Individuals sort into and out of economic environments based on their preferences and in response
to relative prices. We demonstrate the importance of such sorting for the measurement of social
preferences, using two laboratory experiments. First, allowing subjects to avoid environments in
which sharing is possible significantly reduces sharing. This reveals the existence of a type of
individual who shares reluctantly, preferring to avoid the opportunity to share. Second, after
subsidizing the sharing environment, the aggregate amount shared increases, but less is shared, on
average, by those who enter. Thus, subsidies intended to induce more sharing have weak effects
since they attract those who share the least.
Using the business cycle accounting framework [Chari V., P. Kehoe and E. McGrattan 2007. Business Cycle Accounting. Econometrica 75, 781-836.], this paper sheds new light on the French Great Depression. Frictions that reduce the efficiency with which factor inputs are used (efficiency wedge) were the primary factor in the economic downturn. The decline in consumption can be attributed to distortions in the Euler equation (investment wedge). In addition, frictions creating a gap between the marginal rate of substitution and the marginal product of labor (labor wedge) contributed to the slowdown of the economy after 1936. This drop in the efficiency wedge might have resulted from financial frictions and tariff policies, whereas the investment wedge might have been caused by financial frictions due to agency costs. A potential explanation for the decline of the labor wedge after 1936 is institutionals changes in the labor market.
This paper is concerned with the analysis of zero-inflated count data when time of exposure varies. It proposes a new zero-inflated count data model that is based on two homogeneous Poisson processes and accounts for exposure time in a theory consistent way. The new model is used in an application to the effect of insurance generosity on the number of absent days.
We advance the measurement of trust in economics in two ways. First, we highlight the importance of clearly identifying the target of trust, particularly for obtaining concordance between attitudinal and behavioral measures of trust. Second, we introduce a novel behavioral measure of (dis)trust, based on individuals? willingness to pay to avoid being vulnerable to the target of trust. We conduct an experiment in which we vary the target of trust among passersby at several locations around a city, measuring both behavioral distrust and trust attitudes towards these varying targets. We find that subjects discriminate based on perceived characteristics of different targets in determining whether to trust, in a manner consistent with trust elicited using attitudinal measures and with actual trustworthiness. Risk aversion and altruism do not correlate highly with our measure of distrust.
The paper proposes a new estimator for the fixed effects ordered logit model. In contrast to existing methods, the new procedure allows estimating the thresholds. The empirical relevance and simplicity of implementation is illustrated in an application to the effect of unemployment on life satisfaction.
I expose the risk of false discoveries in the context of multiple treatment effects. A false discovery is a nonexistent effect that is falsely labeled as statistically significant by its individual t-value. Labeling nonexistent effects as statistically significant has wide-ranging academic and policy-related implications, like costly false conclusions from policy evaluations. I eexamine an empirical labor market model by using state-of-the art multiple testing methods and I provide simulation evidence. By merely using individual t-values at conventional significance levels, the risk of labeling probably nonexistent treatment effects as statistically significant is unacceptably high. Individual t-values even label a number of treatment effects as significant, whereas multiple testing indicates false discoveries in these cases. Tests of a joint null hypothesis such as the well-known F-test control the risk of false discoveries only to a limited extent and do not optimally allow for rejecting individual hypotheses. Multiple testing methods control the risk of false discoveries in general while allowing for individual decisions in the sense of rejecting individual hypotheses.
This paper studies the effect of leadership on the level and evolution of pro-social behavior using an artefactual field experiment on local public good provision. Participants decide how much to contribute to an actual conservation project. They can then revise their donations after being randomly matched in pairs on the basis of their authority and having observed each other’s contributions. Authority is measured through a social ranking exercise identifying formal and moral leaders within the community. I find that giving by a pair is higher and shows a lower tendency to decrease over time when a leader is part of a pair. This is because higher-ranked pair members in general, and leaders in particular, donate more and are less likely to revise contributions downwards after giving more than their counterparts. Leadership effects are stronger when moral authority is made salient within the experiment, in line with the ethical nature of the decision under study. These findings highlight the importance of identifying different forms of leadership and targeting the relevant leaders in projects aimed at local public good provision.
What determines reciprocity in employment relations? We conducteda controlled field experiment to measure the extent to whichmonetary and non-monetary gifts affect workers’ performance. We findthat non-monetary gifts have a much stronger impact than monetarygifts of equivalent value. We also observe that when workers are offeredthe choice, they prefer receiving money but reciprocate as if theyreceived a non-monetary gift. This result is consistent with the commonsaying, “it’s the thought that counts”. We underline this point byshowing that also monetary gifts can effectively trigger reciprocity ifthe employer invests more time and effort into the gift’s presentation.
