How does risk tolerance vary with stake size? This important question cannot be adequately answered if framing effects, nonlinear probability weighting, and heterogeneity of preference types are neglected. We show that, contrary to gains, no coherent change in relative risk aversion is observed for losses. The increase in relative risk aversion over gains cannot be captured by the curvature of the utility function. It is driven predominantly by a change in probability weighting of a majority group of individuals who exhibit more rational probability weighting at high stakes. These results not only challenge expected utility theory, but also prospect theory.
It has long been recognized that there is considerable heterogeneity in individual risk taking behavior but little is known about the distribution of risk taking types. We present a parsimonious characterization of risk taking behavior by estimating a finite mixture regression model for three different experimental data sets, two Swiss and one Chinese, over a large number of real gains and losses. We find two distinct types of individuals: In all three data sets, the choices of roughly 80% of the subjects exhibit significant deviations from rational probability weighting consistent with prospect theory. 20% of the subjects weight probabilities linearly and behave essentially as expected value maximizers. Moreover, the individuals are assigned to one of these two groups with probabilities of close to one resulting in a low measure of entropy. The reliability and robustness of our classification suggest using a mix of preference theories in applied economic modeling.
We consider sample covariance matrices constructed from real or complex i.i.d. variates with finite 12th moment. We assume that the population covariance matrix is positive definite and its spectral measure almost surely converges to some limiting probability distribution as the number of variables and the number of observations go to infinity together, with their ratio converging to a finite positive limit. We quantify the relationship between sample and population eigenvectors, by studying the asymptotics of a broad family of functionals that generalizes the Stieltjes transform of the spectral measure. This is then used to compute the asymptotically optimal bias correction for sample eigenvalues, paving the way for a new generation of improved estimators of the covariance matrix and its inverse.
Volunteer work is an increasingly large, yet ill-understood sector of the economy. We show that monetary rewards undermine the intrinsic motivation of volunteers. A unique data set from Switzerland allows us to assess the effects of financial rewards on the effort put into volunteer work. There is a fairly standard pattern regarding the volunteers reaction e.g. to more labor market work hours. But we obtain the puzzling result that, when rewarded, volunteers work less. These findings are in line with a large literature in social psychology emphasizing that external rewards can undermine the intrinsic motivation for an activity. We show the implications for public policy towards volunteering.
This paper studies the effect of financial booms and extreme asset valuations on the relative demand for skills and the wage structure. The substantial rise in wage inequality in the U.S. since the late 1970s has been accompanied by a major expansion of financial services, a series of asset bubbles, and rising relative wages and relative education in the financial industry. I motivate and develop a theoretical framework where financial institutions benefit from financial booms and asset bubbles. Yet the complexity and novelty of financial products and fundamentals surrounding bubbles favor the supremacy of skilled individuals in exploiting these opportunities. Hence financial booms increase opportunities for skilled labor, contributing to the rise in overall wage inequality in the economy. Simple extensions of the basic framework allow us to study the implications of financial regulation and globalization of financial services, as well as further topics. Finally, the paper documents and compares relative wage and employment patterns in the U.S., U.K., Germany, and France, providing suggestive evidence for the theoretical framework.
This paper explores the labor supply effects of a large-scale policy change in the Austrian disability insurance program, which tightened eligibility criteria for men above a certain age. Using administrative data on the universe of Austrian private-sector employees, the results of difference-in-difference type regressions suggest a substantial and statistically significant decline in disability enrollment of 5-5.7 percentage points and a modest increase in employment of 1.4 to 2.7 percentage points. On the other hand, the policy change had important spillover effects into the unemployment and sickness insurance program. Specifically, the share of individuals receiving unemployment benefits increased roughly by 3 percentage points and the share receiving sickness insurance benefits by 0.6 percentage points.
We study the long-run effects of initial labor market conditions on wages for a large sample of male individuals entering the Austrian labor market between 1978 and 2000. We find a robust negative effect of unfavorable entry conditions on starting wages. This initial effect turns out to be quite persistent and even though wages do catch up later on, large effects on lifetime earnings result. We also show that initial labor market conditions have smaller and less persistent effects for blue-collar workers than for white-collar workers. We further show that some of the long-run adjustment takes place through changes in job-mobility and employment patterns as well as in job tenure. Finally, we find that adjustments at the aggregate level are key to explain wages' adjustment process in the longer run.
This paper identifies simple conditions for monotone comparative statics of a unique equilibrium in the Akerlof-Wilson model. Separate conditions apply to trade volume and price. Trade volume increases when supply becomes both stronger and more elastic. In contrast, price decreases when supply becomes both stronger and less elastic. An application to the interbank market suggests surprisingly specific measures to address elevated term rates and market breakdown.
Since information asymmetries have been identified as an important source of bank profits, it may seem that the establishment of information sharing will lead to lower investment in acquiring information. However, banks base their decisions on both hard and soft information, and it is only the former type of data that can be communicated credibly. We show that when hard information is shared, banks will invest more in soft, relationship-specific information. These will lead to more accurate lending decisions, favor small, informationally opaque borrowers, and increase welfare. Since relationship banking focuses on the usage of soft information, the model implies that investment in relationship banking will increase. We test our theory using a large sample of firm-level data from 24 countries.
