A growing body of literature has highlighted two important caveats to the credit-to-GDP gap as advocated by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS). The first relates to the approach used to normalise credit (i.e., dividing nominal credit by GDP). In this regard, critics have argued that a normalised measure of credit runs the risk of being affected by GDP movements that may or may not be relevant. The second relates to the use of the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter to estimate the gap's trend component. In this regard, critics have emphasised several measurement problems associated with using the HP filter. In this paper, we assess the relevance of these critiques for Switzerland. While we find no compelling evidence suggesting a need to deviate from using the BIS gap as a reliable excess credit measure, our findings do emphasise the need to interpret its signal with caution, particularly during long-lasting boom phases and subsequent bust phases. In these situations in particular, authorities should strengthen their decision-making frameworks with additional credit relevant indicators.
We study the tightness of the link between U.S. monetary and macroeconomic communication events and the exchange rate movements against the USD of four major currencies - the euro, the Swiss franc, the Brazilian real and the Mexican peso - since the global financial crisis (GFC). We find three main results. Approximately 20 percent of the U.S. communications events were associated with statistically significant exchange rate effects. Unconventional and conventional monetary policy announcements had equal impacts. The reactions of the advanced countries' currencies were more in line with each another than with those of the emerging markets' currencies.
We analyze the economic impact of central banks sensed by business executives in a sample of 61 countries from 1998 to 2016. Based on a survey conducted by the Institute for Management Development (IMD), we find compelling evidence that intensive central bank communication worsens the perceived impact. During the global financial crisis (GFC), this effect became even stronger. In contrast, economic growth and a positive output gap improve the opinion executives have of their central bank's impact on the economy. Moreover, although less robustly, higher unemployment, and higher short-term interest rates worsen executives' opinion, while market uncertainty improves it. The level of inflation and an inflation targeting regime, central bank independence and transparency, financial crises, the zero lower bound constraint, forward guidance, the performance of the stock exchange, and the volatility of the exchange rate seem to be unimportant in this regard.
