neither predicted by existing theories nor documented in the existing empirical studies.
Although Unified Growth Theory presumes the existence of the Maltusian mechanism in pre-industrial England recent empirical studies challenged this assumption. This paper studies the interaction of vital rates and real wages in the period from 1540 to 1870 in England. We employ time-varying VARs, an approach which addresses potential shortcomings such as parameter instability and declining volatilities in the previous literature. In contrast to recent studies, the main Malthusian mechanisms - the preventive and the positive check - were both at work until the mid-19th century. The preventive check was decreasing and the positive check increasing in importance. Most remarkably, the positive check dominated after the 1750s. The results indicate that instead of disappearing before the advent of the industrial revolution, the Malthusian mechanism rather changed its face over time.
Research on happiness has produced valuable insights into the sources of subjective well-being. A major finding from this literature is that people exhibit a 'baseline' happiness that shows persistent strength over time, and twin studies have shown that genes play a significant role in explaining the variance of baseline happiness between individuals. However, these studies have not identified which genes might be involved. This article presents evidence of a specific gene that predicts subjective well-being. Using data from the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health, we show thatnindividuals with a transcriptionally more efficient version of the serotonin transporter gene (5HTT) are significantly more likely to report higher levels of life satisfaction. Having one or two alleles of the more efficient type raises the average likelihood of being very satisfied with one's life by 8.5% and 17.3%, respectively. This result maynhelp to explain the stable component of happiness and suggests that genetic association studies can help us to better understand individual heterogeneity in subjective well-being.
This paper shows how non-individualistic preferences can be individual fitness maximizing in the presence of general equilibrium externalities. In the model, individuals share an endowment, which can be consumed on its own and/or used as a means of exchange to purchase goods from merchants on the external market if such exists. Assuming that increased consumption means increased individual fitness, we show that inequity-averse behavior with respect to endowment distribution can benan optimal response to merchants' price discrimination and lead to the evolution ofninequity-averse preferences. The findings presented here are supported by empirical evidence on the endogeniety of people's preferences with respect to exposure to market exchange.
Markups vary widely across industries and countries, their heterogeneity has increased overtime and asymmetric exposure to international trade seems partly responsible for this phenomenon. In this paper, we study how the entire distribution of markups affects resource misallocation and welfare in a general equilibrium framework encompassing a large class of models with imperfect competition. We then identify conditions under which trade opening, by changing the distribution of markups, may reduce welfare. Our approach is novel both in its generality and in the emphasis on the second moment of the markup distribution. Two broad policy recommendations stand out from the analysis. First, whenever there is heterogeneity in markups, be it due to trade or other distortions, there is also an intersectoral misallocation, so that the equilibrium can be improved upon with an appropriate intervention. This suggests that trade liberalization and domestic industrial policy are complementary. Second, ensuring free entry is a crucial precondition to prevent adverse effects from asymmetric trade opening.
We suggest a probabilistic voting model where voters’ preferences for alternative public goods display habit formation. Current policies determine habit levels and in turn the future preferences of the voters. This allows the incumbent to act strategically in order to influence the probability of reelection.nComparing to a benchmark case of a certain reelection, we demonstrate that the incumbent’s optimal policy features both a more polarized allocation between the alternative public goods and a debt bias.
In recent years, a number of governments and consumer groups in rich countries have tried to discourage the use of child labor in poor countries through measures such as product boycotts and the imposition of international labor standards. The purported objective of such measures is to reduce the incidence of child labor in developing countries and thereby improve children’s welfare. In this paper, we examine the effects of such policies from a political-economy perspective. We show that these types of international action on child labor tend to lower domestic political support within developing countries for banning child labor. Hence, international labor standards and product boycotts may delay the ultimate eradication ofnchild labor.
Nations have historically sought power and prosperity through control of physical space. In recent decades, however, territorial empire has largely ceased. Most states that can take and hold territory no longer appear eager to do so, while the weak are unable to expand. Have powerful countries become 'kinder and gentler', or has something fundamental changed about the logic of empire? We offer a theory of imperialism and decolonization that explains both historic cycles of expansion and decline and the demise of the urge to colonize. Technological shocks enable expansion, while military technology gradually disseminates, diluting imperial advantage. At the same time, economic development has led to a secular decline in the payoffs for appropriating land, minerals, and reluctant labor. Once conquest no longer pays for great powers, the systemic imperative to vertically integrate production also becomes archaic.
We develop a theory of corporate liquidity demand, capturing the fact that a firm'snborrowing capacity depends on news on future investment profitability. In our model, bad news on future investment profitability reduces a firm's borrowing capacity and therefore increases the need for internal finance. Consequently, the firm's cash savings respond negatively to news on future profitability. This negative correlation is strongly supported by our empirical evidence using a combined data set of Compustat and IBES. Moreover, both our simulation and empirical results show that the sensitivity of cash savings to news on future profitability is a reliable indicator of the presence of financial constraints at firm level.
