"Sovereign debt crises in emerging markets are usually associated with liquidity and banking crises within the economy. This connection is suggested by both anecdotical and empirical evidence. The conventional view is that the domestic financial turmoil is caused by foreign creditors' retaliation. Yet, there is no clear-cut evidence supporting the existence of 'classic' default penalties (e.g., trade sanctions or exclusion from international capital markets). This paper then proposes a novel mechanism linking sovereign defaults with liquidity and banking crises without any intervention of foreign creditors. The model considers a standard unwillingness-to-pay problem assuming that: (i) the enforcement of private contracts is limited and, as a result, public debt represents a source of liquidity; (ii) the government cannot discriminate between domestic and foreign agents. In this setting, the prospect of drying up the private sector's liquidity restores the ex-post incentive to pay of the government without any need to assume foreign penalties. Nonetheless, liquidity crises might arise when economic conditions deteriorate and the government chooses opportunistically to default in order to avoid the repayment of foreign agents. The interaction between the enforcement friction and sovereign risk is then exploited to study the implications on international capital flows and legal and institutional domestic reforms."
Historical evidence suggests that poor population groups are more likely to engage in conflict. We construct a theoretical model of the choice between appropriation and production. Fully specified production functions allow for both symmetrical outcomes and for introducing inequalities in abilities and endowments. It is examined under what conditions income and capital redistribution, as well as education, health and poverty-alleviation spending reduce the incentives for appropriation. Empirical evidence is presented that is consistent with the theory.
Awards—widespread in the corporate sector and elsewhere—are motivators that derive their value from non-pecuniary concerns such as status and self-image. Quasi-experimental panel data from the call center of a large international bank allow us to estimate the causal impact on effort when receiving an award. The performance of winners proves to be significantly higher than that of comparable nonrecipients after the award has been presented. This increase in work effort is sizeable and robust. We investigate the various theories that could explain the change in behavior. We find that image concerns most likely drive the effect.
Public agencies rely on two key modes to procure goods and services: auctions and direct negotiations. The relative advantages of these two modes are still imperfectly understood. This paper therefore studies public procurement of regional passenger railway services in Germany, where regional agencies can use auctions and negotiations to procure regional passenger rail services. This offers the unique opportunity to assess the two procurement modes within the same institutional and legal framework. We first characterize the decisions of the agency in a simple reduced form framework of negotiations and auctions. This analysis suggests accounting for the endogeneity of the choice of procurement mode by estimating the mode of procurement, quantity and price simultaneously. We then test this framework using information on lines that were auctioned and lines that were directly negotiated with the former monopolist. Results indicate (i) endogeneity of procurement choice can be fully characterized by observed line characteristics;(ii) frequency of service is 16 percent higher on lines that were auctioned compared to lines that were negotiated, and (iii) the procurement price is 25 percent lower on auctioned lines than on those with direct negotiations. Taken together, these results indicate a significant efficiency enhancing effect of auctions.
This article presents the first attempt to formalize the optimization of experimental design with the aim of comparing models of brain function based on neuroimaging data. We demonstrate our approach in the context of Dynamic Causal Modelling (DCM), which relates experimental manipulations to observed network dynamics (via hidden neuronal states) and provides an inference framework for selecting among candidate models. Here, we show how to optimize the sensitivity of model selection by choosing among experimental designs according to their respective model selection accuracy. Using Bayesian decision theory, we (i) derive the Laplace-Chernoff risk for model selection, (ii) disclose its relationship with classical design optimality criteria and (iii) assess its sensitivity to basic modelling assumptions. We then evaluate the approach when identifying brain networks using DCM. Monte-Carlo simulations and empirical analyses of fMRI data from a simple bimanual motor task in humans serve to demonstrate the relationship between network identification and the optimal experimental design. For example, we show that deciding whether there is a feedback connection requires shorter epoch durations, relative to asking whether there is experimentally induced change in a connection that is known to be present. Finally, we discuss limitations and potential extensions of this work.
We examine a “Rotten Kid” model (Becker 1974) where a player with social preferences interacts with an egoistic player. We assume that social preferences are intentionbased rather than outcome-based. In a very general multi-stage setting we show that any equilibrium must involve mutually unkind behavior of both players, endogenously generating negative rather than positive emotions. In a large class of two-stage games that includes principal-agent and gift-giving games, this prevents the equilibrium from being materially Pareto efficient. Compared to the subgame-perfect equilibrium without social preferences, efficiency is still generally increased. On the other hand, the materialistic player has lower whereas the reciprocal player has higher material payoffs, so that reciprocity does not increase equity: For sufficiently strong reciprocity concerns, the materialistic player ends up with a negligible share of the gains from trade.
The economic concept of the second-best involves the idea that multiple simultaneous deviations from a hypothetical first-best optimum may be optimal once the first-best itself can no longer be achieved, since one distortion may partially compensate for another. Within an evolutionary framework, we translate this concept to behavior under uncertainty. We argue that the two main components of prospect theory, the value function and the probability weighting function, are complements in the second-best sense. Previous work has shown that an adaptive S-shaped value function may be evolutionary optimal if decision-making is subject to cognitive or perceptive constraints. We show that distortions in the way probabilities are perceived can further enhance fitness. The second-best optimum involves overweighting of small and underweighting of large probabilities. Behavior as described by prospect theory might therefore be evolution's second-best solution to the fitness maximization problem. We discuss under which circumstance our model makes empirically testable predictions about the relation between individuals' value and probability weighting functions.
A continuous and a discrete rating scale were implemented for a single item happiness question in a representative survey. A randomized controlled experiment enables unique analyses on data quality and distributions, which suggest superiority of the continuous scale. Results raise doubts about earlier inferences drawn on correlates of happiness. So far only self-assessed discrete happiness data have been used for research into the determinants of happiness. However, distribution distortions were found for the numerically labeled discrete scale, especially for women. Through this discretization bias, the widely reported gender happiness inequality puzzle can be explained.
We analyze the fertility and health effects resulting from the abolition of the Austrian baby bonus in January 1997. The abolition of the benefit was publicly announced about ten months in advance, creating the opportunity for prospective parents to (re-)schedule conceptions accordingly. We find robust evidence that, within the month before the abolition, about 8% more children were born as a result of (re-)scheduling conceptions. At the same time, there is no evidence that mothers deliberately manipulated the date of birth through medical intervention. We also find a substantial and significant increase in the fraction of birth complications, but no evidence for any resulting adverse effects on newborns' health.
This paper studies the evolution of life satisfaction over the life course in Germany. It clarifies the causal interpretation of the econometric model by discussing the choice of control variables and the underidentification between age, cohort and time effects. The empirical part analyzes the distribution of life satisfaction over the life course at the aggregated, subgroup and individual level. To the findings: On average, life satisfaction is mildly decreasing up to age fifty-five followed by a hump shape with a maximum at seventy. The analysis at the lower levels suggests that people differ in their life satisfaction trends, whereas the hump shape after age fifty-five is robust. No important differences between men and women are found. In contrast, education groups differ in their trends: highly educated people become happier over the life cycle, where life satisfaction decreases for less educated people.
