Exporting firms do not only decide how much of their products they ship abroad but also at which frequency. Doing so, they face a trade-off between saving on fixed costs per shipments (by shipping large amounts infrequently) and saving on storage costs (by delivering just in time with small and frequent shipments). The firm's optimal choice defines a mapping from size and frequency of shipments to fixed costs per shipment. We use a unique dataset of Swiss cross-border trade on the transaction level to analyze the size and shape of the underlying fixed costs. The data suggest that for the average Swiss exporter the fixed costs per shipment are economically important: about one percent of the value of export or at a net present value of 7790 CHF. We document that the imputed fixed costs per shipment correlate negatively with language commonalities, trade agreements and geographic proximity.
This paper aims to provide the first evidence concerning the relationship between time ans risk preferences and illegal migration in an African context. Based upon our theoretical model and using a unique data set on potential migrants collected in urban Senegal, we evaluate a measure of time and risk preferences through the individual's intertemporal discount rate and coefficient of absolute risk aversion. Remarkably, our results show that these individual preferences matter in the willingness to migrate illegally and to pay a smuggler.
We revisit the simultaneous equations model of rebellion, mobilization, grievances and repression proposed by Gurr and Moore (1997). Our main contribution is to clarify and improve on the underlying identification strategy and to emphasize the role played by the institutional environment. Instrumental variables estimates for post-colonial societies reveal that the strength of the state, as proxied empirically by an index of bureaucratic quality, exerts a strong preventive effect on rebellion. On the other hand, working institutions also influence the likelihood of rebellion indirectly, through mobilization. As such, the total net effect of state capacity on rebellion is ambiguous.
The cross-border flows of goods, investment, services, know-how and people associated with international production networks–call it ‘supply-chain trade’ for short–has transformed the world. The WTO has not kept pace. This paper argues that adapting world trade governance to the realities of supply-chain trade will require a new organization–a WTO 2.0 as it were. Reasoning on the optimal nature of the new organization is based on the nature of supply-chain trade, the nature of the disciplines that underpin it, and the nature of the gains from cooperation.
