Publications des institutions partenaires
When Are Market Crashes Driven by Speculation?
A natural conjecture is that speculative trade disappears when individual beliefs become correct through learning. Sandroni in [22] gives a counterexample in an economy with sunspots. We generalizenSandroni's result by showing that the conjecture holds for economies with complete markets only. We consider a standard finite-horizon General Equilibrium model with complete markets...
Institution partenaire
English / 01/08/2004
Existence and Global Attractivity of Stable Solutions in Neural Networks
The present paper shows that a sufficient condition for the existence of a stable solution to an autoregressive neural network model is the continuity and boundedness of the activation function of the hidden units in the multi layer perceptron (MLP). In addition, uniqueness of a stable solution is ensured by global lipschitzness and some conditions on the parameters of the system. In...
Institution partenaire
English / 01/08/2004
Why the Olympics have three prizes and not just one
There are at least two reasons why multiple prizes can be optimal in symmetric imperfectly discriminating contests. First, the introduction of multiple prizes reduces the standard deviation of contestants' effort in asymmetric equilibria, when the majority of contestants actively participate in competition. Second, the introduction of multiple prizes may increase the aggregate (...
Institution partenaire
English / 01/08/2004
Are stock markets really like beauty contests? Empirical evidence of higher order belief's impact on asset prices
The goal of this paper is to assess, for the first time, the empirical impact of "Keynes’ beauty contest", or "higher order beliefs", on asset price volatility. The paper shows that heterogeneous expectations induce higher order beliefs and that heterogeneous expectation asset pricing models theoretically generate more volatility than rational expectation models....
Institution partenaire
English / 01/08/2004
Yes, Managers Should be Paid Like Bureaucrats
"Corporate scandals, reflected in excessive management compensation and fraudulent accounts, cause great damage. Agency theory’s insistence to link the compensation of mangers and directors as closely as possible to firm performance is a major reason for these scandals.nThey cannot be overcome by improving variable pay for performance as selfish extrinsicnmotivation is...
Institution partenaire
English / 01/07/2004
Mergers under Asymmetric Information Is there a Lemons Problem?
We analyze a Bayesian merger game under two-sided asymmetric information about firm types. We show that the standard prediction of the lemons market model–if any, only low-type firms are traded–is likely to be misleading: Merger returns, i.e. the difference between pre- and post-merger profits, are not necessarily higher for low-type firms. This has two implications. First, under...
Institution partenaire
English / 01/07/2004
Beyond Outcomes: Measuring Procedural Utility (final version)
"People not only obtain utility from actual outcomes but also from the conditions which lead to these outcomes. The paper proposes an economic concept of this notion of procedural utility. Preferences beyond outcome can be manifold. We distinguish proceduralnutility people get from institutions as such, i.e. from how allocative and redistributive decisions are taken, procedural...
Institution partenaire
English / 01/06/2004
Happiness Research: State and Prospects
This paper intends to provide an evaluation of where the economic research on happiness stands and in which interesting directions it might develop. First, the current state of the research on happiness in economics is briefly discussed. We emphasize the potential of happiness research in testing competing theories of individual behavior. Second, the crucial issue of causality is...
Institution partenaire
English / 01/06/2004
Fairness and Incentives in a Multi-Task Principal-Agent Model
This paper reports on a two-task principal-agent experiment in which only one task is contractible. The principal can either offer a piece-rate contract or a (voluntary) bonus to the agent. Bonus contracts strongly outperform piece rate contracts. Many principals reward high efforts on both tasks with substantial bonuses. Agents anticipate this and provide high efforts on both tasks...
Institution partenaire
English / 01/06/2004
Distrust - The Hidden Cost of Control
We show experimentally that a principal's distrust in the voluntary performance of an agent has a negative impact on the agent's motivation to perform well. Before the agent chooses his performance, the principal in our experiment decides whether he wants to restrict the agents' choice set by implementing a minimum performance level for the agent. Since both parties...
Institution partenaire
English / 01/06/2004
Approval of Equal Rights and Gender Differences in Well-Being
"Women earn less than men but are not less satisfied with life. This paper argues that norms on the appropriate pay for women compared to men explain thesenfindings. We take citizens’ approval of an equal rights amendment to the Swissnconstitution as a proxy for the norm that “women and men shall have the right to equal pay for work of equal value”. We...
Institution partenaire
English / 01/06/2004
Income and Happiness: New Results from Generalized Threshold and Sequential Models
Empirical studies on the relationship between income and happiness commonly use standard ordered response models, the most well-known representatives being the ordered logit and the ordered probit. However, these models restrict the marginal probability effects by design, and therefore limit the analysis of distributional aspects of a change in income, that is, the study of whether...
Institution partenaire
English / 01/06/2004
Measuring and comparing the (in)efficiency of German and Swiss hospitals
A nonparametric data envelopment analysis (DEA) is performed on hospitals in the federal state of Saxony (Germany) and in Switzerland. This study is of interest from three points of view. First, contrary to most existing work, patient days are not treated as an output but as an input. Second, the usual DEA assumption of a homogeneous sample is tested and rejected for a large part of...
Institution partenaire
English / 17/05/2004
Evolutionary Portfolio Selection with Liquidity Shocks
Insurance companies invest their wealth in financial markets. The wealth evolution strongly depends on the success of their investment strategies, but also on liquidity shocks which occur during unfavourable years, when indemnities to be paid to thenclients exceed collected premia. An investment strategy that does not take liquidity shocks into account, exposes insurance companies to...
Institution partenaire
English / 01/05/2004
Liquidity, Information, and the Overnight Rate
We model the interbank market for overnight credit with heterogeneous banks and asymmetric information. An unsophisticated bank justntrades to compensate its liquidity imbalance, while a sophisticated bank willnexploit its private information about the liquidity situation in the market. It is shown that with positive probability, the liquidity effect (Hamilton, 1997) is reversed, i.e...
Institution partenaire
English / 01/05/2004
Existence of Sunspot Equilibria and Uniqueness of Spot Market Equilibria: The Case of Intrinsically Complete Markets
We consider economies with additively separable utility functions and give conditions for the two-agents case under which the existencenof sunspot equilibria is equivalent to the occurrence of the transfer paradox.nThis equivalence enables us to show that sunspots cannot matter if the initial economy has a unique spot market equilibrium and there are only twoncommodities or if the...
Institution partenaire
English / 01/05/2004
Signaling, Globality, and the Intuitive Criterion
A global signaling game is a sender-receiver game in which the sender is only imperfectly informed about the receiver's preferences. The paper considers an economically relevant class of signaling games that possessnmore than one Perfect Bayesian equilibrium. For this class of games, it is shown that a Perfect Bayesian equilibrium is una®ected by a small perturbation of the...
Institution partenaire
English / 01/05/2004
Innovation and risk selection in deregulated social health insurance
One important motive for deregulating social health insurance is to encourage product innovation. For the first time, the cost savings achieved by non-US managed care plans that are attributable to product innovation are estimated, using a novel approach. Panel data from a major Swiss health insurer permits to infer health status, which can be used to predict health care expenditure...
Institution partenaire
English / 24/04/2004
Forschungsstarke Hochschulen haben einen Startvorteil
Im Gegensatz zu den USA ist die schweizerische Hochschullandschaft noch immer alles andere als hierarchisiert. Professor Egon Franck ist überzeugt, dass sich dies indes durch die BolognaReform ändern wird. Mit dem Ordinarius für Betriebswirtschaftslehre an der Universität Zürich unterhielt sich NZZRedaktor Jan Mühlethaler.
Institution partenaire
Deutsch / 20/04/2004
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