The impact of intra-team pay dispersion on team productivity is a highly discussed issue. On the one hand, wage differentials provide incentives for higher employee effort. On the other hand, pay inequality may reduce team cohesiveness and increase feelings of relative deprivation leading to lower performance. Analysing nonlinear effects of wage dispersion in professional soccer, we find empirical evidence that team performance is strongest when there is either very high or very low wage inequality. Medium levels produce the weakest team performance. In addition, we show that the pay structure affects the team's playing style even after controlling for team and coach heterogeneity. We discuss the theoretical and managerial implications as well as the limits of generalization.
Professional football clubs earn most of their revenues from four sources: sale of broadcasting
rights, matchday revenues, merchandising, and sponsorship. The relative importance of these
sources differs among clubs and leagues.
Economists often argue that the ability of
professional football clubs to generate revenues depends to a large extent on their legal
structure. In this paper we analyze the effect of different legal structures, such as private
company, public company, members’ association, on sponsorship. Based on the platform
theory we introduce a model of value creation in professional football. After elaborating the
property rights situation for each of the legal structures we show the direct and indirect effects
on the generation of sponsorship revenues. We theoretically proof the members’ association
to be the favorable legal structure with regard to sponsorship. The lack of hold-up risks for the
stakeholders and the strong position of the fans are the major reasons for the superiority of
this non-profit legal structure.
Using an international sample of 222 banks from 41 countries, this study examines whether the fair value option (FVO) affects earnings volatility. Prior empirical studies associate higher levels of earnings volatility with fair value accounting (Barth et al. 1995; Hodder et al. 2006). In contrast, I find evidence that banks applying the FVO to reduce accounting mismatches exhibit lower earnings volatility than other banks. I assign this alternative outcome to the optional characteristic of the FVO. Banks can use the flexibility in accounting to reduce artificial earnings volatility. The cross-sectional results are robust against outliers and several model alterations, including controls for endogeneity bias. Furthermore, I predict and find that banks from countries with high regulatory quality are more likely to apply the FVO to reduce accounting mismatches. Overall, the findings confirm the IASB’s initial intention on introducing the FVO. Hence, the study contributes to the current debate on the use of fair values in financial reporting.
