Since its creation in 1995, twenty new Members have acceded to the World Trade Organization (WTO). On 13 October 2004, Cambodia became the WTO’s 148th member, almost 10 years after it had first applied and just over a year after its membership package was approved at the Cancún Ministerial Conference. Cambodia is the second least developed country (LDC) to join the WTO, following Nepal’s accession on 23 April 2004.
Countries applying for WTO membership have to face a complex and, in most cases, long process. Some applications date back to the late 1980s (e.g., Algeria) or early 1990s (e.g., Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Saudi Arabia). Applicants often need to implement substantive reforms to align their domestic institutions and policies with WTO disciplines. Most developing countries lack the capacity to engage effectively in these negotiations due to the absence of trained personnel, not to mention institutional and financial constraints. It is worth noting that currently roughly one-third of the 29 governments in the process of accession represent LDCs (see Annex I for a list of current applicants).
As illustrated by the experiences of China, and more recently, Cambodia, WTO accession can be an effective lever to promote trade liberalization and substantive regulatory reform. Yet, there is a generalized perception that the process is too cumbersome and onerous for acceding countries. Notwithstanding, these concerns the demand for WTO accession remains strong and the goal of WTO “universalization” is often referred to by most Member countries as a worthwhile objective.
In this note, we discuss the experience of developing countries with the WTO accession process and highlight the implications for policymakers in applicant countries and in existing WTO members.
If trade diplomats thought they knew one thing, it was how to cut industrial tariffs. Yet the Doha deadlock rests squarely on the inability to compromise on industrial tariff cuts. This column says that the arguments made for higher levels of ambition don't stand up to much scrutiny and should not be allowed to provide a basis for a continuing impasse.
One recurring concern in the debate over the efficacy of enacting competition laws in developing countries is that its enforcement may compromise important industrial policy goals. This concern has been raised in regional fora and in multilateral organizations such as the World Trade Organization, where officials have considered the pros and cons of including competition provisions in international trade agreements. However, the concern is broader and often national debates over the merits of adopting a competition law touch on the implications for the operation of national industrial policies. In fact, as the chapters in this book on China, Malaysia, and Vietnam attest the apparent primacy given to industrial policy has substantially colored recent debates over whether to adopt a competition law. Given the recent upturn in interest in industrial policy in Europe and in Latin America, and the considerable dissatisfaction with the Washington Consensus elsewhere in the developing world, the discussion in this chapter will also be of interest to scholars and policymakers outside of East Asia. In Europe, none other than the European Commissioner for Industry was reported in January 2005 as calling for the re-evaluation of the way in which prospective mergers and acquisitions are reviewed (a form of competition law enforcement) so as to bolster international competitiveness, which is a traditional industrial policy goal.
Many aspects of globalization have captured worldwide attention in the 1990s, including capital flows, migration, and environmental issues. But for more than a century, the driving force behind globalization has been the expansion of trade in goods and services. And throughout the early decades of the 21st century, trade will continue to drive global integration, especially among developing countries.
